sector. For example, nearly all <strong>of</strong> the well‐known Indian retailgroups, including the Big Bazaar Group, Pantaloon Retail,and Shoppers’ Stop, have been backed by ICICI Venture.Not coincidentally, this sector exposure reflects the group’sstrategy to capitalize on the domestic regulatory environmentthat until recently has heavily protected the rapidly growingretail sector against foreign investment.India’s retail sectorIndia’s retail sector is vast yet inefficient and underdeveloped.Retail currently accounts for about 10% <strong>of</strong> India’s GDP,making it a $250 billion industry and India the world’s twelfthlargest retail market. Yet, in 2007, only 3% <strong>of</strong> this market wascomprised <strong>of</strong> organized retail (chain stores). 3 <strong>The</strong> remaining97% consists <strong>of</strong> more than 15 million tiny “mom‐and‐pop”shops (called “Kiranas”), with an average space <strong>of</strong> 100square feet, selling groceries and household products atwhat is known as the “maximum retail price”. 4But the sector’s massive inefficiency and under‐developmentis poised for dramatic change. According to a recent study, 5India’s aggregate consumption is projected to quadruple in thenext 20 years, making the country the fifth largest retail marketin the world. Moreover, the middle class will swell from thecurrent 50 million to almost 600 million by 2025, creatingexceptional opportunities for astute retailers who are able tocapture part <strong>of</strong> this huge market.Despite this enormous potential, however, the Indian retailsector is still fraught with regulatory and political risk. Untilrecently, foreign direct investment was strictly limited inIndia’s retail sector. While new regulations in 2006 permittedmajority foreign ownership (up to 51%) in retail businessesfor the first time, such investments were still limited tosingle‐brand stores. In addition, even domestic playerscannot escape the political pressure from the 15 millionstrong Kirana operators who comprise the second largestemployment sector in India, just behind agriculture. Recently,for example, when large Indian business groups such asReliance and Birla entered the retail market, they weresubjected to frequent store shut‐downs caused by(sometimes violent) protests.Nevertheless, the overall outlook for Indian retail is bright.“Our view is that India’s retail sector sooner or later will followthe trend in China. <strong>The</strong> shift towards organized retail isinevitable,” said Deshpande, who has been responsiblefor most <strong>of</strong> the group’s investment in the sector. This viewseems to have been borne out by the huge amount <strong>of</strong>interest shown by established Indian business groupsas well as foreign retail operators. 6Subhiksha – a truly indian retail modelIndian entrepreneur R. Subramanian (RS) founded SubhikshaTrading Services <strong>Private</strong> Limited (henceforth Subhiksha,pronounced su`biksha) in 1997 in his hometown <strong>of</strong> Chennai,a city <strong>of</strong> 8 million inhabitants on the east coast <strong>of</strong> India.<strong>The</strong> energetic, fast‐talking RS, as he is known, has anengineering degree from the renowned Indian Institute <strong>of</strong>Technology, Madras, and he graduated at the top <strong>of</strong> his classfrom the Indian Institute <strong>of</strong> Management, Ahmedabad in the1980s. Preferring to “do something in front <strong>of</strong> my own people”,RS decided to stay in India at a time when many fellowgraduates were choosing to go abroad. He quickly became asuccessful entrepreneur, founding two ventures that developedpioneering financial instruments for the Indian marketplace. 7 In1997, RS launched his third venture, Subhiksha, even thoughhe had no experience in the retail sector.<strong>The</strong> carefully chosen brand name “Subhiksha” means “giver<strong>of</strong> good things in life” in Sanskrit and was an apt name forthe company’s philosophy. Subhiksha’s business model wasto sell everyday necessities and staples, such as food,groceries, and commonly used pharmaceuticals at asubstantial 8%‐10% discount to the “maximum retail” pricecharged at Kirana stores. For the average Indian middle-classfamily that spent about 50% <strong>of</strong> its total budget on groceries,a saving <strong>of</strong> this magnitude was significant. <strong>The</strong> uniqueness inSubhiksha’s business model is its hybrid feature adapted tothe changing Indian retail market: while its heavily promoteddiscounts resembled Wal‐Mart’s “everyday low prices”, itsstore format was closer to 7‐eleven’s convenience‐storemodel. Subhiksha’s stores are small, ranging from 1,000 to2,000 square feet in floor space, and are located in the heart<strong>of</strong> residential catchments with a 1‐2km radius.This distinctive retail model was the outcome <strong>of</strong> a three‐monthstudy <strong>of</strong> Subhiksha’s target customers that consisted <strong>of</strong> theburgeoning Indian middle class. As Deshpande explained:“First, the middle class shopper doesn’t have a car to dodestination shopping. Second, Indians are obsessed withthe freshness <strong>of</strong> their food and prefer frequent shopping. (Ithelps that 85% <strong>of</strong> the women don’t work.) Third, frequentpurchases in small amounts also helps households bettermanage cash flow… In my view, Subhiksha’s model, whichcombines the front‐end friendliness and familiarity <strong>of</strong> aKirana, and a back‐end efficiency <strong>of</strong> a large discount chain,makes a lot <strong>of</strong> sense and is a meaningful way to address theIndian retail market.”But not everyone was convinced that the model wouldbe successful. “I was questioned so many times about this3Statistics on India retail sector are compiled from “Gently does it – Indian retailing”, <strong>The</strong> Economist, 11 August 2007; “Setting up shop in India– Retailing”, <strong>The</strong> Economist, 4 November 2006; and “Coming to market – Retailing in India”, <strong>The</strong> Economist, 15 April 2006.4In India, producers set the maximum retail price for goods. Kiranas seldom deviates from this price, effectively reducing competition and differentiation.5“<strong>The</strong> Bird <strong>of</strong> Gold: <strong>The</strong> Rise <strong>of</strong> India’s Consumer Market”, McKinsey <strong>Global</strong> Institute, May 2007.6Reliance Group has launched Reliance Fresh, a chain <strong>of</strong> grocers. <strong>The</strong> Tata Group and the Bharti Group have formed joint ventures with Australia’sWoolworths group and the US giant Wal‐Mart respectively to enter into retail business.7RS’ first company did asset securitization in India in 1992, and his second company <strong>of</strong>fered financing for small investors to make IPO investmentsin the booming Indian stock market in 1994.144 Case studies: ICICI Ventures and Subhiksha<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
investment,” recalled Deshpande. Critics <strong>of</strong> the Subhikshamodel believed that ‘organized retail’ meant a big‐box format.<strong>The</strong>y argued that the only reason Kiranas could survive in thelow‐margin food and grocery business was that they had nooverheads. A chain <strong>of</strong> small stores would not achieve scaleefficiency, but its overheads would eliminate all <strong>of</strong> the margin.RS however was able to counter conventional wisdom bydeveloping a set <strong>of</strong> unique, innovative practices in his storesthat made a small‐format grocery chain pr<strong>of</strong>itable in India.For example:• Careful selection <strong>of</strong> store location to save on rent:Subhiksha’s stores were located in residential areas whererentals were typically 30%‐50% lower than “high streets”.Traffic into the stores was not affected by the back‐streetlocations because most <strong>of</strong> Subhiksha’s business wasderived from local residents, who were well aware <strong>of</strong> thestore’s presence.• SKU control:Subhiksha stocked only the 70%‐80% most frequently usedhousehold items, and for each category only the top oneor two brands were stocked. This practice ensured highinventory turnover and efficient shelf‐space management.For select product categories, Subhiksha was developingprivate label items to increase customer choice.• Eliminating the middlemen:Subhiksha purchased in large volumes directly fromwholesalers and received quantity discounts.• Just‐in‐time inventory management:Subhiksha stores carried very small inventories. <strong>The</strong> bulk<strong>of</strong> the inventory was stored in a central depot, serving allstores in a city. Using computerized just‐in‐time inventorymanagement, at the end <strong>of</strong> each day each store uploadedre‐stocking requests to the central depot; the data wasprocessed overnight and the exact amount <strong>of</strong> inventorywas delivered the next morning before the store opened.• Value‐adding services but bare‐bones operations:To increase customer loyalty, Subhiksha <strong>of</strong>fered a loyaltyprogramme and home delivery service (via bicycle). Dueto low labour costs and store proximity to customerresidences, each store was able to <strong>of</strong>fer delivery servicefor next to nothing.ICICI Venture’s investment in subhishaBetween 1997 and 2000, RS built a chain <strong>of</strong> 50 stores acrossChennai and he was beginning to plan a more aggressivegrowth strategy that was contingent on raising outside capital.Familiar with the ICICI brand name, RS contacted ICICIVenture to explore his financing options. Among manyinvestments it made during the technology bubble, ICICIVenture invested 150m Rupees (Rs) (about US$3.4 million) 8 inSubhiksha in June 2000 for 15% <strong>of</strong> the company. (See Exhibit2 for a time line <strong>of</strong> ICICI Venture’s investments in Subhiksha.)But shortly after this initial investment ICICI Venture beganto undergo a series <strong>of</strong> changes, in part caused by thebursting <strong>of</strong> the technology bubble and the deterioratingperformance <strong>of</strong> its investment portfolio. One major changewas the hiring <strong>of</strong> Deshpande, who had more than 10 years<strong>of</strong> operational experience in a number <strong>of</strong> multinational retailoperations, including Best Foods and Cadbury. Her first taskwas to pare down her inherited portfolio <strong>of</strong> 39 companiesby 50%. <strong>The</strong> portfolio review resulted in the retention <strong>of</strong>18 companies, eight <strong>of</strong> which were in the retail sector, 9including Subhiksha. 10 Deshpande was attracted toSubhiksha because it targeted the rapidly expanding middleclass, where food and groceries comprised more than 50%<strong>of</strong> their total spending. But, according to her, that wasn’t themost compelling reason to retain Subhiksha in the portfolio.That reason was “clearly the founder. RS is a maverick, atruly talented entrepreneur”, she said.From its first $3 million commitment in 2000, ICICI Ventureeventually invested a total <strong>of</strong> $20 million in Subhiksha infour rounds over seven years, and was the company’sonly external source <strong>of</strong> equity. During this long period, therelationship between ICICI Venture and Subhiksha deepenedas they worked closely to enhance performance and expandthe company’s geographic footprint.2000 – 2002: the early yearsInitially the relationship between Deshpande and RS wasformal and somewhat distant. RS referred to the period asone in which “neither side made many demands on theother… We moved on with our own business. <strong>The</strong>y weretrying to understand what we were doing and also fix theirown portfolio problems. But it was a period in which a lot<strong>of</strong> comfort and trust was built.”Although ICICI Venture may have appeared relatively passiveon the surface, it was not entirely laissez faire. Deshpandeexplained her approach: “<strong>The</strong> first question is whether youtrust the entrepreneur. In RS’s case, the answer was yes…But as with all brilliant people, RS has his quirks and ourapproach had to be flexible. You need to maintain theoversight, but also give the entrepreneur space. You don’twant to push him to do things that he does not like to do.”Aside from capital, there was an additional, tangible benefitICICI Venture brought to Subhiksha during this early stage.“<strong>The</strong>ir investment gave us a lot <strong>of</strong> credibility, which was whatwe wanted. After all, we were an unknown quantity with a newformat. With their investment, we could attract good employeesand negotiate with better suppliers better, etc,” explained RS.8All US Dollar amounts are approximate, converted from average exchange rate during the month <strong>of</strong> the investment.9<strong>The</strong> other retail businesses Deshpande kept included Shoppers’ Stop; the Future Group, which operates the department store chain Pantaloon;and Big Bazaar. Today, they are all leading retail groups in different segments <strong>of</strong> the Indian market.10ICIC Venture closed out or exited the rest <strong>of</strong> the investments.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Case studies: ICICI Ventures and Subhiksha 145
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
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Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
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Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
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Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
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Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
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Private equity and long-run investm
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alternative names associated with t
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4. Finally, we explore whether firm
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When we estimate these regressions,
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cutting back on the number of filin
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Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
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Table 4: Relative citation intensit
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figuresFigure 1: Number of private
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Private equity and employment*steve
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Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
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Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
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Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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Figure 12: Differences in impact on
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Private equity and corporate govern
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et al (2007) track the evolution of
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groups aim to improve firm performa
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distribution of the LBO sponsors, m
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the most difficult cases. This stor
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to see whether these changes of CEO
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Figure 3:This figure represents the
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TablesTable 1: Company size descrip
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Table 5: Changes in the board size,
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Table 7: Board turnoverPanel A: Siz
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Part 2Case studiesThe Global Econom
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European private equity cases: intr
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Exhibit 1: Private equity fund size
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Messer Griesheimann-kristin achleit
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