took the relevant decision was not housed in the companythat was the direct owner <strong>of</strong> the original one, but two or threelayers above that. Moreover, this structure could change overthe years <strong>of</strong> the LBO, and therefore the relevant board couldbe housed in different companies over time. In order to identifywhich board to observe, we had to proceed in the followingmanner. First, we used the datasets Dash, Fame andAmadeus to reconstruct the post‐LBO ownership structure<strong>of</strong> the various companies and their subsidiaries. <strong>The</strong>n, wedownloaded the board compositions <strong>of</strong> each <strong>of</strong> thesecompanies, in order to identify the relevant board. To identifythe relevant board a certain degree <strong>of</strong> discretion had to beexercised. We took into account the hierarchical ownershipstructure and then looked at various aspects, for examplewhether an outside director was sitting on the board, or howlarge the board was. 8 We also looked at whether private equitygeneral partners were sitting on the board, since they tendedto sit only on the relevant board, while a subset <strong>of</strong> themanagement directors was reported in all the other boards.This was repeated for each year, since the relevant board wasnot necessarily in the same company through the entire timeperiod (although in most cases it was). We went throughseveral iterations, until we felt comfortable with our choice <strong>of</strong>company and its board. In cases where there was uncertaintyabout which board was the relevant one, we considered morethan one board and also conducted the analysis with thealternative boards.We used Capital IQ to determine the announcement date<strong>of</strong> the transaction. Since we only observe the board onceper year at fixed dates, the date in which we observe theboard could be very close to the announcement date, oralmost a year afterwards. <strong>The</strong>refore, we identified the yearbefore and the year after the company was taken privateby looking at the directors <strong>of</strong> the first board observed afterthe announcement date and the last board before theannouncement date. By comparing these boards and theidentities <strong>of</strong> the directors, we could determine whether thefirst board after the announcement date was still the board<strong>of</strong> the public company (i.e. the transition to private companyhad not been completed yet) or it was already the board <strong>of</strong>the private company. In some cases, however, the board onthe first date after the announcement was still a transitionalboard (especially when the board date was close to theannouncement date). For example, immediately after thetransaction, not all new board members had been nominatedto the board. In some cases, the CEO was only present inthe second board following the transaction, since at the time<strong>of</strong> the first board the CEO had not yet been assigned. Forthis reason, the analysis in Section 3 has been conductedcomparing the characteristics <strong>of</strong> the board prior to theannouncement to the second board after the announcementdate, instead <strong>of</strong> the first board. 9<strong>The</strong> data report the date <strong>of</strong> birth and country <strong>of</strong> residence<strong>of</strong> each director <strong>of</strong> the board. <strong>The</strong> data also provide informationon how many other boards the director was also involved in(the Dash dataset, which reports the board starts in 1996, twoyears before the first LBO in the dataset, but it also reports howmany directorships the director had before 1996, although wedo not have that information year by year). <strong>The</strong> data also includeinformation (SIC code) on which industries the companiesbelong to, the number <strong>of</strong> employees they have and theirturnover. From Capital IQ we can also determine which privateequity funds were involved in each leveraged buyout. Finally,using Capital IQ and press coverage we found how many dealshad been exited and what type <strong>of</strong> exit they had. Sixty‐five <strong>of</strong>the 142 deals were not exited as <strong>of</strong> August 2007: <strong>of</strong> thesedeals, 37 were pure MBOs (which are less likely to be exitedanyway) and 28 were LBOs. 10 Among the 77 exited deals, 23were secondary buyouts, 11 IPOs, two MBOs, 26 trade sales,13 bankruptcies and two exits <strong>of</strong> an unknown type.Finally, we looked for the identity <strong>of</strong> all the directors sitting onthe boards each year. We did this using a series <strong>of</strong> datasets(i.e. Capital IQ, Fame, Amadeus, Perfect Information and ageneral search in press releases) and divided the directorsinto the following categories: CEO, management, othernon‐management insiders (for example, previous CEOs),outsiders and LBO sponsors. Outside directors are directorswho neither work for the firm nor any <strong>of</strong> the private equitygroups backing the LBO, and who have no other obviousspecial relationship to the firm. A director can be classified asan LBO sponsor only after the LBO. This category identifieswhether the director is employed by one <strong>of</strong> the private equityfunds that are backing the LBO. For all other directors (alsothe ones involved in the board before the LBO) we identifythose who have some past or present connection to anyprivate equity group. 11 We also identify the outside directorswho are or have been CEOs <strong>of</strong> other companies.3. Changes in the board followingan LBO or MBOIn this section we examine changes in board characteristics(mainly size and composition) before and after the firm wastaken private and examine whether these changes aredifferent for LBOs and MBOs.<strong>The</strong> existing literature on public firms argues that some boardcharacteristics (such as size and proportion <strong>of</strong> outsidedirectors) are associated with better management incentivesand thus to better firm performance. 12 Given that private equity8As mentioned above, some boards were obviously only nominal boards and had only two or three people who were also in what we finally identifiedas the relevant board, so some boards were easy to rule out as the relevant ones.9We have conducted the same analysis by taking the first board afterwards, or the board two years before going private or any combination <strong>of</strong> thesecases, and the results do not change.10Naturally, the most recent deals were less likely to be exited because there has not been enough time, still if one considers only the LBOs that hadbeen announced by the end <strong>of</strong> 2000, 12 have not yet been exited.11For example, they sit or have sat on the board <strong>of</strong> a private equity group, or they have taken part in the past in an LBO sponsored by a private equitygroup, maybe as management.68 Large-sample studies: Corporate governance<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
groups aim to improve firm performance, one may wonderwhether some <strong>of</strong> this improved performance is achieved bychanging the characteristics <strong>of</strong> the board. As mentioned in theintroduction, when making the comparison one has to takeinto account that the situation <strong>of</strong> a public company and <strong>of</strong> acompany which has recently been taken private in an LBO oran MBO is very different. A public company has dispersedownership: as a consequence shareholders cannot monitorthe management and therefore need to rely on the board todo so. On the other hand, private equity groups own a largefraction <strong>of</strong> the company that they take private, allowing themto monitor and advise management constantly and bringingthe need for a board into question. That is why the boards <strong>of</strong>firms that undergo an MBO provide a useful comparison.Board size, univariate analysisIn Table 2, Panel A, we first compare the size <strong>of</strong> the boards<strong>of</strong> companies that underwent an LBO with those thatunderwent an MBO or other types <strong>of</strong> transactions. 13 In theyear before the companies were taken private there is nosignificant difference in the size <strong>of</strong> the boards <strong>of</strong> the twotypes <strong>of</strong> companies (both have approximately 6.5 directors).This is, to a certain extent, surprising, because one wouldexpect that companies that are taken private in an LBO needmore external intervention and therefore might have hadlarger (i.e. more inefficient) boards. We also checked whetherprior to the LBO or MBO transactions, these boards hadan outside director with ties to private equity. We expectedthat there would be more people with such connections incompanies that subsequently underwent an LBO. We findthat in 44% <strong>of</strong> the LBOs there was a director with such aconnection (before the LBO), while there was only such aconnection in 26% <strong>of</strong> the non‐LBO cases (the difference isstatistically significant).Looking at the boards after the companies have been takenprivate, one can see that companies that underwent an MBOhave significantly smaller boards than those that underwentLBOs (4.2 instead <strong>of</strong> 5.4 people). Boards <strong>of</strong> companies thatunderwent both an LBO and an MBO are significantly andsubstantially smaller after being taken private. <strong>The</strong> drop inboard size is significantly larger for MBOs. On average,MBOs lose two directors out <strong>of</strong> six, i.e. they are 33% smaller,while LBOs lose one director out <strong>of</strong> 6.5, i.e. they are 15%smaller. <strong>The</strong> difference between MBO and LBO sizes and thechanges in their sizes could be due to the fact that LBOtransactions are on average larger than MBOs (in terms <strong>of</strong>implied enterprise value $328 million vs $55 million, asshown in Table 1 and Figure 2). <strong>The</strong>refore, we construct asize‐matched sample <strong>of</strong> 39 MBOs and 39 LBOs (this is thenumber <strong>of</strong> deals we could match) and in Panel B we conductthe same analysis as in Panel A but for the matchedcompanies only. By size‐matching the 39 MBOs with LBOswe remove any change in board size that might be inherentlydue to the fact that LBO transactions are on average largerthan MBOs.As we found before, we discover that prior to going privatethere is no significant difference in board size betweencompanies that subsequently undergo LBOs or MBOs. Wealso find that there is no significant difference in board sizebetween companies that undergo LBOs and MBOs after theprivate equity transaction. <strong>The</strong> drop in board size when thecompany goes private is also not significantly different forLBOs and MBOs. In other words, once we take into accountthe size <strong>of</strong> the company, there is a considerable drop inboard size in both cases.<strong>The</strong> decrease in board size is consistent with the existingliterature about boards <strong>of</strong> public companies, which suggeststhat public board sizes are correlated with companyperformance. This is also consistent with Kaplan and Gertner(1996) who look at boards <strong>of</strong> reverse LBOs (after they wentpublic) and find that reverse LBOs have smaller boards than theother firms trading in the market, matched by size and industry.Some companies may have been taken private because theprivate equity sponsors thought their performance could beimproved, but not because the management was inefficient.In such cases, while the company was public the board mayhave been working in an efficient manner, and therefore maynot need to be changed. In 45 out <strong>of</strong> the 87 private equitydeals the CEO was replaced. 14 When the CEO was notreplaced, it suggested that the CEO may have been doinghis/her job effectively. Note that in a few cases afterthe company has been taken private a representative <strong>of</strong> theprivate equity fund backing the LBO assumes the functionalrole <strong>of</strong> CEO and there is no <strong>of</strong>ficial CEO. Since the previousCEO is no longer present in these cases, we consider themto be cases where the CEO has been replaced. In Panel C<strong>of</strong> Table 2 we look at private equity deals only and distinguishbetween cases in which the CEO changed and cases inwhich they did not.We interpret a change in CEO to mean that the CEO’sperformance prior to the company going private wasdeemed unsatisfactory by the new sponsor. Although anunsatisfactory performance <strong>of</strong> the CEO does not necessarilyimply that the board was not doing its job, there is a higherprobability that the board was not putting enough pressureon the CEO. However, we find that when there was a changein the CEO, the board declined in size less than when therewas no CEO change, although the difference is notstatistically significant.Board compositionFigure 3 presents charts with the composition <strong>of</strong> the boardbefore and after going private for LBOs, MBOs and other12Note that this literature can only establish a correlation, not a causality (see also the conclusions <strong>of</strong> this paper). Performance can be measuredin different ways: probability <strong>of</strong> exit, company value at exit, or looking at different financial measures such as operating pr<strong>of</strong>its.13We have also compared changes in the board size <strong>of</strong> LBOs and pure MBOs only, with no difference in the results.14We now talk <strong>of</strong> 87 deals since we have dropped the case for which we did not have board characteristics after the company was taken private.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Large-sample studies: Corporate governance 69
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde