1 - National Labor Relations Board

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Unfair Labor Practices 81 had one been held at the time of the termination of the strike. Evaluating the employer's basis for doubting the union's majority in the light of a unit including the replaced strikers, the Board found it inadequate and directed the employer to bargain with the union.25 ■ 3. Coordination of Bargaining In a number of cases decided during the year, the Board was called upon to consider various actions taken by unions to coordinate their bargaining aims or tactics in order to increase their bargaining power. In two cases, 26 the Board held that employers violated section 8(a) (5) and (1) by refusing to meet with the negotiating committees of unions representing some of the employer's employees, because members of other unions representing, in separate bargaining units, other employees of the same employers were included on the negotiating committees as nonvoting members. The Board pointed out that the unions had expressly disclaimed any intent to engage in coalition bargaining or to bargain for employees represented by other unions or in other units and that the employers had walked out of the bargaining sessions without waiting to see whether the unions were acting in bad faith or whether their demands and actions were consistent with the disclaimer." In holding that the mere presence of members of other unions on the negotiating committee of a representative does not justify a refusal to bargain, the Board 28 pointed out that the right of employees, guaranteed by section 7 of the Act, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing includes the right of the employees' duly elected bargaining agent to select the bargaining team which will represent it at the bargaining table. It noted that although this right has been denied where the chosen repre- " The Board departed from the standard of Stoner Rubber Co., 123 NLRB 1440 (1959), in which replaced economic strikers were excluded and other cases following it, since they were prior to the 1959 amendment to sec. 9(c) (3) of the Act. 28 General Electric Co., 173 NLRB No. 46, enfd. as modified 412 F.2d 512 (C.A. 2) ; Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 173 NLRB No. 47, enfd. 415 F.2d 174 (C.A. 8). The Board's rationale, discussed herein, was set forth in General Electric, and, except for the point discussed in fn. 29, infra, was equally applicable to Minnesota Mining. " In United Steelworkers of Amer. (Kennecott Copper Corp.), Case 27—CB-453, a trial examiner found that several unions which bargained jointly with an employer violated sec 8 (b) (3) of the Act by insisting upon demands which would have resulted in the consolidation of several separate units In the absence of exceptions, the Board adopted the trial examiner's decision without passing on his rationale. 2' Chairman McCulloch and Members Fanning, Brown, and Zagoria for the majority. Member Jenkins, dissenting, was of the opinion that inclusion on one union's bargaining committee of representatives of other unions would be inherently disruptive of the bargaining process.
82 Thirty-fourth Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board sentative is so tainted with conflict or so patently obnoxious that good-faith bargaining is inherently impossible, it should not be denied merely because of the possibility of abuse. The Board also found that the presence on one union's bargaining committee of representatives of other unions could not be regarded as inherently disruptive of the bargaining process; no such disruption occurred in the instant cases when the employers subsequently bargained with the mixed negotiating committees pursuant to court orders. Moreover, the unions involved were likely to share common objectives, rather than have conflicts of interest, since they usually received similar offers and executed similar contracts with the employer. In the Board view a blanket prohibition of mixed bargaining committees would unduly limit the opportunity for cooperation and collaboration between unions; for example-, it would prevent an expert employed by one union from assisting another union at the negotiating table, even though the negotiating union sought only technical advice from the expert. Accordingly, the Board held that the employers could not exercise a veto power on the unions' selection of bargaining committees, and that the refusals to meet with the committees selected by the union constituted violations of section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.29 In another ease, 99 a union proposed a clause providing that the wage rates paid to employees in the bargaining unit represented by the union would always be equal to the wage rates paid to comparable employees in a neighboring city who were represented by a sister local. The Board found that the union had not insisted on the clause in question, but had merely proposed it as one of several alternative methods of achieving wage parity between the employees it represented and those in the neighboring city. In any event, the Board concluded, even if the union had insisted on the clause in question, such insistence would not violate section 8(b) (3) of the Act, since the clause dealt with a mandatory subject of bargaining. The fact that the clause would bind the parties to wage rates set by others did not change its basic character as a wage demand. The employers " The Board (Members Jenkins and Zagoria dissenting on this point) also held in General Electric that the employer violated section 8 ( a ) ( 5) and (1) by refusing to proceed with preliminary discussions 3 months before the period for reopening the contract While the employer could not be required to bargain before the union served notice of contract termination, it could voluntarily agree . to bargain earlier, and, having done so, was obliged to meet the statutory requirement of good-faith bargaining Accordingly, it could not walk out of the preliminary meeting solely because of the composition of the union's bargaining committee. The Second Circuit, while enforcing the Board's order in other respects, reversed the Board's finding of a violation on this point. See discussion at p. 140, infra. 3° General Teamsters, Loc. 126 (Oshkosh Ready-Mix Co.), 170 NLRB No. 52.
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TMR.TY-FOURM ANNUAL REPORT
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Memb
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7 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. Oper
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Table of Contents ix Page 1. Preser
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1 8 Thirty-fourth Annual Report of
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PERCENT PERCENT 100 100 1111111 90
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II Jurisdiction of the Board The Bo
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IX Injunction Litigation Section 10
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Table 3A.—Formal Actions Taken in
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Table 6.—Geographic Distribution
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Table 7.-Analysis of Methods of Dis
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it! All C cases CA cases CB cases C
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Stage of disposition ' Table 8.-Dis
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Table 11A.—Analysis of Elections
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Table 13.-Final Outcome of Represen
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Participating unions AFL-CIO v. AFL
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Table 14.-Valid Votes Cast in Repre
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Participating unions AFL-CIO v. AFL
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1.) LA, iv Table 17.-Size of Units
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Table 18.-Distribution of Unfair La
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Table 19.-Litigation for Enforcemen
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Table 20.—Injunction Litigation U
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