1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
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116 Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />
In Sinclair, the <strong>Board</strong> had found that the employer's communications<br />
to the employees had conveyed the message that<br />
the company was in a precarious financial condition, that the<br />
"strike-happy union would in all likelihood have to obtain its<br />
potentially unreasonable demands by striking, the probable result<br />
of which would be a plant shutdown, as the past history<br />
of labor relations in the area indicated, and that the employees<br />
in such a case would have great difficulty finding employment<br />
elsewhere. Applying the standard outlined above, the Court held<br />
that the <strong>Board</strong> was reasonable in concluding "that the intended<br />
and understood import of that message was not to predict that<br />
unionization would inevitably cause the plant to close but to<br />
threaten to throw employees out of work regardless of the<br />
economic realities."<br />
D. Union Fines for Exceeding Production Ceilings<br />
In Scofield, 15 the Supreme Court affirmed the <strong>Board</strong>'s holding<br />
that the union did not violate section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act<br />
by imposing, and bringing court suits to collect, fines against<br />
members who violated a union rule prohibiting the acceptance<br />
of immediate payment for production in excess of a ceiling rate.<br />
The Court noted that, under its prior decisions interpreting<br />
section 8(b) (1) (A), 16 a union is free "to enforce a properly<br />
adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs<br />
no policy which Congress had imbedded in the labor laws, and is<br />
reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave<br />
the union and escape the rule." It found that these conditions<br />
were satisfied in Scofield.<br />
Thus, the Court noted that there was no showing that "the<br />
fines were unreasonable or the mere fiat of a union leader, or<br />
that the membership of [the disciplined employees] in the union<br />
was involuntary." The Court further found that the union ceiling<br />
rule served a legitimate union interest, guarding against competitive<br />
pressure which would endanger workers' health, foment<br />
jealousies, and reduce piece rates and the work force. Moreover,<br />
the union rule neither impeded collective bargaining, nor was it<br />
in derogation of the collective-bargaining agreement. The union<br />
had never refused to bargain about the ceiling, and at various<br />
" Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, affg. 393 F.2d 49 (C.A. 7), which sustained 145 NLRB<br />
1097.<br />
"NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U S. 418, Thirtythird<br />
Annual Report (1968), pp. 135-136; N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175,<br />
Thirty-second Annual Report (1967), p. 138.