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Enforcement Litigation 149<br />

autonomy of the international union continued to be described<br />

as including millwrights' work, but the local expressly disclaimed<br />

any trade autonomy or jurisdiction over millwrights, and the new<br />

contract, unlike prior contracts, did not mention a pay rate specifically<br />

for millwrights. Subsequently, however, the carpenters'<br />

local threatened a work stoppage if two millwrights hired by<br />

the employer continued on the job without joining the carpenters'<br />

local, and the employer discharged them notwithstanding<br />

they were members of the millwrights' local. The First Circuit<br />

sustained the <strong>Board</strong>'s finding that the employer violated section<br />

8(a) (3) and (1) of the Act by discharging the millwrights,<br />

and the union violated section 8(b) (2) and (1) (A) by causing<br />

their discharge. In agreement with the <strong>Board</strong>, it found that while<br />

the international union claimed jurisdiction over millwrights, the<br />

carpenters' local, although continuing to represent the millwrights,<br />

in fact, expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over them. Since the<br />

union-shop agreement, requiring membership in the carpenters'<br />

local, applied only to employees in the bargaining unit, and the<br />

parties intended to exclude millwrights from the unit, the court<br />

agreed that the millwrights were not covered by the terms of<br />

the union-security clause and could not be discharged for failing<br />

to satisfy its requirements.<br />

5. Prohibited Boycotts and Boycott Agreements<br />

A number of cases decided by courts during the year involved<br />

the question whether specific union conduct was secondary activity,<br />

proscribed by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act, or lawful<br />

primary activity. In one such case," the District of Columbia Circuit<br />

sustained the <strong>Board</strong>'s finding that a union violated section<br />

8(b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) by picketing at a common situs construction<br />

site, notwithstanding the fact that the union picketing<br />

complied with the criteria set forth in the <strong>Board</strong>'s Moore Dry<br />

Dock decision, 62 since the purpose of the picketing was to force<br />

the general contractor to replace a nonunion subcontractor with<br />

one having a union contract, rather than, as asserted, to protest<br />

the nonunion subcontractor's failure to meet area standards. The<br />

court pointed out that the line between lawful primary and prohibited<br />

secondary activity is not always clear, and that the<br />

<strong>Board</strong>, in examining activity with both primary and secondary<br />

effects to determine whether the secondary effects were truly an<br />

objective of the activity, needs both general guidelines and flexel<br />

IBEW, Loc. 480 v. N.L.R.B., 413 F.2d 1085.<br />

"2 Sailorse Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock). 92 NLRB 547 (1950).

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