enter into a period <strong>of</strong> due diligence. A slowdown in sales <strong>of</strong>winter clothing first increased doubts about the takeover bidmaterialising, however, on 13 February 2004, Singh putforward a 348p per share (£699 million valuation) proposalto bring the business back under private control (see Exhibit1 and Exhibit 2 for the development <strong>of</strong> New Look’s shareprice prior to the proposal). On 16 March 2004, more than99% <strong>of</strong> investors voted to accept the <strong>of</strong>fer (only Fidelitylodged a no vote). 13 New Look joined Debenhams, Selfridgesand Hamleys as a private retailer.A <strong>Private</strong> New Look: 2004–2007New Look set <strong>of</strong>f on its transformation as soon as thepublic‐to‐private transaction was closed. <strong>The</strong> agendaincluded three main initiatives: building a new distributioncentre and reorganizing the company’s logistics, adding newstores in the UK and shifting over to the larger store formatextending a men’s and children’s wear line while als<strong>of</strong>ocusing the women’s line more closely on fashion <strong>of</strong>ferings,and expanding internationally. In addition, the managementteam was strengthened and, within the next two years, thecompany’s capital structure was changed.Corporate Governance: A Public versus <strong>Private</strong> New LookPost‐buyout, both the executive and non‐executive boardswere changed. Wrigley, the COO and main advocator <strong>of</strong>the new vision for New Look, was installed as CEO. Hebrought several new members to the management board,including Paul Marchant as managing director for BuyingMerchandising and Design, and Michael Lemmer asinternational director. Singh also took on a more hands‐onrole as managing director, commercial and executivemember <strong>of</strong> the board. <strong>The</strong>se changes were necessary, asone private equity investor noted: “<strong>The</strong> new managementteam changed the direction <strong>of</strong> New Look and changed thepace at which it was managed. <strong>The</strong> change in themanagement team made the growth story happen.”<strong>The</strong> board initially consisted <strong>of</strong> four additional non‐executivemembers, two from each private equity firm. <strong>The</strong> two boardmembers from Apax Partners were Alex Fortescue (head<strong>of</strong> Retail and Consumer Sector in Europe) and MirkoMeyer‐Schönherr. When Meyer‐Schönherr left Apax Partners,Matthew Brockman, previously a board observer, becamenon‐executive board member. Martin Clarke (head <strong>of</strong>Consumer Sector) and Leanne Buckham were the Permiraboard members. Both investment partners were committedto continuity on the board through the deal and up to exit.“We do not change board members in the life cycle <strong>of</strong> acompany,” one partner said. “We believe that it is all aboutthe relationship with the management and it is important tohave consistency over time.”Fortescue was chairman <strong>of</strong> the board until RichardLapthorne, non‐executive director and chairman <strong>of</strong> Cable& Wireless, was brought in by the private equity investors.If New Look went back to the public markets the teamwanted someone with experience in managing a publiccompany chairing the board. <strong>The</strong>y felt they had alreadycovered retail experience sufficiently with the other boardmembers and, therefore, wanted to have someone withpublic market experience.<strong>The</strong> management team saw the company had benefited fromhaving been publicly listed as it had disciplined management inbecoming more pr<strong>of</strong>essional in their corporate governance andreporting. Many <strong>of</strong> the changes due to increased informationrequirements by public investors were still kept post‐buyoutand highly valued by the management team.<strong>The</strong> corporate governance as well as strategicdecision‐making processes in New Look still changedsubstantially in other respects, due to the differentshareholder structure post‐buyout, also leading to changesin the board. All three parties – the management team, Singhand Apax Partners/Permira – had the expectation <strong>of</strong> a closerelationship with each other, with the private equity investorsfulfilling the role <strong>of</strong> a more active investor compared toinvestors on public markets. Due to this closer relationship,both the investors as well as the management were willingto take more risk with their decisions and to follow throughwith the envisioned initiatives for the transformation process.“New Look doubled the rate <strong>of</strong> investments,” Fortescuerecalled. “<strong>The</strong>y were willing to take more risk in exchange forlonger term success. We were willing to take more risks aswell, given our relationship with New Look was closer thanit would have been for investors on the public market.”<strong>The</strong> three parties today agree that their expectations weremet and they all evaluate the collaboration as highly positive.<strong>The</strong> private equity partners monitored the business activitiesclosely and supported the strategic decisions made by themanagement team. <strong>The</strong>y had detailed discussions on keystrategic decisions that had to be made in board meetings.Apax Partners/Permira did not impact day‐to‐day operationsbut had a vital role in making high level strategic decisions.“Before the buyout, public investors were mainly concernedabout how well New Look performed financially. After thebuyout, the primary debate was on what would be the rightstrategy going forward, so the board was more a powerhouse focussing on strategy rather than financials,”Fortescue said. A new monitoring system for operatingindicators was put in place and used to monitor thecompany more closely.A New Distribution Centre In July 2004, the companyannounced it would make a £400 million investment in a newdistribution centre in Newcastle‐under‐Lyme, which openedin 2005. This larger distribution centre in a more centrallocation made a great deal <strong>of</strong> sense from the perspective <strong>of</strong>mid‐ and long‐term performance. However, as Alastair Miller,current CFO <strong>of</strong> New Look, recalled: “If we had still beenpublic at that time, Wrigley and I would have spent most<strong>of</strong> our time in road shows around the City explaining to13Susie Mesure, “Fidelity refuses to back Singh’s pounds 700m buyout <strong>of</strong> New Look chain,” <strong>The</strong> Independent, 16 March 2004.106 Case studies: New Look<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
institutional investors why this initiative was necessary.”Given the cash‐intensive aspect <strong>of</strong> the investment, buildingthe new distribution centre required a willingness to accepta short‐term slowdown in pr<strong>of</strong>it growth. One year later the pressreported strong progress in New Look’s transformation. 14Changes to both the chain’s distribution network and its designteam contributed to an 18.8% rise in total sales during the 14weeks up to 1 January 2005, according to management. NewLook doubled the number <strong>of</strong> designers working on new rangesto 22 and also strengthened its buying and merchandisingteam 15 (see Exhibit 3 for New Look’s key financials).Larger Store Format Management felt the threat <strong>of</strong> marketconsolidation and the need for New Look to broaden itspresence in the market. In the UK, this was done in part bysheer physical presence, e.g. through acquisitions <strong>of</strong> theleases and/or property <strong>of</strong> 30 former C&A stores and newstore openings. In addition, a rebrand campaign waslaunched in 2004: “<strong>The</strong> New Now” gave New Look a moreupmarket image, and presented a clean, modernfashion‐oriented store image consistently across the chain.<strong>The</strong> management team and the new investors looked closelyat expanding the company’s clothing and accessoriesranges, wanting to roll out their larger store format further by<strong>of</strong>fering a wide range for the whole family. <strong>The</strong>y followed arollout <strong>of</strong> menswear across many stores after the buyout andalso launched a separate children’s clothing line.International Expansion Management pushed expansion intoother European countries and the Middle East with new storeopenings in France, Belgium, Ireland and Dubai. “Expandinginto Europe and Dubai was another key driver in theirtransformation process,” said an insider. “This too wouldhave been difficult to pursue while listed on public marketswithout being punished by decreasing price shares.”New Look Employees<strong>The</strong> public‐to‐private transaction was supported both by themanagement team and New Look’s employees. Employeesacross the ranks, from middle management and beyond,were very excited about the deal, as they felt this would givethe company the opportunity to expand the brand furtherand with it, their own career development, as New Look’spresence grew in the market.Employee Incentives According to Wrigley, many employeesfelt the public‐to‐private transaction brought a culture <strong>of</strong>inclusion to the company. While New Look had been publiclylisted, employees had always had the opportunity to ownshares; however, post‐buyout, a new programme was setup, giving management and a large proportion <strong>of</strong> employeesthe opportunity to become New Look shareholders.Committed to taking as many people with them as possible,the management wanted a vehicle for employees to directlyparticipate in New Look’s transformation process. Twenty <strong>of</strong>New Look’s extended management team invested directly in14Liz Morrell, “New Look grows up”, Retail Week, 8 April 2005.15“Happy Progress at New Look”, 4 January 2005, www.newlook.co.uk, accessed 4 December 2007.the company as it went private. Four levels <strong>of</strong> managers wereable to participate: executive directors, operative directors,controllers, senior managers and select store managers witha particularly good performance rating. To give a wider group<strong>of</strong> employees the chance to participate in New Look’sdevelopment, <strong>The</strong> New Look Trust for Employees was set up,enabling employees to indirectly hold shares in the companyas beneficial owners <strong>of</strong> <strong>The</strong> Trust. By mid‐2006, over 300people had invested in the option scheme via <strong>The</strong> Trust,rising to nearly 500 in 2007. <strong>The</strong> participation schemeswere developed jointly by shareholders and management.Shareholders proposed the structure and the amount <strong>of</strong> equityavailable and worked with advisors to turn them into reality.Management worked on allocating the equity amongemployees and communicating the message.<strong>The</strong> private equity partners were committed to maintainingthe status quo in terms <strong>of</strong> New Look’s employment policies.It was considered a general policy for both investors tosafeguard the existing employment rights in a company wheregrowing the business is the key management objective. One<strong>of</strong> the private equity investors said: “It was very clear early onthat New Look was a growth story, not a restructuring story.<strong>The</strong> turnover <strong>of</strong> staff is relatively high in retail and our aim wasto keep employees longer, to increase retention particularlyfor key people.” <strong>The</strong>refore, there were no changes to termsor conditions <strong>of</strong> employment including staff benefits, e.g.staff discount, life assurance, income protection for seniormanagers, medical insurance or company cars, and thebonus scheme remained unchanged. Training anddevelopment programmes for employees remained in placeand were reviewed and improved in the normal course <strong>of</strong>events. As employment conditions were unaffected by thebuyout, employee satisfaction remained constant.Employment Growth <strong>The</strong> company did not buy any newentities, continuing to grow organically. From March 2004 toMarch 2007, group employee numbers grew by 8.9% perannum, from 12,166 to 15,708 employees; full‐time equivalentheadcount grew from 6,498 to 8,120 (see Exhibit 4 foremployment development). New Look was able to outperformsome <strong>of</strong> its main UK competitors, such as Marks & Spencerand Debenhams, who realized less employment growth overthe same period. However, several market players had evengreater average number <strong>of</strong> employee increases (see Exhibit 5for employment information across select competitors).Employment increased across different categories andfunctions, with slightly higher growth in part‐time employeescompared to full‐time employees. Group employee costsgrew annually by an average <strong>of</strong> 14.0% from 2004 to 2007.Employees in administration and distribution were decreasedbetween 2003 and 2007 in order to increase efficiencies inproduction and distribution. <strong>The</strong> higher efficiencies were alsocaptured in increasing employment productivity, e.g. withEBITDA per employee increasing 6.4% per year betweenMarch 2004 and March 2007 (refer to Exhibit 4).<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Case studies: New Look 107
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
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Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
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Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
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Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
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Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
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Private equity and long-run investm
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alternative names associated with t
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4. Finally, we explore whether firm
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When we estimate these regressions,
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cutting back on the number of filin
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Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
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Table 4: Relative citation intensit
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figuresFigure 1: Number of private
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Private equity and employment*steve
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Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde