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1 - National Labor Relations Board

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In junction Litigation 161<br />

union, it was based upon allegations that the employer's recognition<br />

of the union, on grounds a new unit of employees was an<br />

accretion to an existing unit, was assistance in violation of the<br />

Act, and the union's acceptance of recognition interference with<br />

the employee's right to select their own representative.<br />

1. Standards for Injunctive Relief<br />

The standards under which a court will accord injunctive<br />

relief under section 10(j) in advance of the <strong>Board</strong>'s own resolution<br />

of the issues continued to be 2 a matter of concern to the<br />

courts in cases decided this year. In the Davis & Hemphill case 3<br />

the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's<br />

grant of a temporary injunction under section 10(j) 4 based upon<br />

that court's finding that there was reasonable cause to believe<br />

that the employer had unlawfully refused to bargain with the<br />

certified union. The employer had withdrawn recognition from<br />

the union at a time when it did not have a reasonable basis for<br />

a doubt of the union's majority status and had begun hiring<br />

replacements for his employees striking in protest of his action.<br />

The court of appeals, finding a close relationship between the<br />

standards for grant of an injunction under section 10(j) and<br />

that applicable to injunctions under section 10(e), held that,<br />

as under 10(e), relief under 10(j) required not only a finding<br />

of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Act had<br />

occurred, but also a finding that injunctive relief was just and<br />

proper because "under the circumstances the remedial purposes<br />

of the Act would be frustrated unless temporary relief was<br />

granted." In reference to the "reasonable cause" finding the court<br />

noted that "the standard on review is the usual one applicable<br />

to district court findings of fact: the finding will stand unless<br />

clearly erroneous. We inquire only whether there has been a<br />

sufficient showing by the <strong>Board</strong> to raise a substantial question<br />

of a violation of the Act." On the matter of "just and proper"<br />

relief, the court concluded that in view of the overriding importance<br />

of protecting the bargaining process and relationship,<br />

interim relief was required since the employer's coercive actions<br />

were diminishing union support, and if continued would cause<br />

its dissipation.<br />

2 See Thirty-second Annual Report (1967), p. 176, for other decisions involving this issue.<br />

Also Thirty-third Annual Report (1968), p. 165.<br />

'Sacks v. Davis & Hemphill, 71 LRAM 2126 (C.A. 4).<br />

'Sac/is V. Davis & Hemphill, 295 F.Supp. 142 (D.C.Md.)•

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