1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
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102 Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />
8 (b) (4) (B). In rejecting the contention that the right-of-control<br />
test can no longer be considered of decisive significance in<br />
view of certain language of the Supreme Court in the <strong>National</strong><br />
Woodwork s° opinion, the <strong>Board</strong> pointed out that the Supreme<br />
Court had specifically noted that the right-to-control doctrine<br />
was not before it. In announcing that it would continue to use<br />
the test in appropriate circumstances in determining whether<br />
a secondary boycott exists, the <strong>Board</strong> expressed its view that<br />
the `right-of-control' test . . . is the most readily available analytical<br />
tool in deciding the primary-secondary dichotomy and conforms,<br />
we believe, with the congressional intent in proscribing<br />
secondary boycotts."<br />
The right-of-control test was relied on by the <strong>Board</strong> in Carpet<br />
Layers, Loc. 419, 81 where it found that the union violated section<br />
8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) in picketing a retail department store<br />
in furtherance a the union's dispute with carpet installers whose<br />
services were utilized by the store in installing carpet it sold.<br />
Finding that the installers were independent contractors with<br />
a scope of decision-making power adequate to resolve the underlying<br />
dispute, and that the store was "not sufficiently related<br />
to the contractors to destroy its neutrality," the <strong>Board</strong> concluded<br />
that the picketing was for the unlawful object of forcing the<br />
store to cease doing business with the installers, and therefore<br />
was prohibited secondary activity. In the Local 1066 case, 82 however,<br />
the <strong>Board</strong> found reliance upon the right-of-control test<br />
to be misplaced. There the Massachusetts Port Authority as<br />
operator of a port terminal exercised it reserved option under<br />
published terminal regulations to direct the agent for a steamship<br />
line to have all freight not claimed by the consignee within<br />
the 5-day free-time period removed to a public warehouse. The<br />
union representing the employees of the steamship agent refused<br />
to permit them to effect the transfer of the cargo as directed,<br />
since removal of the unclaimed cargo would eliminate employment<br />
for the clerk crews represented by the union who were<br />
required under the contract to be present with the cargo so long<br />
as it remained on the dock. The <strong>Board</strong> rejected the view that as<br />
the port authority alone had the power to invoke the regulation,<br />
it had the right of control and the steamship agent employer<br />
s° <strong>National</strong> Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. N L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 625; Thirty-second Annual<br />
Report (1967), p. 139. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit expressed the view<br />
that under that decisions the right-of-control was only one of many factors to be weighed,<br />
American Boiler Mfrs. Assn. v. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d 556.<br />
Carpet, Linoleum, Soft Tile & Resilient Floor Covering Layers, Loc. 419 (Sears, Roebuck<br />
& Co.), 176 NLRB No. 120.<br />
s2 Loc. 1066, I.L.A. (Bay State Stevedoring Co.), 175 NLRB No. 5.