agreed that an additional 8% <strong>of</strong> Hony’s shares would betransferred to company management at the same price uponits successful completion <strong>of</strong> the IPO. To ensure that thedesignated executives could afford the two share purchases,local banks and Hony agreed to provide loans on favourableterms. In return for this generous share purchase agreement,the executives signed long‐term contracts obligating themto remain with the company. Thus, Hony clearly understoodthe importance <strong>of</strong> ensuring a stable, highly motivatedmanagement team that would work seamlessly to build value.<strong>The</strong> value‐creation objective was most likely to be achieved bycreating an incentive‐based executive compensation schemelinked directly to company performance.Attracting a world-class strategic investorZhao and his Hony colleagues recognized from the outsetthe imperative <strong>of</strong> attracting a highly credible internationalstrategic partner to enhance the value <strong>of</strong> the deal, both forthe operational and technological expertise it would <strong>of</strong>ferand the prestige it would add at the time <strong>of</strong> the IPO. Alarge, financially strong strategic investor with a long‐termcommitment to China’s glass industry also provided Honywith an attractive exit route when the timing was right.In 2004, even before the deal closed, Hony entered intodiscussions with senior executives at UK‐based Pilkington, atthe time the world’s largest flat glass producer with 23 glassplants in 11 countries. Although Pilkington had been operatingin China through several joint ventures since the 1980s its seniormanagement was convinced the company had to implement amore aggressive strategy in order to capture a larger share inthe country that accounted for one third <strong>of</strong> the world market.<strong>The</strong> optimal strategy, they believed, was to acquire a majorstake in one <strong>of</strong> the premier domestic manufacturers.During the due diligence phase <strong>of</strong> the Jiangsu deal, Zhaowas introduced to Gerry Gray, the senior Pilkington executiveresponsible for implementing the firm’s China strategy.According to Gray: “I knew that no deal in China would everbe legally airtight, but if we could find a partner with whom wehad a high level <strong>of</strong> trust, we could make it work. From the firstmeeting I had a strong sense that we could trust John, and thishas served as the cornerstone <strong>of</strong> our relationship ever since.”Based on pre‐close negotiations, Pilkington initiallysubscribed to 9.9% <strong>of</strong> the China Glass shares at the IPO<strong>of</strong>fer price. Hony and Pilkington also entered into twocall‐option agreements whereby Pilkington would eventuallyhave the right to acquire all <strong>of</strong> Hony’s shares in China Glass.<strong>The</strong> first call option, which had to be exercised within 18months <strong>of</strong> the IPO, gave Pilkington the right to acquire 20%<strong>of</strong> China Glass shares from Hony at a 5% premium to theIPO price. 9 <strong>The</strong> second option, which must be exercised by2011, allows Pilkington to acquire all <strong>of</strong> Hony’s remainingshares in China Glass at the 12‐month average price priorto the purchase. This carefully orchestrated arrangement<strong>of</strong>fered tangible benefits to both investors. Hony was seekinga strong strategic partner with a long and successful globaltrack record and a potential exit route, while Pilkingtonwanted to establish a stronger foothold in China by havingthe option to take control <strong>of</strong> a major domestic manufacturer,thus allowing the firm to become the dominant foreign playerin the domestic flat glass market.Preparing for the IPOIn addition to creating the new incentive‐based executivecompensation scheme and attracting a reputable strategicinvestor, Hony helped China Glass in a series <strong>of</strong> major structuralreforms to transform the formerly state‐owned company intoan attractive publicly listed company. <strong>The</strong>se included:• Board restructuring: Prior to the Hony buyout, even thecompany’s CEO acknowledged that, like most SOEs, theboard was merely a rubber stamp, providing virtually nomeaningful oversight or governance <strong>of</strong> the company. Oncethe Hony deal was sealed, board composition, structureand functions were dramatically changed to provide thecompany with corporate governance standards andpractices that met the international benchmarks expectedby investors <strong>of</strong> publicly listed companies. For example:• <strong>The</strong> new board would be comprised <strong>of</strong> three seniormembers <strong>of</strong> management, two Hony representativesand three independent directors unrelated to thecompany. It was further agreed that the boardcomposition would further change after the IPO toinclude two representatives from Pilkington. (SeeExhibit 4 for pr<strong>of</strong>iles <strong>of</strong> board members prior to the IPO.)• Hony CEO John Zhao became chairman <strong>of</strong> the board• A number <strong>of</strong> committees, including audit, compensation,and compliance committees, were created• Regularly scheduled board meetings were mandatedat approximately one-month intervals• Management was instructed to provide all boardmembers with monthly financial and operating reports,using a newly created standard format• New accounting and audit standards: Immediate stepswere also taken to establish accounting standards andpractices that would fully comply with the GenerallyAccepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) required by HongKong Stock Exchange. An annual independent audit wouldalso be performed for the first time in the company’s history.• Obtaining international certifications: Operational standardswere improved and benchmarked against internationalstandards. Prior to the IPO, the company received anISO9001 certification for its quality assurance systemand another ISO certification for its environmentalmanagement systems.9This option has already been exercised in March 2007, increasing Pilkington’s holding in China Glass to 29.9% at the time.120 Case studies: Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
Executing the IPOEach <strong>of</strong> the initiatives taken in the months immediately beforeand after Hony closed the transaction at the end <strong>of</strong> 2004were building blocks for creating a more pr<strong>of</strong>essionallymanaged, internationally competitive company. <strong>The</strong> ultimateobjective <strong>of</strong> these reforms was to establish credibility withprospective investors and regulators, which would positionthe company to gain continuous access to diversifiedsources <strong>of</strong> capital and a platform to expand – a necessityfor China Glass’s long‐term growth and competitiveness.Moreover, a successful IPO would eliminate the company’sfinancial dependence on the State, and place it squarelyin the ranks <strong>of</strong> private companies that are continuouslysubjected to the discipline <strong>of</strong> market forces. In other words,the future availability and cost <strong>of</strong> capital would be a function<strong>of</strong> market perceptions <strong>of</strong> company performance rather thangovernment considerations.As the controlling shareholder, Hony took charge <strong>of</strong> guidingthe company through the entire underwriting process,selecting the investment bank and financial advisors,overseeing the preparation <strong>of</strong> the prospectus, registeringthe <strong>of</strong>fering with the Hong Kong authorities, orchestratingand running the road show and establishing the timing andpricing <strong>of</strong> the <strong>of</strong>fering. Zhou believed that “Hony’s hands‐oninvolvement at every step <strong>of</strong> the process was critical to thesuccessful outcome <strong>of</strong> the IPO”.In June 2005, only seven months after Hony closed thebuyout transaction, China Glass Holdings Ltd issued 90 millionnew shares on the HKSE, raising US$25 million <strong>of</strong> capital, thebulk <strong>of</strong> which was applied to meet the previously agreedstrategic objective <strong>of</strong> rapidly expanding production capacity.As one measure <strong>of</strong> how far the company had come in a shortperiod <strong>of</strong> time, the <strong>of</strong>fering was eight times over-subscribedeven though the IPO price represented a 12.8 P/E ratio, wellabove the prevailing industry average <strong>of</strong> about 8.0. Post‐IPO,Hony continued to control the company, albeit with a dilutedequity stake now <strong>of</strong> 62.56%; management held 12.44%,Pilkington held 9.9% and the remaining 15.1% was in thehands <strong>of</strong> the public shareholders.Creating a market leader: executing anacquisition‐led growth strategyFrom the very beginning <strong>of</strong> their strategic discussions,Hony and China Glass management shared theunderstanding that a successful listing would be only thebeginning <strong>of</strong> China Glass’s fight to become China’s premierflat glass manufacturer. Pre‐IPO, ranked tenth in scaleamong domestic manufacturers, China Glass was in atenuous position facing the inevitable onslaught <strong>of</strong> industryconsolidation. “Either we will be acquired by one <strong>of</strong> our largercompetitors, or we would become an acquirer,” explainedZhou. Post‐IPO, armed with the international brandrecognition and the permanent source <strong>of</strong> diversified capitalafforded by the listing, China Glass was ready to be the latter.In February 2006, only eight months after China Glass’s HKSElisting, the company announced its intention to undertake amajor acquisition on an unprecedented scale in the history<strong>of</strong> the Chinese glass industry. <strong>The</strong> transaction involved theacquisition <strong>of</strong> seven glass manufacturers with a combineddaily capacity <strong>of</strong> 4,780 tons, more than three times ChinaGlass’s own capacity. <strong>The</strong> expansion took the companyfrom three production lines to 14, making it China’s largestlisted flat glass producer. With one stroke, not only did thisacquisition extend China Glass’s footprint to all theeconomically important regions <strong>of</strong> the country, but it alsoresulted in a significantly more diversified and technicallyadvanced product portfolio, containing varieties such aslow‐e glass, super‐thin glass, silicon glass and solar glass.Hony led China Glass through every stage <strong>of</strong> thetransaction, serving as both the strategic mastermind andthe execution specialist. <strong>The</strong> Hony team played a criticalrole in selecting the acquisition targets, designing a feasiblefinancing strategy, mobilizing the required capital and guidingthe company through a web <strong>of</strong> technical complexities.When the entire transaction was finally completely inmid-2007, China Glass had established itself as the leadingChinese glass manufacturer. When asked about Hony’srole in the acquisition strategy, Zhou said without hesitation:“Without Hony, we could never have dreamed <strong>of</strong> takingChina Glass where it is today.” (See Exhibit 5 and Exhibit 6for a summary <strong>of</strong> recent acquisitions by China Glass, and thecompany’s post‐acquisition capacity and product portfolioinformation respectively.)Expanding access to international capital marketsIn July 2007, two years after the IPO, a much larger andcompletely restructured China Glass again demonstratedits ability to access capital from international sources oncompetitive terms. Returning to the public securities market,the company successfully issued a US$100 million ($95.8million net after fees and commissions), five‐year, 9.625%US‐dollar denominated note in Singapore. <strong>The</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> theproceeds from this bond issue were used to strengthen thecompany’s balance sheet by refinancing and extending thematurities <strong>of</strong> existing debt obligations. Hony was againinstrumental in marketing and placing this <strong>of</strong>fering.Employment practicesThrough the years, Hony never wavered from one <strong>of</strong> thefundamental tenets <strong>of</strong> its investment philosophy: buyoutsuccess in China depends on the retention <strong>of</strong> keymanagement personnel. Zhao explained: “We will only makean investment when we are convinced there is a completealignment <strong>of</strong> interests with senior management about whatneeds to be done post‐investment to grow the company.Consistent with this approach is our conviction that we willnot do a deal that requires a change <strong>of</strong> management.” Inthe China Glass case, as <strong>of</strong> mid‐2007 there had been nomanagement turnover, no abnormal lay<strong>of</strong>fs associated withthe buyout and employee wages and benefits had beenstructured to ensure competitiveness with industry standards.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Case studies: Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings 121
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
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Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
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Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
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Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
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Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
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Private equity and long-run investm
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alternative names associated with t
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4. Finally, we explore whether firm
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When we estimate these regressions,
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cutting back on the number of filin
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Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
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Table 4: Relative citation intensit
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figuresFigure 1: Number of private
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Private equity and employment*steve
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Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
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Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
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Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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Figure 12: Differences in impact on
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Private equity and corporate govern
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et al (2007) track the evolution of
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The World Economic Forum is an inde