monitoring

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UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE The Task Force recommends a 4‐phase approach for expanded cooperation, each step of which would gradually evolve to “internationalize the transparency inspections.” The Task Force approach could be enabled by expansion of the role of IAEA for assuming responsibility for the transparency responsibilities that ultimately emerge: 1. Bilateral, cooperative developments and evaluations among P‐5 states, building on experience in historic allied partnership programs, as well as the CTR program with Russia; 2. Extension to all nuclear weapon states; 3. Expansion to nuclear materials transparency among major states with nuclear power generation; 4. Negotiation of a future Non‐Proliferation Treaty (NPT “X”) to bring in all nuclear weapon and material programs into a cooperative, multi‐lateral regime. The three lead offices cited should establish a Multi‐Agency Roadmap in partnership with other relevant players in the USG. The effort should be spearheaded by a (U.S.) Mission Manager 20 to drive the realization and coordination for this initiative throughout the development process. Key steps in support of the engagement plan and roadmap include the following: • The activities outlined in the Road Map should be given priority within the participating Agencies, including clear definition of the anticipated step‐by‐step approach to realize the initiative. • The State Department should begin to consult with foreign representatives, in order to prepare for their participation, starting with a rough schedule for joint efforts, and devise measures of effectiveness to ensure success through the distinct phases (P‐5, nuclear weapon states, SNM possessors, etc.) • Blue Team and Red Team efforts 21 should begin and be coordinated from the outset, to ensure that the proposals brought forward can meet the requirements to protect our own (and others) sensitive information from being revealed, while meeting the goals of accurate SNM characterizations. • Major efforts should be mounted to adapt the proposed technologies into use, in the U.S. and in countries worldwide, to ensure that security measures are not compromised for either warheads or materials. (This will entail creativity and flexibility by both the inspected and inspecting parties to ensure that robust security information protection and material protection measures are retained.) • Focused consultations with the U.S. Congress will be needed to ensure that all foreign interactions and participations meet U.S. Atomic Energy Act protections and 20 See Chapter 5 for a more complete discussion on the Mission Manager role. 21 See Chapters 4 and 6 for a more complete discussion on the Blue and Red teaming. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 30 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD | DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE classification constraints, including establishing new Congressional “123” Agreements 22 for participating nations as required. • As the transparency effort emerges, it will be critical to ensure (1) a high level of confidence in, (2) acceptance for use of, and (3) expressions of support for, the efforts by all U.S. departments and agencies responsible for U.S nuclear weapons and for SNM inventories in government and private custody. (The Task Force notes that advance buyin and enthusiastic support for eventual achievement of a Universal Transparency Regime is crucial to prevent “pocket‐vetoes” within the U.S. interagency forums, and later in negotiating the international agreements.) • Finally, the Task Force recommends that a line item budget be sought for this important multi‐year initiative, with dedicated funding for developing the key technology pieces, for creation of the operating systems that will be proposed for joint international use, and the cooperative experiments and trials with foreign nations. Research and Development. DOE/NNSA/NA‐20 should pursue an international R&D program in automated monitoring and reporting systems supported by information barriers and authentication to enable more effective and extensive materials monitoring. Trusted information barriers, capabilities for real‐time process monitoring and in‐field inspection and analysis capabilities should be developed. DoD/Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs ASD(NCB), DTRA, and DOE/NNSA/NA‐10 should partner to develop cooperative options for asymmetric nuclear weapons security paradigms; e.g., • Sharable technical security principles, practices, and technologies for sites, materials, and components • Site declaration and portal monitoring • “Assurance Volume” concepts U.S. Modernization Programs. In anticipation of treaties and agreements with more intrusive inspection regimes, State/AVC, DOE/NNSA, and DoD/AT&L should review current U.S. facility and weapon system modernization programs and instruct program managers, if necessary, to plan for accommodation of greater transparency measures. Methods for red teaming and performing vulnerability assessments should be developed and exercised routinely. 22 Section 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, titled "Cooperation With Other Nations", establishes an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the US and any other nation. Such an agreement is called a 123 Agreement. To date, the U.S. has entered into roughly twenty‐five 123 Agreements with various countries. DSB TASK FORCE REPORT Chapter 2: Cooperative Regimes| 31 Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat UNCLASSIFIED
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