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Examination of Firearms Review: 2007 to 2010 - Interpol

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3.1 Chemical<br />

Chemical warfare agents (CWA) have been used in the past by terrorist<br />

groups as in the case <strong>of</strong> the sarin attack in the Tokyo subway in 1995, but<br />

these high end agents have remained mostly aspirational. The opportunistic<br />

nature <strong>of</strong> most terrorist groups has seen a shift <strong>to</strong>wards using more easily<br />

available <strong>to</strong>xic industrial chemicals in attacks, such as the recent use <strong>of</strong><br />

chlorine in Iraq <strong>to</strong> enhance improvised explosive devices. Other <strong>to</strong>xic<br />

chemicals <strong>of</strong> interest are readily generated gases, pesticides or even heavy<br />

metals such as thallium. 6<br />

3.2 Biological<br />

The 2001 Amerithrax case 7 and aspirations <strong>of</strong> groups like Al Qaida 8 have<br />

brought anthrax in<strong>to</strong> the limelight and many hoaxes, also known as “white<br />

powder incidents”, are based on this fear. However, this agent is not that easy<br />

<strong>to</strong> prepare and forensic investiga<strong>to</strong>rs are more likely <strong>to</strong> encounter other types<br />

<strong>of</strong> biological agents. 9 Plague is a potential bioterrorism agent that cannot be<br />

ignored although several technical hurdles remain. However, many natural<br />

<strong>to</strong>xins such as ricin or abrin are readily prepared and can be used <strong>to</strong> poison<br />

small numbers <strong>of</strong> individuals. In general, such <strong>to</strong>xins are more likely <strong>to</strong> be<br />

used than bacteriological agents such as anthrax, or viruses that are even<br />

harder <strong>to</strong> culture.<br />

3.3 Radiological and nuclear<br />

Although the use <strong>of</strong> a nuclear device by a terrorist group is highly unlikely, the<br />

use <strong>of</strong> radioactive materials <strong>to</strong> cause harm is a much more likely scenario. It is<br />

technically infeasible <strong>to</strong> manufacture radiological material in a clandestine<br />

labora<strong>to</strong>ry as such preparations require access <strong>to</strong> a nuclear reac<strong>to</strong>r.<br />

Nevertheless, the assembly <strong>of</strong> an Radiological Dispersion Device using<br />

illicitly-acquired radioactive material and conventional explosives might be<br />

achieved in a clandestine labora<strong>to</strong>ry.<br />

4. Detection<br />

The greatest concern <strong>to</strong> the investiga<strong>to</strong>r is the hazards <strong>of</strong> the CBRN<br />

environment, hence rapid identification <strong>of</strong> the agent is essential. Information<br />

gathered from the crime scene will help determine the likely impact and risks<br />

<strong>to</strong> crime scene examiners and the general public 10 . However, the need for<br />

personal protective equipment (PPE) can severely limit the capability <strong>of</strong> crime<br />

scene investiga<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>to</strong> gather appropriate and adequate evidence. If CBRN<br />

agents have been released in a public place, there will be pressure <strong>to</strong> rapidly<br />

528

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