which can be used for further research <strong>of</strong> this phenomenon.Secondly, the study analyses the extent to which leveragedbuyout transactions are successfully exited, and whether exitsuccess has varied across time periods, regions and dealcharacteristics. Thirdly, and most importantly, the study focuseson the longevity, or “staying power”, <strong>of</strong> leveraged buyouts.Among the key findings are the following:• <strong>Private</strong> equity investment activity has accelerated.More than 40% <strong>of</strong> the buyouts in the sample havetaken place since 1 January 2004. <strong>The</strong> total value <strong>of</strong>firms (both equity and debt) acquired in leveragedbuyouts is estimated to be $3.6 trillion over the sampleperiod, <strong>of</strong> which $2.7 trillion worth <strong>of</strong> transactionsoccurred between 2001 and 2007.• Public-to-private transactions, which have been the focus<strong>of</strong> earlier buyout research and media attention, onlyaccount for 6.7% <strong>of</strong> all transactions. Measured in terms<strong>of</strong> dollar value, public-to-private transactions represent28% <strong>of</strong> the firms acquired. <strong>The</strong> vast majority <strong>of</strong> buyoutsare acquisitions <strong>of</strong> private firms and corporate divisions.• Non-US private equity activity has grown to be largerthan that <strong>of</strong> the US in the last few years. <strong>The</strong> growth<strong>of</strong> Continental European buyouts has been particularlypronounced. Still, LBO transactions outside NorthAmerica and Western Europe are relatively few andonly account for approximately 12% <strong>of</strong> global LBOtransactions in number and 9% in value over theperiod from 2001 to 2007.• <strong>The</strong> caricature <strong>of</strong> buyouts occurring in old and decliningindustries does not reflect the rise <strong>of</strong> buyout activity inhigh-growth, “high-tech” sectors in the last decade. Infact, buyouts have always taken place in a wide range<strong>of</strong> industries, although mature industries such aschemicals, machinery and retailing still providepopular buyout targets.• IPOs account for 13% <strong>of</strong> private equity investment exits,and this exit route seems to have decreased in relativeimportance over time. <strong>The</strong> most common exit route is tradesales to another corporation, accounting for 39% <strong>of</strong> allexits. <strong>The</strong> second most common exit route is secondarybuyouts (24%), which have increased in importance overthe last decade consistent with anecdotal evidence.• 6% <strong>of</strong> buyout transactions end in bankruptcy or financialrestructuring. While this number implies a lower successrate compared to bankruptcy rates among US publiclytraded firms, it also suggests that buyouts have a loweraverage default rate than US corporate bond issuers, andsubstantially lower than the default rates among averagejunk bond issuers.• <strong>Private</strong> equity investors have a long-term ownership bias.58% <strong>of</strong> the private equity funds’ investments are exitedmore than five years after the initial transaction. So-called“quick flips” (i.e. exits within two years <strong>of</strong> investment byprivate equity fund) account for 12% <strong>of</strong> deals and havedecreased in the last few years.• <strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> businesses operating under private equityownership has grown rapidly. <strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> firmsentering LBO status has been substantially higher thanthe number <strong>of</strong> firms leaving LBO status over time everyyear since 1970. As a result, at the beginning <strong>of</strong> 2007,close to 14,000 firms worldwide were held in LBOownership, compared to fewer than 5,000 in 2000and fewer than 2,000 in the mid-1990s. <strong>The</strong> LBOorganizational form seems more long term thantemporary: almost 40% <strong>of</strong> all LBOs remain in thisorganizational form 10 years after the original leveragedbuyout was announced. In addition, the length <strong>of</strong> timefirms remain private has increased in recent years.B. Key findings: Long-run investment studyThis study was motivated by the lively debate about theimpact <strong>of</strong> private equity investors on the time horizons <strong>of</strong> thecompanies in their portfolios. <strong>The</strong> private status, accordingto some, enables managers to proceed with challengingrestructurings without the pressure <strong>of</strong> catering to themarket’s demands for steadily growing quarterly pr<strong>of</strong>its,which can lead to firms focusing on short-run investments.Others have questioned whether private equity-backedfirms take a longer-run perspective than their public peers,pointing to practices such as special dividends to equityinvestors. <strong>The</strong>y suggest private equity investors are likelyto encourage steps that boost short-run performance atthe expense <strong>of</strong> sustained corporate growth.In this study, one form <strong>of</strong> long-run investment was examined:investments in innovation. Innovation <strong>of</strong>fers an attractivetesting ground for the issues delineated above due to variousfactors. <strong>The</strong>se factors include the long-run nature <strong>of</strong> R&Dexpenditures, their importance to the ultimate health <strong>of</strong> firmsand the extensive body <strong>of</strong> work in the economics literaturethat has documented that the characteristics <strong>of</strong> patentscan be used to assess the nature <strong>of</strong> firms’ technologicalinnovation. Moreover, patents can be used to study bothpublic and private firms, which is important when studyingprivate equity transactions.<strong>The</strong> authors examine the impact <strong>of</strong> private equity investment onthe patenting behaviour <strong>of</strong> 495 firms worldwide with at least onesuccessful US patent application filed from three years before t<strong>of</strong>ive years after a later-stage private equity investment.Key findings include:• Firms that undergo a buyout pursue more economicallyimportant innovations, as measured by patent citations,in the years after private equity investments. In a baselineanalysis, the increase in the key proxy for economicimportance is 25%.viiiExecutive summary <strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
• <strong>Private</strong> equity-backed companies maintain comparablelevels <strong>of</strong> cutting-edge research. Post-buyout, thesebusinesses display no deterioration in the extent towhich their research is basic or fundamental, asmeasured by patent originality and generality.• <strong>The</strong> quantity <strong>of</strong> patenting does not appear tosystematically change after private equity transactions.• Innovation becomes more targeted post-buyout.<strong>The</strong> patent portfolios <strong>of</strong> firms become more focusedin the years after private equity investments.• <strong>Private</strong> equity-backed firms concentrate on coretechnologies. <strong>The</strong> increase in patent importance, asdenoted by patent citations, is greatest in the patentclasses where the firm has had its historic focus and whereit increases its activities after the private equity investment.C. Key findings: Employment study<strong>The</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> private equity on employment arousesconsiderable controversy. Critics have claimed huge joblosses, while private equity associations and other groupshave released several recent studies that claim positiveeffects <strong>of</strong> private equity on employment. While efforts to bringdata to the issue are highly welcome, many <strong>of</strong> the priorstudies have significant limitations, such as the reliance onsurveys with incomplete responses, an inability to control foremployment changes in comparable firms, the failure todistinguish cleanly between employment changes at firmsbacked by venture capital and firms backed by other forms<strong>of</strong> private equity, difficulties in disentangling organic jobgrowth from acquisitions, divestitures and reorganizationsat firms acquired by private equity groups, and an inabilityto determine where jobs are being created and destroyed.In this study, the research team constructed and analyseda dataset in order to overcome these limitations and, at thesame time, encompass a much larger set <strong>of</strong> employers andprivate equity transactions. This study examines US privateequity transactions from 1980 to 2005. <strong>The</strong> study utilizes theLongitudinal Business Database (LBD) at the US Bureau <strong>of</strong>the Census to follow employment at virtually all privateequity-backed companies in the US, before and after privateequity transactions. Using the LBD, it was possible toanalyse employment at both the firm level and establishmentlevel. Establishments in this context means the specificfactories, <strong>of</strong>fices, retail outlets and other distinct physicallocations where business takes place. <strong>The</strong> LBD covers theentire non-farm private sector and includes annual data onemployment and payroll for about 5 million firms and 6 millionestablishments, including 5,000 US firms (target firms) and300,000 establishments (target establishments) that were thesubject <strong>of</strong> a buyout. Employment at target establishmentswas tracked for five years before and after the private equitytransaction, irrespective <strong>of</strong> whether these establishments areowned and operated by the target firm throughout the entiretime period around the private equity transaction. Each targetfirm and each target establishment is matched against otherfirms and other establishments that are comparable in terms<strong>of</strong> industry, age and size. <strong>The</strong>se comparable firms andestablishments served as the control group.Among the key results were:• Employment grows more slowly at target establishmentsthan at the control group in the year <strong>of</strong> the private equitytransaction and in the two preceding years. <strong>The</strong> averagecumulative employment difference in the two years beforethe transaction is about 4% in favour <strong>of</strong> controls.• Employment declines more rapidly in targetestablishments than in control establishments in the wake<strong>of</strong> private equity transactions. <strong>The</strong> average cumulativetwo-year employment difference is 7% in favour <strong>of</strong>controls. Just as was the case before the private equitytransaction, growth at controls is higher in the three yearsafter the private equity transaction. In the fourth and fifthyears after the transaction, employment at private equitybackedfirms mirrors that <strong>of</strong> the control group.• Post-transaction, buyout establishments seem to createroughly as many jobs as peer group establishments.Gross job creation (i.e. new employment positions) inthe wake <strong>of</strong> private equity transactions is similar intarget establishments and controls. <strong>The</strong> differencein net employment is attributable to higher gross jobdestruction rates in targets.• Firms backed by private equity have 6% more greenfieldjob creation than the peer group. Greenfield job creation inthe first two years post-transaction is 15% <strong>of</strong> employmentfor target firms and 9% for control firms. It appears thatthe job losses at target establishments in the wake <strong>of</strong>private equity transactions are partly <strong>of</strong>fset by substantiallylarger job gains in the form <strong>of</strong> greenfield job creation bytarget firms.D. Key findings: Governance study<strong>The</strong> final study examines the boards <strong>of</strong> companies whichhave been taken from public to private ownership to learnmore about the governance model <strong>of</strong> private equity investors.<strong>The</strong>re has been almost no scrutiny <strong>of</strong> these boards orcomprehensive analysis <strong>of</strong> how they differ systematicallyfrom those <strong>of</strong> public companies.This study constructs a new dataset, which follows the boardcomposition <strong>of</strong> all public-to-private transactions in the UKfrom 1998 to 2003. Out <strong>of</strong> 142 such transactions, 88 weresponsored by at least one private equity fund. <strong>The</strong> researchteam looked at the change in the composition <strong>of</strong> the boardwhen the company became private and any subsequentchange throughout the period in which the private equityfund was still involved. <strong>The</strong> public-to-private transactionswere compared to private equity transactions where therewas no private equity sponsor: i.e. pure management buyouts(MBOs), or buyouts backed by non-financial sponsors.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>Executive summaryix
- Page 2 and 3: The Globalization of Alternative In
- Page 5: ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
- Page 9 and 10: PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
- Page 11 and 12: Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
- Page 13: Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
- Page 17 and 18: C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
- Page 19 and 20: Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
- Page 21 and 22: The new demography of private equit
- Page 23 and 24: among US publicly traded firms, it
- Page 25 and 26: should be fairly complete. While th
- Page 27 and 28: according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
- Page 29 and 30: draining public markets of firms. I
- Page 31 and 32: FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
- Page 33 and 34: TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
- Page 35 and 36: Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
- Page 37 and 38: Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
- Page 39 and 40: Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
- Page 41 and 42: Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
- Page 43 and 44: Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
- Page 45 and 46: Private equity and long-run investm
- Page 47 and 48: alternative names associated with t
- Page 49 and 50: 4. Finally, we explore whether firm
- Page 51 and 52: When we estimate these regressions,
- Page 53 and 54: cutting back on the number of filin
- Page 55 and 56: Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
- Page 57 and 58: Table 4: Relative citation intensit
- Page 59 and 60: figuresFigure 1: Number of private
- Page 61 and 62: Private equity and employment*steve
- Page 63 and 64: Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
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Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
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Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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Figure 12: Differences in impact on
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Private equity and corporate govern
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et al (2007) track the evolution of
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groups aim to improve firm performa
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distribution of the LBO sponsors, m
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the most difficult cases. This stor
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to see whether these changes of CEO
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Figure 3:This figure represents the
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TablesTable 1: Company size descrip
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Table 5: Changes in the board size,
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Table 7: Board turnoverPanel A: Siz
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Part 2Case studiesThe Global Econom
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European private equity cases: intr
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Exhibit 1: Private equity fund size
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Messer Griesheimann-kristin achleit
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ealized it was not possible to grow
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The deal with Allianz Capital partn
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the deal, the private equity invest
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Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
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Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
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New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
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feet. This restricted store space w
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institutional investors why this in
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Although a public listing did not a
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Exhibit 5: Employment development a
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Chinese private equity cases: intro
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Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
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Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde