• <strong>The</strong>se firms display no deterioration in the extent to whichtheir research is basic or fundamental after the private equityinvestments, as measured by patent originality and generality• <strong>The</strong> quantity <strong>of</strong> patenting does not appear tosystematically change after private equity transactions• <strong>The</strong> patent portfolios <strong>of</strong> firms become more focusedin the years after private equity investments• <strong>The</strong> increase in patent importance is the greatest in thepatent classes where the firm has had its historic focusand in those classes where the firm increases patentingafter the private equity investmentCollectively, these findings appear inconsistent with claimsthat private equity firms generate pr<strong>of</strong>its by sacrificingnecessary long‐run investments: rather, the private equityinvestments appear to lead to a beneficial refocusing <strong>of</strong> thefirms’ innovative portfolios.<strong>The</strong>re are two sets <strong>of</strong> related literatures. First, a number <strong>of</strong>works have looked at the impact <strong>of</strong> leverage, which is aprominent feature <strong>of</strong> private equity investments, on innovation.<strong>The</strong>se studies, which have typically examined publicly tradedfirms with differing debt levels, have reached ambiguousconclusions. On the one hand, there is a clear associationbetween more leverage and lower levels <strong>of</strong> R&D spending,as documented by Hall’s (1992) examination <strong>of</strong> over 1200manufacturing firms and Himmelberg and Petersen’s (1994)more targeted study <strong>of</strong> 170 small, high‐technology firms. Onthe other hand, the direction <strong>of</strong> causality is unclear: it is difficultto determine if debt leads to R&D cutbacks or if strugglingfirms simply have more debt and less spending on innovation.Hao and Jaffe (1993), who carefully grapple with this question,conclude that more debt can be shown to reduce R&Dspending only for the very smallest firms. For larger firms,the causal relationship is ambiguous.A second set <strong>of</strong> related papers examines innovative activityspecifically after leveraged buyouts. Hall (1990) looks at76 public‐to‐private buyouts (i.e. transactions where apublicly traded firm was purchased and taken private) <strong>of</strong>manufacturing firms that took place in the 1980s. She pointsout that the impact <strong>of</strong> these transactions on cumulativeinnovation is likely to be slight: while these firms represent4% <strong>of</strong> manufacturing employment in 1982, they only accountfor 1% <strong>of</strong> the R&D spending. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990)examine 43 whole‐firm LBOs during the 1980s where thefirm files the Bureau <strong>of</strong> the Census’s survey on researchactivities (Form RD‐1) prior to and after the transaction. <strong>The</strong>yfind that these firms increase research spending after theLBO, both on an absolute basis and relative to their peers.<strong>The</strong>re are several reasons to revisit the question <strong>of</strong> theimpact <strong>of</strong> private equity investments on innovation. First, theprivate equity industry is much more substantial than it wasin the 1980s. This growth not only means that we have alarger sample to work with, but the changes in the industry(e.g. the increased competition among and greateroperational orientation <strong>of</strong> private equity groups) suggest thatthe earlier relationships may not hold today. In particular,transactions involving technology‐intensive industries havebecome more common in recent decades. It is also desirableto look beyond the public‐to‐private transactions thatdominate earlier samples. Finally, the computerization <strong>of</strong>patent records in the past two decades has enhanced ourability to study the impact on innovation.<strong>The</strong> plan <strong>of</strong> this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describethe construction <strong>of</strong> the dataset. Section 3 reviews themethodology employed in the study. We present the empiricalanalyses in Section 4. <strong>The</strong> final section concludes the paperand discusses future work.2. <strong>The</strong> sampleTo construct the dataset, we identify a comprehensive list<strong>of</strong> private equity investments and match these firms to theUS patent records. This section describes the process.A. Identifying private equity transactionsTo identify private equity investments, we begin with theCapital IQ database. Capital IQ has specialized in trackingprivate equity deals on a worldwide basis since 1999.Through extensive research, Capital IQ attempts to “back fill”information about investments prior to this period. 2Our starting point is the list <strong>of</strong> transactions identified byCapital IQ that closed between January 1980 and December2005. We eliminate two types <strong>of</strong> transactions. First, Capital IQincludes some transactions by private equity groups that didnot entail the use <strong>of</strong> leverage. Many buyout groups made atleast some venture capital investments during the late 1990sand Capital IQ also captures a considerable number <strong>of</strong>venture capital investments by traditional venture funds.Hence, we eliminate transactions that were not classified inthe relevant categories by Capital IQ (which involve thephrases “going private”, “leveraged buyout”, “managementbuyout”, “platform”, or slight variants). Second, the databaseincludes a number <strong>of</strong> transactions that do not have theinvolvement <strong>of</strong> a financial sponsor (i.e. a private equity firm).We eliminate these deals as well: while transactions in whicha management team takes a firm private using their ownresources and/or bank debt are interesting, they are not thefocus <strong>of</strong> this study. After these eliminations, the databaseconsists <strong>of</strong> approximately 11,000 transactions.We supplement the Capital IQ data with data from anothervendor, Dealogic. In many cases, Dealogic has morecomprehensive information about the features <strong>of</strong> thetransactions, such as the multiple <strong>of</strong> earnings paid and thecapital structure. It also frequently records information on2Most data services tracking private equity investments were not established until the late 1990s. <strong>The</strong> most geographically comprehensive exception,SDC VentureXpert, was primarily focused on capturing venture capital investments until the mid-1990s.28 Large-sample studies: Long-run investment<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
alternative names associated with the firms, add‐onacquisitions and exits, which are useful for searching patentrecords. We also use a wide variety <strong>of</strong> databases, includingthose from Capital IQ and SDC and compilations <strong>of</strong> newsstories, to identify the characteristics <strong>of</strong> the transactionsand the nature <strong>of</strong> the exits from the investment.B. Capturing patent dataWe then match the names <strong>of</strong> the private equity portfolio firmsto those <strong>of</strong> the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).To do this, we employ the Harvard Business School (HBS)patent database, which includes all electronic records <strong>of</strong> theUSPTO up to May 2007. Since the names <strong>of</strong> assignees inthe original USPTO database are riddled with misspellingsand inconsistencies, the names in the HBS patent databasehave been researched and consolidated.We then search the database for each <strong>of</strong> the bought‐outfirms, using both the original name and any alternative namesfrom Dealogic. We examine firms based both in the US andabroad: patent protection is nation‐specific, so non‐US firmswith important discoveries will apply for patent protection inthe US.We only identify cases where we were confident that thename and geographic location <strong>of</strong> the firms matched. (<strong>The</strong>patent data have information on the location <strong>of</strong> both theinventors and the entity to which the firm was assigned atthe time the patent issues, which is typically the inventor’semployer.) In many cases, we encounter ambiguoussituations where the firm names are similar, but not exact,or where the location <strong>of</strong> the patentee differs from the records<strong>of</strong> Capital IQ. In these cases, we research the potentialmatches, using historical editions <strong>of</strong> the Directory <strong>of</strong>Corporate Affiliations, Hoover’s Directory, the Factivadatabase <strong>of</strong> news stories and web searches. Only whenwe are confident <strong>of</strong> the match is it included in the sample.In all, we identify 496 entities with at least one ultimatelysuccessful patent application from the calendar yearstarting three years before to the calendar year startingfive years after the year <strong>of</strong> the private equity investment. 3We believe the seemingly small number <strong>of</strong> patentees reflectstwo considerations. First, in many instances, the privateequity‐backed firms are “old economy” ones that rely ontrade secrets or branding to protect intellectual property.Second, the acceleration <strong>of</strong> private equity activity means thatmany <strong>of</strong> the transactions were undertaken in 2004 and 2005.In cases <strong>of</strong> divisional buyouts where new firms were created,we have only a short period to observe patenting activity.Even if these new entities have filed patents, they are unlikelyto have issued by May 2007. (We are only examining patentapplications that are successful, that is, have been grantedby the USPTO.)One challenge is that, <strong>of</strong> the 8,938 patents we identify,more than one‐quarter (2,440) are assigned to a single firm,Seagate Technologies. <strong>The</strong> next largest patentee accountsfor under 5% <strong>of</strong> the sample. Because Seagate woulddominate the sample, we do not include it in the analyses.Thus, our sample consists <strong>of</strong> 6,398 patents from 495 firms.Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the data. In Panel A, wesummarize the years <strong>of</strong> the private equity investments and<strong>of</strong> the exits from these investments. (Many investmentsremain in progress, and we are not able to determine theyear <strong>of</strong> all exits, especially those involving private sales.)<strong>The</strong> transactions are concentrated in the second half <strong>of</strong> the1990s and the first half <strong>of</strong> the 2000s. This pattern reflectsboth the increased volume <strong>of</strong> private equity investmentsduring these years and the growing representation <strong>of</strong>technology firms (which are more likely to have patents)among more recent investments (Strömberg <strong>2008</strong>). <strong>The</strong>absence <strong>of</strong> transactions from 2006 and 2007 reflects theconstruction <strong>of</strong> the sample, as described above. Exits, notsurprisingly, lag the transactions by several years.Panel B shows the transactions are a mixture <strong>of</strong> types.Most common are buyouts <strong>of</strong> corporate divisions, followedby private‐to‐private (investments in unquoted entities),secondary (that is, groups already with a private equityinvestor) and public‐to‐private deals. <strong>The</strong>se patterns mirrorprivate equity investments more generally, as does thepreponderance <strong>of</strong> exits by trade sale revealed in Panel C(Strömberg <strong>2008</strong>).Panel D reveals the industry composition <strong>of</strong> the firmsand patents in the sample. (All patents in this tabulationare assigned to the primary industry <strong>of</strong> the parent: in lateranalyses, we use the patent‐specific information revealedin its classification by the USPTO.) No single industrydominates the population, which consists <strong>of</strong> a mixture <strong>of</strong>“old” (e.g. auto parts and building products) and “new”(for instance, application s<strong>of</strong>tware and healthcareequipment) economy sectors.Panel E displays the timing <strong>of</strong> the patent applications andawards in the sample. <strong>The</strong> application dates <strong>of</strong> the awardsin the sample extend from 1983 (three years before the firstprivate equity investment) to 2006. (No applications from2007 appear because we are only examining successfulapplications that have already been granted by the USPTO.)<strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> grants mirrors the pattern <strong>of</strong> applications witha two‐to‐three year lag. <strong>The</strong> number <strong>of</strong> awards falls sharplyin 2007, because we only identify grants up to May 2007.<strong>The</strong> growth in private equity investments and patent grantsis also captured in Figure 1.Panel F, which shows the distribution <strong>of</strong> patenting relativeto the private equity investments, illustrates one <strong>of</strong> the3We follow the literature in focusing only on standard, or utility, patents, rather than other awards, such as design or reissue awards. Utility patentsrepresent about 99% <strong>of</strong> all awards (Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2002).<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Large-sample studies: Long-run investment 29
- Page 2 and 3: The Globalization of Alternative In
- Page 5: ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
- Page 9 and 10: PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
- Page 11 and 12: Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
- Page 13 and 14: Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
- Page 15 and 16: • Private equity-backed companies
- Page 17 and 18: C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
- Page 19 and 20: Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
- Page 21 and 22: The new demography of private equit
- Page 23 and 24: among US publicly traded firms, it
- Page 25 and 26: should be fairly complete. While th
- Page 27 and 28: according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
- Page 29 and 30: draining public markets of firms. I
- Page 31 and 32: FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
- Page 33 and 34: TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
- Page 35 and 36: Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
- Page 37 and 38: Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
- Page 39 and 40: Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
- Page 41 and 42: Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
- Page 43 and 44: Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
- Page 45: Private equity and long-run investm
- Page 49 and 50: 4. Finally, we explore whether firm
- Page 51 and 52: When we estimate these regressions,
- Page 53 and 54: cutting back on the number of filin
- Page 55 and 56: Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
- Page 57 and 58: Table 4: Relative citation intensit
- Page 59 and 60: figuresFigure 1: Number of private
- Page 61 and 62: Private equity and employment*steve
- Page 63 and 64: Especially when taken together, our
- Page 65 and 66: centred on the transaction year ide
- Page 67 and 68: and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
- Page 69 and 70: sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
- Page 71 and 72: employment-weighted acquisition rat
- Page 73 and 74: FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
- Page 75 and 76: Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
- Page 77 and 78: Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
- Page 79 and 80: Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
- Page 81 and 82: Figure 12: Differences in impact on
- Page 83 and 84: Private equity and corporate govern
- Page 85 and 86: et al (2007) track the evolution of
- Page 87 and 88: groups aim to improve firm performa
- Page 89 and 90: distribution of the LBO sponsors, m
- Page 91 and 92: the most difficult cases. This stor
- Page 93 and 94: to see whether these changes of CEO
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TablesTable 1: Company size descrip
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Table 5: Changes in the board size,
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Table 7: Board turnoverPanel A: Siz
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Part 2Case studiesThe Global Econom
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European private equity cases: intr
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Exhibit 1: Private equity fund size
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Messer Griesheimann-kristin achleit
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ealized it was not possible to grow
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The deal with Allianz Capital partn
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the deal, the private equity invest
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Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
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Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
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New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
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feet. This restricted store space w
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institutional investors why this in
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Although a public listing did not a
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Exhibit 5: Employment development a
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Chinese private equity cases: intro
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Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
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Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde