economically quite small. Ten years <strong>of</strong> experience increasesthe likelihood <strong>of</strong> a quick exit by 1.7 – 2.2 percentage points.<strong>The</strong> tendency to exit early does not differ significantly acrossregions. Finally, there is no evidence that early exits areincreasing over the sample period and the LBOs undertakenin the 2000–2002 period were the least likely to exit early.We then examine the likelihood <strong>of</strong> a successful exit over thelonger term in regressions (2) and (5), using a horizon <strong>of</strong>seven years. Again, many <strong>of</strong> the patterns are similar to theshort-term horizon, with larger deals being more likely tohave exited successfully. Controlling for size, public-to-privatedeals are less likely and divisional and secondary buyouts arenow significantly more likely to have exited successfully withinseven years. <strong>The</strong> presence <strong>of</strong> a financial sponsor increasesthe exit likelihood, especially for sponsors that have longerexperience, are not publicly traded and syndicate theinvestment with other sponsors. With respect to region,LBOs undertaken in the UK and Scandinavia are more likelyto have exited successfully compared with other regions.Finally, the time period from 1990 to 1995 seems to havebeen a particularly successful period in terms <strong>of</strong> successfulexits (although the seven-year criterion only allows us toconsider deals undertaken before November 2000).Finally, regressions (3) and (6) look at the flip side <strong>of</strong> theissue and consider the determinants <strong>of</strong> LBOs ending up inbankruptcy or financial restructuring. We only consider LBOdeals undertaken by 2002 in the analysis so that the dealshave at least five years to eventually file for bankruptcy. Incontrast with the successful exits, there is no significantrelation between bankruptcy and deal size. Confirming thepattern from the univariate analysis, deals that were originallydistressed acquisitions are more than five percentage pointsmore likely to end up in financial distress again. Divisionalbuyouts, on the other hand, are significantly less likely to endin financial distress. In contrast with the univariate results,deals with financial sponsors are somewhat more likely togo bankrupt when other factors are controlled for, althoughthe economic magnitude is relatively small. Among financialsponsors, the deals undertaken by publicly traded fundsexhibit a higher incidence <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy and restructuringcompared with private partnerships. Somewhat surprisingly,given earlier research (e.g. Kaplan and Stein 1993), we find nomajor difference in the probability <strong>of</strong> bankruptcy across timeperiods. Finally, possibly because Capital IQ coverage <strong>of</strong>corporate failures may be more accurate in the US and theUK, LBOs undertaken in these regions are more likely to endup in bankruptcy and the magnitudes are very large (five andseven percentage points, respectively).Across the different tests and specifications a few consistentfindings emerge. Larger deals are more likely to be exitedsuccessfully, although among larger deals the going-privatetransactions are slower to exit. Deals undertaken by privateequity funds exit quicker than pure management buyouts, butthey are also somewhat more likely to end in bankruptcy orrestructuring. Among the LBOs with a financial sponsor, thedeals that are syndicated and undertaken by experiencedfunds or funds that are not publicly traded are more successfulin terms <strong>of</strong> exit. Finally, distressed investments are the mostrisky form <strong>of</strong> LBO deals, with a significantly higher bankruptcyrisk compared with other deals.4. Analysis <strong>of</strong> LBO holding periodsFinally, we turn to the issue <strong>of</strong> the longevity <strong>of</strong> the LBOorganizational form, which has been at the core <strong>of</strong> theacademic discussion <strong>of</strong> the economic impact <strong>of</strong> leveragedbuyouts. Tables 6 to 9 look at the ultimate holding periods<strong>of</strong> firms undergoing LBOs, i.e. the time from the initial LBOtransaction until the transition out <strong>of</strong> LBO ownership status.Again, this is a different measure compared with the timeuntil an individual transaction is exited, since firms whoseexits involve a sale to another private equity-backed firmremain in the LBO organizational form.Table 7 considers the transition out <strong>of</strong> LBO status over time(Panel A) and across different types <strong>of</strong> LBO transactions(Panel B).When we extend the sample from the early Kaplan (1991)study, the LBO organizational form seems more long termthan temporary. Panel A shows that out <strong>of</strong> all firms everentering LBO status over the 1980–2007 period, 69% arestill in the LBO organizational form by November 2007.Disregarding the 2003–2007 period, which may have hadtoo short a time to exit, the number is still as high as 45%.For a non-trivial fraction <strong>of</strong> firms, the LBO status seems moreor less permanent. For firms undergoing their original LBObefore 1990, 10% are still in LBO status by 2007.Figure 4A shows the total stock <strong>of</strong> LBO firms as a function <strong>of</strong>transitions in and out <strong>of</strong> LBO ownership. In order to mitigatethe effect <strong>of</strong> missing transactions in Capital IQ, we assumethat firms leave LBO ownership if no subsequent M&A,bankruptcy, or securities <strong>of</strong>fering has been recorded within12 years <strong>of</strong> the original transaction. As shown in Figure 4A,the number <strong>of</strong> firms entering LBO status has consistentlybeen substantially higher than the number <strong>of</strong> firms leavingLBO status over time. At the beginning <strong>of</strong> 2007, close to14,000 firms worldwide were in LBO ownership, comparedwith fewer than 5,000 in 2000 and fewer than 2,000 in themid-1990s.Panel B <strong>of</strong> Table 7 considers transitions out <strong>of</strong> LBOownership as a function <strong>of</strong> pre-LBO status for the subset<strong>of</strong> firms doing their first LBO before 2003. Of these firms,45% still remain in the LBO organizational form and thehighest fraction is found among firms that were publiclytraded before the LBO, i.e. for going-private transactions.In addition, only 13% <strong>of</strong> the going-private sub-sampleeventually return to public markets, which is not all thatdifferent from the sample average <strong>of</strong> 11%. <strong>The</strong>se facts seemhighly inconsistent with the Rappaport (1990) view thatgoing-private transactions are a temporary “shock therapy”for public firms. Still, this does not imply that LBOs are10 Large-sample studies: Demography<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
draining public markets <strong>of</strong> firms. In fact, Panel B showsthat among firms entering LBO status over the 1970–2002period, the fraction <strong>of</strong> firms exiting LBO status by goingpublic was 11%, which is substantially higher than thefraction <strong>of</strong> going-private transactions over the 1970–2002period (6.3%). Hence, the net flow into public markets hasbeen positive over the long run. 9 In other words, most <strong>of</strong> theLBO firms going public originate from acquisitions <strong>of</strong> privatecompanies and most <strong>of</strong> the going-private transactions donot return to public markets.Panel B also shows that the most common fate <strong>of</strong> firmstransitioning out <strong>of</strong> LBO ownership is to be acquired byanother strategic buyer, which happens to 29% <strong>of</strong> all doingtheir original LBO in 1970–2002, which works out to 53%<strong>of</strong> all firms transitioning out <strong>of</strong> LBO ownership. Of firmsundergoing leverage buyouts, 6% eventually enter financialrestructuring or bankruptcy, which again is higher than theComputstat average but seems low given the high leverageused in these deals. This number also disregards thefact that many distressed firms are eventually financiallyrestructured and continue as independent companies.In fact, for 10% (i.e. 49 cases) <strong>of</strong> all bankruptcies andrestructurings, the financial distress is resolved by thefirm being reacquired in an LBO transaction. Out <strong>of</strong> these49 firms, 36 are still in LBO ownership, 10 were acquiredby a strategic buyer and three eventually ended up inbankruptcy a second time.Panel C <strong>of</strong> Table 7 considers transitions out <strong>of</strong> LBOownership as a function <strong>of</strong> the location <strong>of</strong> the acquired firm,again for the subset <strong>of</strong> firms that underwent their first LBObefore 2003. One reason why we might expect differencesacross regions is because the liquidity and development <strong>of</strong>local financial markets may affect the propensity <strong>of</strong> firms tostay in LBO ownership and the types <strong>of</strong> exit routes that areavailable. For example, the local availability <strong>of</strong> capital mayaffect the likelihood <strong>of</strong> LBOs failing, or the ability <strong>of</strong> a potentialacquirer to buy the LBO firm in a trade-sale. Similarly, thedevelopment <strong>of</strong> local equity markets may affect the ability<strong>of</strong> firms to exit through an IPO. Previous research has shownthat the UK and the US have the most developed financialmarkets, while most emerging markets have relatively smalland underdeveloped financial markets and institutions(e.g. LaPorta et al 1998 and King and Levine 1993). Hence,we would expect exit patterns in the US and UK to exhibitdifferent behaviour compared with the rest <strong>of</strong> the world.<strong>The</strong> support in favour <strong>of</strong> these hypotheses is quite weak.Although the likelihood <strong>of</strong> LBO firms eventually going publicis somewhat higher in the United States and Canada (13%<strong>of</strong> firms), it is not significantly different from IPO exits in Asia,Australia and emerging markets (i.e. “Rest <strong>of</strong> <strong>World</strong>”, 12%).UK LBOs seem more likely to become acquired than thosein other regions. Bankruptcy and financial restructuringrates are significantly higher in the US and the UK. <strong>The</strong>seconclusions should be taken with a grain <strong>of</strong> salt, however,since they only consider univariate differences and do notcontrol for other factors. We return to this issue in themultivariate regression below.Table 8 considers the ultimate holding periods <strong>of</strong> LBO firms,taking into account the fact that many firms remain in LBOstatus even though the original LBO sponsor has exited.<strong>The</strong> holding periods <strong>of</strong> LBO firms are remarkably long. <strong>The</strong>median firm remains in LBO status for more than nine yearsand only 17% <strong>of</strong> firms exit LBO status within three years <strong>of</strong>the original LBO transaction. In addition, holding periodsseem to have increased over time. <strong>The</strong> median firmundergoing the original LBO in the 1980s exited LBO statusafter 6–7 years, while the median LBO firm in the 1995–1999period exited after nine years. Deals that were originallysponsored by private equity funds tend to transition out<strong>of</strong> LBO ownership more quickly and only 32% <strong>of</strong> the puremanagement buyouts have transitioned out <strong>of</strong> LBOownership 10 years after the original transaction.Table 9 analyses the factors determining the longevity <strong>of</strong>buyouts and the likelihood <strong>of</strong> LBOs eventually returning topublic markets, using logit regressions. Similar to the exitregressions <strong>of</strong> Table 6, we control for pre-LBO firm status,financial sponsor characteristics, original transaction size,location and time period <strong>of</strong> the original transaction.Regressions (1) through (4) address the likelihood <strong>of</strong> firmstransitioning out <strong>of</strong> LBO status for different time horizons(three, five and nine years). <strong>The</strong> factors that determine thelongevity <strong>of</strong> buyouts are largely consistent with the factorsthat determine exit likelihood (see Table 6). LBOs thatoriginate from divisions <strong>of</strong> other companies exit LBOownership significantly faster than other LBOs and are7% more likely to have exited within nine years. Consistentwith the univariate analysis, pure MBOs remain in thatorgnizational form longer and are 22% less likely to haveexited within nine years. LBOs acquired by more experiencedfunds and funds that are not publicly traded have shorterlongevity, as do syndicated deals. Larger transactionstransition from LBO ownership quicker than smaller deals.LBOs undertaken in Continental Europe are less likely toleave LBO ownership. Finally, holding periods seem to haveincreased significantly over the last 10 years <strong>of</strong> our sampleperiod. That is to say, the longevity <strong>of</strong> leveraged buyouts hasincreased significantly compared with the time when Kaplan(1991) wrote his original study.Regressions (5) and (6) analyse the likelihood <strong>of</strong> LBOsreturning to public markets. As expected, larger deals aremore likely to eventually go public. Interestingly, the presence<strong>of</strong> a financial sponsor per se does not significantly increase theprobability <strong>of</strong> going public, but the presence <strong>of</strong> experiencedsponsors seems to do so, as does the presence <strong>of</strong> a financialsponsor syndicate. <strong>The</strong> development <strong>of</strong> local equity markets9This argument disregards the fact that many LBOs are buyouts <strong>of</strong> divisions <strong>of</strong> public companies, while many trade-sale exits are to public companyacquirers. A more complete flow analysis will have to take this into account as well. We intend to pursue this issue in future research, where we willalso analyse the acquisition and divestment activity <strong>of</strong> LBO firms in more detail.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Large-sample studies: Demography 11
- Page 2 and 3: The Globalization of Alternative In
- Page 5: ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
- Page 9 and 10: PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
- Page 11 and 12: Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
- Page 13 and 14: Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
- Page 15 and 16: • Private equity-backed companies
- Page 17 and 18: C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
- Page 19 and 20: Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
- Page 21 and 22: The new demography of private equit
- Page 23 and 24: among US publicly traded firms, it
- Page 25 and 26: should be fairly complete. While th
- Page 27: according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
- Page 31 and 32: FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
- Page 33 and 34: TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
- Page 35 and 36: Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
- Page 37 and 38: Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
- Page 39 and 40: Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
- Page 41 and 42: Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
- Page 43 and 44: Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
- Page 45 and 46: Private equity and long-run investm
- Page 47 and 48: alternative names associated with t
- Page 49 and 50: 4. Finally, we explore whether firm
- Page 51 and 52: When we estimate these regressions,
- Page 53 and 54: cutting back on the number of filin
- Page 55 and 56: Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
- Page 57 and 58: Table 4: Relative citation intensit
- Page 59 and 60: figuresFigure 1: Number of private
- Page 61 and 62: Private equity and employment*steve
- Page 63 and 64: Especially when taken together, our
- Page 65 and 66: centred on the transaction year ide
- Page 67 and 68: and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
- Page 69 and 70: sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
- Page 71 and 72: employment-weighted acquisition rat
- Page 73 and 74: FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
- Page 75 and 76: Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
- Page 77 and 78: Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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Figure 12: Differences in impact on
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Private equity and corporate govern
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et al (2007) track the evolution of
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groups aim to improve firm performa
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distribution of the LBO sponsors, m
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the most difficult cases. This stor
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to see whether these changes of CEO
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Figure 3:This figure represents the
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TablesTable 1: Company size descrip
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Table 5: Changes in the board size,
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Table 7: Board turnoverPanel A: Siz
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Part 2Case studiesThe Global Econom
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European private equity cases: intr
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Exhibit 1: Private equity fund size
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Messer Griesheimann-kristin achleit
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ealized it was not possible to grow
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The deal with Allianz Capital partn
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the deal, the private equity invest
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Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
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Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
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New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
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feet. This restricted store space w
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institutional investors why this in
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Although a public listing did not a
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Exhibit 5: Employment development a
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Chinese private equity cases: intro
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Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
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Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde