Executive Summary: 3i Group plc and Little SheepIn 2006, a large, well‐established global private equity firminvested in a rapidly growing Chinese restaurant chain thatoriginated in Inner Mongolia. This case describes why andhow a productive, though unlikely, relationship was forgedbetween these two firms, and the result <strong>of</strong> their collaboration.3i, a highly respected global private equity firm, firstestablished a presence in Asia in 2001. Three years later,the firm became aware <strong>of</strong> a rapidly growing restaurant chaincalled Little Sheep. Due to its meteoric growth and nationalbrand name recognition, the founder <strong>of</strong> Little Sheep hadbeen approached by prestigious investors with attractive<strong>of</strong>fers <strong>of</strong> financing. As the founder later explained, hefavoured 3i over other prospective investors because <strong>of</strong> astrong belief that 3i had the expertise and commitment toadd value on a number <strong>of</strong> fronts, from corporate governanceto helping revamp the firm’s franchising strategy.Executive Summary: Hony Capital and China Glass HoldingsThis case traces the 2004 buyout <strong>of</strong> a state‐owned flat glassmanufacturer, Jiangsu Glass, by Hony Capital, a recentlycreated Chinese private equity fund, and the value creationthat resulted from the transaction. Once in control, Honyrapidly orchestrated a major growth‐oriented restructuring<strong>of</strong> the company, a successful IPO on the Hong Kong StockExchange (with a new name, China Glass), and the acquisition<strong>of</strong> seven Chinese glass manufacturing companies. As a result,in the time span <strong>of</strong> about three years China Glass wastransformed from a relatively obscure, mid‐size glassmanufacturing company to one <strong>of</strong> the largest, most efficientproducers in China.A striking feature <strong>of</strong> this transaction was the close,collaborative working relationship between the Hony dealteam and the senior management <strong>of</strong> China Glass from thevery beginning, even during the due diligence phase. Thisearly and sustained bond between the key stakeholdersfacilitated and accelerated the major changes required totake the company to a new, higher level. An active, engagedboard <strong>of</strong> directors was established, revamped governancepractices were put in place and internationally acceptableaccounting and financial reporting standards wereimplemented. <strong>The</strong>se reforms enhanced the company’scredibility with investors, attracted one <strong>of</strong> the world’s largestglass manufacturers as a strategic partner and investor, andcreated a solid foundation for rapid growth. Today, ChinaGlass is one <strong>of</strong> the few Chinese glass manufacturers listedoverseas and is trading at an estimated forward P/E ratio <strong>of</strong>about 23, twice the industry average. Since the buyout, dailyproduction capacity has increased more than five‐fold from900 tons in 2003 to 5,230 tons in September 2007.Revenues have grown from $44.5 million to more than$250 million. 2 <strong>The</strong> transformation has also positioned ChinaGlass to be more competitive in global markets by shifting itsproduct mix towards high value‐add, high margin varieties.2All US dollar figures are approximate, converted from local currency at an exchange rate <strong>of</strong> $1USD = RMB 7.5.114 Case studies: Chinese private equity cases: introduction<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings*Lily FanginseadRoger LeedsSchool <strong>of</strong> Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University“We knew that the Chinese glass industry was undergoing rapid consolidation that would increasingly favour larger players. We couldnot survive as we were structured; either we would be acquired by one <strong>of</strong> our larger competitors, or we would become an acquirer. …”Zhou Cheng, CEO, China Glass“We are company builders… I’ve given up trying to be loved as a private equity investor in China. But if I successfully executevalue-creation in an honest way, I can be respected.”John Zhao, CEO, Hony CapitalExecutive SummaryThis case traces the 2004 buyout <strong>of</strong> a state‐owned flat glassmanufacturer, Jiangsu Glass, by Hony Capital, a recentlycreated Chinese private equity fund, and the value-creationthat resulted from the transaction. Once in control, Honyrapidly orchestrated a major growth‐oriented restructuring<strong>of</strong> the company, a successful IPO on the Hong KongStock Exchange (with a new name, China Glass), a USdollar‐denominated bond <strong>of</strong>fering in Singapore, other capitalraising events and the acquisition <strong>of</strong> seven Chinese glassmanufacturing companies. As a result, in the time span <strong>of</strong>about three years China Glass was transformed from arelatively obscure, mid‐size glass manufacturing companyto one <strong>of</strong> the largest, most efficient producers in China.One striking feature <strong>of</strong> this transaction was the close,collaborative working relationship between the Hony dealteam and the senior management <strong>of</strong> China Glass from thevery beginning, even during the due diligence phase. Thisearly and sustained bond between the key stakeholdersfacilitated and accelerated the major changes required totake the company to a new, higher level. An active, engagedboard <strong>of</strong> directors was established, revamped governancepractices were put in place and internationally acceptableaccounting and financial reporting standards wereimplemented. <strong>The</strong>se reforms enhanced the company’scredibility with investors, attracted one <strong>of</strong> the world’s largestglass manufacturers as a strategic partner and investor, andcreated a solid foundation for rapid growth. Today, ChinaGlass is one <strong>of</strong> the few Chinese glass manufacturers listedoverseas and is trading at an estimated forward P/E ratio<strong>of</strong> about 23, twice the industry average. Since the buyout,daily production capacity has increased more than five‐foldfrom 900 tons in 2003 to 5,230 tons in September 2007.Revenues have grown from $44.5 million to more than$250 million. 1 <strong>The</strong> transformation has also positionedChina Glass to be far more competitive in global marketsby shifting its product mix towards high value‐add, highmargin varieties. As a result, exports since the buyouthave increased from 10% <strong>of</strong> sales to 30%.<strong>The</strong> significant value-creation generated by this private equitytransaction can be attributed to a number <strong>of</strong> noteworthyfeatures described in the case, including:• <strong>The</strong> close alignment <strong>of</strong> interests among the three majorstakeholders in the transaction: the seller, a municipalgovernment intent on privatizing the company quickly;the company’s senior management, also keen to seizethe moment and rapidly transform the enterprise into amarket leader; and the buyer, a recently launched privateequity fund that was sharply focused on executing abuyout strategy that would capitalize on new privatizationopportunities generated by a shift in government policy.• <strong>The</strong> shared vision <strong>of</strong> the private equity investor andcompany management about precisely what neededto be achieved to rapidly build a more competitive,growth‐oriented company immediately after the dealwas completed.• <strong>The</strong> strong belief by the private equity investor thata key factor for post‐investment success was theretention <strong>of</strong> senior management and the introduction<strong>of</strong> a new incentive‐based compensation structure thatwould motivate management to work towards a sharedset <strong>of</strong> objectives.• <strong>The</strong> onset in China <strong>of</strong> a significant policy shift, capturedby the central government’s 2002 directive that “thegovernment is not in the business <strong>of</strong> running businesses”.• An industrial sector that was undergoing rapidconsolidation and robust growth, which created veryattractive acquisition opportunities for savvy investors.This case also sheds considerable light on the significantdifferences between buyouts in China and most otheremerging market countries, compared with the US andEurope. For example:• Public‐to‐private: Many buyouts in the US and Europehave involved the outright purchase <strong>of</strong> publicly listed firms* <strong>The</strong> authors express their appreciation for the research and editing support provided by Brian DeLacey.1All US dollar figures are approximate, converted from local currency at an exchange rate <strong>of</strong> $1USD=RMB 7.5.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Case studies: Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings 115
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
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Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
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Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
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Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
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Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
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Private equity and long-run investm
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alternative names associated with t
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4. Finally, we explore whether firm
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When we estimate these regressions,
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cutting back on the number of filin
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Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
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Table 4: Relative citation intensit
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figuresFigure 1: Number of private
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Private equity and employment*steve
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Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
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Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
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Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde