employment paths for targets with the employment pathsfor controls with the same observable characteristics inthe transaction year. <strong>The</strong>re are close to 300,000 targetestablishments in our analysis sample and more than1.4 million control establishments.In constructing control groups we use 72 industry categories,three establishment age classes, three establishment sizeclasses based on relative size within the industry and ageclass, and an indicator for whether the establishment is part<strong>of</strong> a multi-establishment firm or a single-establishment firm. 12Fully interacting these factors yields about 1,300 control cellsper year. After pooling across years, there are about 30,000potential control classes in our analysis. In practice, targetestablishments populate about 7,500 <strong>of</strong> these classes. Wenow provide some additional remarks about the controlsand their motivation:• Industry: By matching targets to controls in the same industry,we alleviate concerns that the non-random industrydistribution <strong>of</strong> targets (Figures 4A and 4B) drives ourresults. We match targets to controls at the two-digitSIC level for the 1980–2001 period and at the four-digitNAICS level (roughly equivalent to two-digit SIC) for the2002–2005 period.• Establishment age: Figure 5 shows that targetestablishments are older than other establishmentson an employment-weighted basis. Previous researchon business dynamics emphasizes that the mean andvariability <strong>of</strong> employment growth rates vary systematicallywith establishment and firm age (e.g. Davis et al 2006,2007). Recent findings highlight especially largedifferences between very young establishments (firms)and more mature establishments (firms). To alleviateconcerns that the non-random age distribution <strong>of</strong>targets drives our results, we use three age classesfor establishments: 0–4, 5–9 and 10 or more yearssince first year <strong>of</strong> positive payroll for the establishment.Given the large differences in the mean and variability<strong>of</strong> employment growth by establishment age, netemployment and volatility <strong>of</strong> growth rates acrossestablishments, controlling for such age differencesis likely to be very important.• Relative size: <strong>The</strong> recent literature also finds that averagenet growth as well as the volatility <strong>of</strong> net growth variessystematically by business size. However, the sizedistribution <strong>of</strong> establishments also varies dramatically byindustry, with manufacturing establishments typically muchlarger than, say, retail establishments. As such, we controlfor the relative size <strong>of</strong> establishments in each industry. Weclassify each establishment into a small, medium or largesize class based on its relative size in the establishment’sindustry-age-year cell. We choose the size thresholds sothat each relative size class contains one third <strong>of</strong>employment in the industry-age-year cell. <strong>The</strong> right panel<strong>of</strong> Figure 5 shows that the targeted establishments aredisproportionately in the middle and larger relative sizeclasses, compared with the LBD universe <strong>of</strong> establishmentson an employment-weighted basis.• Single-unit versus multi-unit: Another factor that hasbeen shown to be important for firm and establishmentdynamics is whether the establishment is part <strong>of</strong> a singleunitfirm or part <strong>of</strong> a firm with multiple establishments.Examples <strong>of</strong> multi-unit firms include Wal-Mart with manyretail and wholesale establishments and Chrysler withmany automobile assembly plants and other facilities.A third choice relates to the time frame <strong>of</strong> the analysis.<strong>The</strong> establishment-level analyses focus on the change inemployment in the five years before and after the transaction.This corresponds to typical holding periods by private equitygroups (Strömberg <strong>2008</strong>), and should give a reasonablycomprehensive sense <strong>of</strong> the impacts <strong>of</strong> the transactions.For the firm-level analysis, we must confront the fact thatfirms are constantly being reorganized through mergers,acquisitions and divestitures, as well as whole-firm changesin ownership. <strong>The</strong> exit <strong>of</strong> a firm <strong>of</strong>ten then does not imply thatall the establishments in the firm have ceased operations andlikewise the entry <strong>of</strong> a firm <strong>of</strong>ten does not imply greenfieldentry. We deal with this limitation <strong>of</strong> the firm-level analysis ina number <strong>of</strong> ways. While our firm-level analysis is based onfirms that we can accurately track over time, we focus on arelatively short horizon after buyout transactions (two years)so that the tracking <strong>of</strong> firms is more reliable. In addition, weuse our establishment-level data integrated with the firm toquantify the impact <strong>of</strong> selection bias in our firm-level analysis.Finally, in Sections 5.A and 5.B, we compare employmentdynamics at the establishments <strong>of</strong> target firms with theemployment dynamics <strong>of</strong> the control establishments. It isuseful to define the measure <strong>of</strong> employment and growth thatwe use in this analysis. Let E itbe employment in year t forestablishment i. Recall this is a point-in-time measurereflecting the number <strong>of</strong> workers on the payroll for the payrollperiod that includes 12 March. We measure establishmentlevelemployment growth as follows:g it= (E it– E it-1) / X it,whereX it= .5* (E it+ E it-1) .This growth rate measure has become standard in analysis<strong>of</strong> establishment and firm dynamics, because it shares someuseful properties <strong>of</strong> log differences but also accommodatesentry and exit. (See Davis et al 2006, and Tornqvist, Vartia12To construct our relative size measure, we first group establishments by the 72 industries and three age classes in each calendar year. Next, we rankestablishments by number <strong>of</strong> employees within each industry-age-year cell. Finally, we define cut<strong>of</strong>fs for small, medium and large establishments sothat each size class category accounts for about one third <strong>of</strong> employment in the industry-age-year cell.48 Large-sample studies: Employment<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employment growth at any level<strong>of</strong> aggregation is given by the appropriate employmentweighted average <strong>of</strong> establishment-level growth:g t= ∑i(X it/ X t) / g it,whereX t= ∑iX itIt is instructive to decompose net growth into thoseestablishments that are increasing employment (including thecontribution <strong>of</strong> entry) and those establishments decreasingemployment (including the contribution <strong>of</strong> exit). Denoting theformer as (gross) job creation and the latter as job destruction,these two gross flow measures are calculated as:JC t= ∑i(X it/ X t) max {g it, 0}JD t= ∑i(X it/ X t) max {-g it, 0}In addition, computing the respective contribution <strong>of</strong> entryto job creation and exit to job destruction is useful. <strong>The</strong>semeasures are given by:JC _ Entry = ∑ (Xt it/ X t) I {g it= 2} ,iwhere I is an indicator variable equal to one if expression inbrackets hold, zero otherwise, and g it= 2 denotes an entrant.JD _ Exit = ∑ (Xt it/ X t) I {g it= –2} ,iwhere g it= –2 denotes an exit.Given these definitions, the following simple relationships hold:g t= JC t– JD t, JC t= JC _ Cont t+ JC _ Entry tand JD t= JD _ Cont t+JD _ Exit twhere JC_Cont and JD_Cont are job creation and jobdestruction for continuing establishments respectively.<strong>The</strong> firm-level analysis uses the same basic measures but withthe caveat that firm-level entry and exit must not be interpretedin the same manner as establishment-level entry and exit. Asdiscussed above, establishment-level entry is the opening up<strong>of</strong> a new (greenfield) establishment at a specific location andestablishment-level exit indicates that the activity at thephysical location has ceased operations. In contrast,firm-level entry may reflect a new organization or ownership<strong>of</strong> previously operating entities and firm-level exit may likewisereflect some change in organization or ownership.5. AnalysisA. Basic establishment-level analysesWe conduct an “event study”, exploring the impact <strong>of</strong> theprivate equity transaction during as well as before and afterthe transaction. As noted above, we focus on the window <strong>of</strong>time from five years before to five years after the transaction.We compare and contrast the employment dynamics for thetarget (private equity-backed) establishments with the controlestablishments. For any given target establishment, the controlestablishments are all the establishments that have positiveactivity in the transaction year <strong>of</strong> the target that are in thesame industry, age, relative size and multi-unit status cell.Since we look at the impact five years prior to and five yearssubsequent to the transaction for this initial analysis, we focuson transactions that occurred in the 1980–2000 period. 13<strong>The</strong> first exercise we explore is the differences in net growthrates <strong>of</strong> employment for the establishments <strong>of</strong> the targets vsthe controls. Figure 6A shows the net growth rate differencesin the transaction year and for the five years prior andsubsequent to the transaction. To construct Figure 6A, wepool all <strong>of</strong> the private equity transactions in our matchedsample from 1980 to 2000 and calculate differences in growthrates relative to controls on an employment-weighted basis.Prior to and in the year <strong>of</strong> the private equity transaction, thereis a systematic pattern in terms <strong>of</strong> less job growth (or more joblosses) for the targets than the controls: the differences in netgrowth are between 1% and 3% per year. This is consistentwith depictions <strong>of</strong> private equity groups investing in troubledcompanies. After a similarly lower rate for net job growth fortargets in the first year after the transaction, the difference inthe job growth rates widens in the second and third year afterthe transaction: the rate is about 4% below that <strong>of</strong> the controlsin each year. In the fourth and fifth years after the transaction,the pattern reverses, with the targets having slightly greateremployment growth. 14To help understand these patterns, we explore differentdimensions <strong>of</strong> the differences between establishments <strong>of</strong> targetsand controls. In Figure 6B, we show the net growth rate patternsseparately for targets and controls. <strong>The</strong> basic patterns <strong>of</strong> netgrowth for targets and controls are quite similar. Prior to thetransaction, both targets and controls exhibit large positivegrowth rates. Subsequent to the transaction, both targets andcontrols exhibit large negative growth rates. <strong>The</strong>se patternshighlight the critical need to include controls in evaluating theemployment dynamics <strong>of</strong> establishments <strong>of</strong> targets. If one lookedat employment dynamics <strong>of</strong> establishments <strong>of</strong> targets in isolation(focusing only on the targets in Figure 6B), one might draw thevery misleading conclusion that targets shrink consistently andsubstantially after the private equity transaction. 1513Our firm-level analysis in later sections focuses on a two-year horizon after the transaction and thus considers all transactions up through those in2003. For the firm-level analysis, we have found that the results are quite similar whether we consider transactions only up through 2000 or 2003,suggesting that the establishment-level analysis is likely not very sensitive to this restriction. We plan to explore this issue further in future work.14We do not report standard errors in this draft but will report standard errors for key exercises in subsequent drafts. For example, the reported netdifferences in Figure 6A can be interpreted as being consistent with pooling the target and control data over all years and estimating an employmentweightedregression <strong>of</strong> net employment growth on fully saturated controls and private equity transaction dummies for targeted establishments.15It is important to note that the pattern <strong>of</strong> positive net employment growth prior to the transaction year and negative net growth after seen in Figure 6Band the inverted v-shape in Figure 6C reflect a generic feature <strong>of</strong> the data. Namely, if one randomly observes establishments at some fixed point intheir lifecycle, they will, on average, exhibit growth up to the point and will, on average, exhibit decline from that point on.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Large-sample studies: Employment 49
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
- Page 15 and 16: • Private equity-backed companies
- Page 17 and 18: C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
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Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
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New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
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feet. This restricted store space w
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institutional investors why this in
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Although a public listing did not a
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Exhibit 5: Employment development a
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Chinese private equity cases: intro
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Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
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Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
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Establishing early agreement on pos
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Executing the IPOEach of the initia
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Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
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Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
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Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
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Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
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3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
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y an aggressive franchise strategy,
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soul” of the business. But there
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Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
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Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
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Indian private equity cases: introd
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ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
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investment,” recalled Deshpande.
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2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
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Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
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Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
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founded two companies at this time
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By 2003 this restructuring task was
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Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
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Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
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Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
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Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
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In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
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consumer products. She was also a R
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde