ReferencesAbramowitz, M. (1956), “Resource and Output Trendsin the United States since 1870”, American <strong>Economic</strong>Review 46, 5–23.Baker, M., J. Stein and J. Wurgler (2003), “When Doesthe Market Matter? Stock Prices and the Investment <strong>of</strong><strong>Equity</strong>-Dependent Firms”, Quarterly Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s118, 969–1006.Griliches, Z. (1990), “Patent Statistics as <strong>Economic</strong>Indicators: A Survey”, Journal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Literature 28,1661–1707.Guo, S., E. Hotchkiss and W. Song (2007), “Do Buyouts(Still) Create Value?”, unpublished Working Paper, BostonCollege and University <strong>of</strong> Cincinnati.Hall, B. (1990), “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> Corporate Restructuring onIndustrial Research and Development”, Brookings Paperson <strong>Economic</strong> Activity 1, 85–136.Hall, B. (1992), “Investment and Research and Development atthe Firm Level: Does the Source <strong>of</strong> Financing Matter?”, NationalBureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Research, Working Paper no. 4096.Hao, K.Y. and A.B. Jaffe (1993), “Effect <strong>of</strong> Liquidity onFirms’ R&D Spending”, <strong>Economic</strong>s <strong>of</strong> Innovation andNew Technology 2, 275–282.Himmelberg, C.P. and B.C. Petersen (1994), “R&D andInternal Finance: A Panel Study <strong>of</strong> Small Firms in High-TechIndustries”, Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s and Statistics 76, 38–51.Jaffe, A.B. and M. Trajtenberg (2002), Patents, Citationsand Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge Economy,Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.Jensen, M.C. (1989), “<strong>The</strong> Eclipse <strong>of</strong> the Public Corporation”,Harvard Business Review 67 (September–October), 61–74.Jensen, M.C. (1993), “<strong>The</strong> Modern Industrial Revolution,Exit and the Failure <strong>of</strong> Internal Control Systems”, Journal<strong>of</strong> Finance 48, 831–880.Kaplan, S.N. and J.C. Stein (1993), “<strong>The</strong> Evolution <strong>of</strong> BuyoutPricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s”, QuarterlyJournal <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s 108, 313–357.Lanjouw, J.O., A. Pakes and J. Putnam (1998), “How toCount Patents and Value Intellectual Property: <strong>The</strong> Uses <strong>of</strong>Patent Renewal and Application Data”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Industrial<strong>Economic</strong>s 46, 405–432.Lichtenberg, F.R. and D. Siegel (1990), “<strong>The</strong> Effects <strong>of</strong>Leveraged Buyouts on Productivity and Related Aspects <strong>of</strong>Firm Behavior”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Financial <strong>Economic</strong>s 27, 165–194.Muelbroek, L.K., M.L. Mitchell, J.H. Mulherin et al (1990),“Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An EmpiricalTest”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Political Economy 98, 1108–1117Seru, A. (2007), “Do Conglomerates Stifle Innovation?”,unpublished Working Paper, University <strong>of</strong> Chicago.Shleifer, A. and L. Summers (1988), “Breach <strong>of</strong> Trust inHostile Takeovers”, in Auerbach, A.J. (ed.), CorporateTakeovers: Causes and Consequences, Chicago, University<strong>of</strong> Chicago Press.Solow, R.M. (1957), “Technical Change and the AggregateProduction Function”, Review <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong>s and Statistics39, 312–320.Stein, J.C. (1988), “Takeover Threats and ManagerialMyopia”, Journal <strong>of</strong> Political Economy 96, 61–80.Strömberg, P. (<strong>2008</strong>), “<strong>The</strong> New Demography <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong><strong>Equity</strong>”, in Anuradha Gurung and Josh Lerner (eds.),<strong>Global</strong>ization <strong>of</strong> Alternative Investments Working PapersVolume 1: <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>2008</strong>,New York, <strong>World</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Forum USA.42 Large-sample studies: Long-run investment<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
<strong>Private</strong> equity and employment*steven J davisUniversity <strong>of</strong> Chicago Graduate School <strong>of</strong> Businessjohn haltiwangerUniversity <strong>of</strong> Marylandjosh lernerHarvard Business Schooljavier mirandaUS Bureau <strong>of</strong> the CensusRon jarminUS Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census1. Introduction<strong>The</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> private equity on employment arousesconsiderable controversy. Speaking about hedge funds andprivate equity groups in April 2005, Franz Müntefering, thenchairman <strong>of</strong> the German Social Democratic Party (and soonto be German vice-chancellor), contended that: “Somefinancial investors don’t waste any thoughts on the peoplewhose jobs they destroy”. 1Contentions like these have not gone unchallenged. <strong>Private</strong>equity associations and other groups have released severalrecent studies that claim positive effects <strong>of</strong> private equity onemployment. Examples include the European Venture CapitalAssociation (2005), the British Venture Capital Association(2006), A.T. Kearney (2007), and Taylor and Bryant (2007).While efforts to bring data to the issue are highly welcome,these studies have significant limitations: 2• Reliance on surveys with incomplete response, giving rise toconcerns that the data do not accurately reflect the overallexperience <strong>of</strong> employers acquired by private equity groups.• Inability to control for employment changes in comparablefirms. When a firm backed by private equity sheds 5% <strong>of</strong>employment, the interpretation depends on whethercomparable firms grow by 3% or shrink by 10%.• Failure to distinguish cleanly between employment changesat firms backed by venture capital and firms backed byother forms <strong>of</strong> private equity. Both are interesting, but therecent debate focuses on buyouts and other later-stageprivate equity transactions, not venture capital.• Difficulties in disentangling organic job growth fromacquisitions, divestitures and reorganizations at firmsacquired by private equity groups. <strong>The</strong> prevalence <strong>of</strong>complex ownership changes and reorganizations at thesefirms makes it hard to track employment using only firm-leveldata. Limiting the analysis to firms that do not experiencethese complex changes is one option, but the results maythen reflect a highly selective, unrepresentative sample.• Inability to determine where jobs are being created anddestroyed. Policy makers are not indifferent to whetherjobs are created domestically or abroad. Some viewforeign job creation in China, India and other emergingeconomies with alarm, especially if accompanied by jobcuts in the domestic economy.In this study, we construct and analyse a dataset thatovercomes these limitations and, at the same time,encompasses a much larger set <strong>of</strong> employers and privateequity transactions. We rely on the Longitudinal BusinessDatabase (LBD) at the US Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census to followemployment at virtually all private equity-backed companiesin the US, before and after private equity transactions. Usingthe LBD, we follow employment at the level <strong>of</strong> firms andestablishments – i.e. specific factories, <strong>of</strong>fices, retail outletsand other distinct physical locations where business takesplace. <strong>The</strong> LBD covers the entire non-farm private sector andincludes annual data on employment and payroll for about5 million firms and 6 million establishments.We combine the LBD with data from Capital IQ and othersources to identify and characterize private equity transactions.<strong>The</strong> resulting analysis sample contains about 5,000 US firms* University <strong>of</strong> Chicago Graduate School <strong>of</strong> Business; University <strong>of</strong> Maryland; US Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census; Harvard Business School; and US Bureau <strong>of</strong> theCensus. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Lerner are research associates with the National Bureau <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> Research, and Davis is a Visiting Scholar at theAmerican Enterprise Institute. We thank Ronald Davis and Kyle Handley for research assistance with this project and Per Strömberg for data on privateequity transaction classifications. Francesca Cornelli, Per Strömberg, a number <strong>of</strong> practitioners, and participants at the NBER “New <strong>World</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong><strong>Equity</strong>” pre-conference and the AEI Conference on “<strong>The</strong> History, <strong>Impact</strong> and Future <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong>” provided many helpful comments. <strong>The</strong> <strong>World</strong><strong>Economic</strong> Forum, the Kauffman Foundation, Harvard Business School’s Division <strong>of</strong> Research, the <strong>Global</strong> Markets Initiative at the University <strong>of</strong> Chicago’sGraduate School <strong>of</strong> Business and the US Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census provided generous financial support for this research. <strong>The</strong> analysis and results presentedherein are attributable to the authors and do not necessarily reflect concurrence by the US Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census. All errors and omissions are our own.1http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2005/10/14/cnmunt14.xml (accessed 3 November 2007). John Adler <strong>of</strong> the ServiceEmployees International Union uses less inflammatory language but <strong>of</strong>fers a similar assessment: “Typically it’s easier to decrease costs quickly bycutting heads, which is why buyouts have typically been accompanied by lay<strong>of</strong>fs”. (Wong, G., “<strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> and the Jobs Cut Myth”, CNNMoney.com,2 May 2007 at http://money.cnn.com/2007/05/02/markets/pe_jobs/index.htm (accessed 10 December 2007). For remarks with a similar flavour byPhillip Jennings, general secretary <strong>of</strong> the UNI global union, see Elliot, L., “Davos 2007: <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> Under Fire”, Guardian Unlimited, 25 January 2007at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/jan/25/privateequity.globalization (accessed 10 December 2007).2See Service Employees International Union (2007) and Hall (2007) for detailed critiques. We discuss academic studies <strong>of</strong> private equity andemployment in Section 2 below.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Large-sample studies: Employment 43
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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- Page 13 and 14: Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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ealized it was not possible to grow
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The deal with Allianz Capital partn
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the deal, the private equity invest
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Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
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Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
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New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
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feet. This restricted store space w
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institutional investors why this in
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Although a public listing did not a
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Exhibit 5: Employment development a
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Chinese private equity cases: intro
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Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
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Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde