1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
1 - National Labor Relations Board
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70 Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the <strong>National</strong> <strong>Labor</strong> <strong>Relations</strong> <strong>Board</strong><br />
potency of strikes as a weapon and the effectiveness of the union seeking to<br />
represent his employees. It is, however, a different matter when the employer<br />
leads the employees to believe that they must strike in order to get concessions.<br />
A major presupposition of the concept of collective bargaining is that minds<br />
can be changed by discussion, and that skilled, rational, cogent argument can<br />
produce change without the necessity for striking. When an employer frames<br />
the issue of whether or not the employees should vote for a union purely in<br />
terms of what a strike might accomplish, he demonstrates an attitude of<br />
predetermination that bargaining itself will accomplish nothing. . . . Policy<br />
considerations dictate that employees should not be led to believe, before<br />
voting, that their choice is simply between no union or striking.<br />
In a union deauthorization election case 89 the <strong>Board</strong> considered<br />
employer statements concerning the possible effects of deauthorization.<br />
In urging employees to vote "no" or refrain from voting,<br />
the employer asserted that the loss of the union-security provision<br />
through an affirmative deauthorization vote might mean that<br />
the union's international might lose interest and the local's charter<br />
be withdrawn, there would then be no union contract or union<br />
at the plant, and the employer would then be free to increase<br />
benefits. The <strong>Board</strong> refused to set aside the election and found<br />
that the statements "did not prevent voters from comprehending<br />
the question upon which they were voting, and that they were<br />
not precluded from expressing a free choice in the referendum,"<br />
but "merely clarified for the employees the actual issues in the<br />
election by pointing to a result which well might emerge from<br />
the contemplated deauthorization election."<br />
c. Election Atmosphere<br />
In several cases the <strong>Board</strong> was called upon to decide whether<br />
a pervasive election atmosphere precluded employees from expressing<br />
a free choice on the question of representation by a<br />
union. In Al Long , 9° the <strong>Board</strong> set aside the election where "a<br />
general atmosphere of confusion, violence, and threats of violence"<br />
occurred during the critical period prior to the election. The<br />
<strong>Board</strong> found that the anxiety and fear of reprisal rendered a<br />
fair election impossible. The election was 'conducted in the face<br />
of an "often violent" and "emotion-filled" strike which included<br />
extensive property damage, threatening calls, bomb threats, and<br />
unruly conduct on the picket line. In reaching this conclusion<br />
the <strong>Board</strong> did not deem it significant that the interference could<br />
not be attributed to one of the parties. As stated, "it is not<br />
material that fear and disorder may have been created by indi-<br />
Sierra Electric, 176 NLRB No. 63.<br />
"1 173 NLRB No. 76.