1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Supreme Court 115<br />
been necessary to repair the unlawful effect of those threats."<br />
However, in the .three Fourth Circuit cases (Gissel, Heck's, and<br />
General Steel), the <strong>Board</strong> did not make a similar finding, nor did<br />
it find that, "even though traditional remedies might be able to<br />
ensure a fair election, there was insufficient indication that an<br />
election (or a rerun in General Steel)" would definitely be a<br />
more reliable test of the employees' desires than the card count<br />
tak^n before the unfair labor practices occurred." Accordingly,<br />
the Court remanded those cases to the <strong>Board</strong> for further findings.12<br />
C. Antiunion Speeches by Employer<br />
In Sinclair," the Supreme Court considered, in addition to the<br />
authorization card issues discussed above, the scope of protection<br />
which section 8 (c) of the Act 14 and the First Amendment afford<br />
antiunion statements made by an employer in the course of a<br />
union's organizational drive. The Court noted that section 8(c)<br />
recognizes the right of the employer to express to his employees<br />
his views concerning unionization, so long as the communications<br />
do not contain threats of reprisal or promises of benefit. The<br />
employer may even make a prediction as to the precise effects<br />
he believes unionization will have on his company. But, the<br />
Court added: " [T] he prediction must be carefully phrased on the<br />
basis of objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably<br />
probable consequences beyond his control or to convey<br />
a management decision already arrived at to close the plant<br />
in case of unionization. . . . If there is any implication that an<br />
employer may or may not take action solely on his own initiative<br />
for reasons unrelated to economic necessities and known only<br />
to him, the statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based<br />
on available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation<br />
and coercion, and as such without the protection of<br />
the First Amendment" and section 8 (c) .<br />
"The Court approved the <strong>Board</strong>'s Bernet Foam doctrine (146 NLRB 1277 (1969) ),<br />
noting that thereunder "there is nothing inconsistent in the Union's filing an election petition<br />
and thereby agreeing that a question of representation exists, and then filing a refusal-tobargain<br />
charge after the election is lost because of the employer's unfair labor practices."<br />
12 Subsequently, the Court reversed the judgments of the Sixth Circuit enforcing bargaining<br />
orders in three cases—Atka Engine Works v. N.L.R.B., 396 F.2d 775. Thrift Drug Co. of<br />
Pa. V. N.L.R.B., 404 F.2d 1097; and N.L.R.B. v Lou De Young's Market Basket, 406 F.2d<br />
17—and the judgment of the Second Circuit denying enforcement of the bargaining order, in<br />
N.L.R.B. v. Pembeek Oil Corp., 404 F.2d 105, and remanded all four cases to the <strong>Board</strong> for<br />
further consideration in the light of Gissel.<br />
" N.L R B. v Sinclair Co. 395 U S 575.<br />
"Sec. 8(c) reads: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination<br />
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be<br />
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression<br />
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."<br />
P,_ ,W,vy,l 1 ,1 r<br />
FrATTP CR TY<br />
OF THt UNITED STATES GOV ERNMENT<br />
NATIONAL LABOR RE LATIONS 130Apn