industry standard where the top five manufacturers held a70% share <strong>of</strong> the world market, the top five in China onlyaccounted for about 20% <strong>of</strong> the domestic market. Zhao andhis team believed the industry was poised for consolidation,following the trend already occurring in many other sectorsthat were striving to enhance efficiency through larger scale.Hony also observed the considerable cyclicality in theindustry, and forecasted that prices would peak in late2004 or early 2005 before beginning a two‐year downturn.(See Exhibit 2 for an illustration <strong>of</strong> glass industry cyclicality.)Tactically, these forecasts guided Hony’s timetable for thebuyout and the subsequent IPO in early 2005.China Glass Holdings OverviewJiangsu Glass, located about halfway between Beijing andShanghai, was owned primarily by the municipal government<strong>of</strong> Suqian (a city in northern Jiangsu Province), with minoritystakes held by two other government‐owned assetmanagement companies. In 1996, the company had sufferedhuge losses and Suqian Vice Mayor Zhou Cheng wasappointed as the new CEO. He was given a mandate by thegovernment to clean house and turn around the money‐losingoperation. Although Zhou knew virtually nothing about theglass manufacturing industry, he quickly set out to streamlinethe company by disposing <strong>of</strong> all non‐essential assets, such asa hospital, a health clinic, schools and other facilities typicallyowned and operated by SOEs in China. He also revampedthe company’s balance sheet by successfully orchestrating amajor debt restructuring.<strong>The</strong> turnaround <strong>of</strong> Jiangsu Glass, led by Zhou, graduallybegan to transform the company into one <strong>of</strong> China’s mostefficient float glass producers, albeit with a relatively smallproduction capacity, even by domestic Chinese standards.Before the Hony investment, Jiangsu Glass had two floatglass production lines with a combined daily capacity <strong>of</strong> 900tons. Accounting for just 2% <strong>of</strong> the domestic market, it wasranked tenth in size among Chinese flat glass producers. Butit was number one in terms <strong>of</strong> return on total assets (beforetax and interest), according to the China Building MaterialsQuantity Supervision Association.Notwithstanding this impressive turnaround, by 2003the municipal government had decided to privatize JiangsuGlass, paying heed to the 2002 Party Congress directivethat “the government is not in the business <strong>of</strong> runningbusinesses”, and therefore every effort would be made bythe government to divest itself <strong>of</strong> businesses in highlycompetitive industries. In China, this significant policy shiftwas widely heralded as “state steps back, people stepforward”. Having successfully restructured the company,Zhou faced the challenge <strong>of</strong> severing ties with the localgovernment and competing as a private company.Just as Hony was being launched in mid‐2003, Hony CEOJohn Zhao arranged to meet Zhou for the first time. Althoughtheir initial encounter lasted less than an hour, even at thisearly stage the two CEOs concluded that they were thinkingalong similar lines about how to execute a buyout <strong>of</strong> thecompany and what was required to transform Jiangsu Glassinto one <strong>of</strong> China’s premier flat glass manufacturers. <strong>The</strong>yshared the conviction that the trend in China’s flat glassindustry was moving irreversibly towards greater consolidation,resulting in fewer and larger companies. In order to thrive inthis more competitive environment, Jiangsu Glass wouldneed to rapidly expand production. This in turn would requireaccess to both additional financial resources and industryexpertise. But instead <strong>of</strong> looking for a glass industry playeras an acquirer/investor, Jiangsu Glass preferred to workwith Hony, a private equity player. Zhou explained: “Ideallywe wanted to work with an investor like Hony that sharedour vision about how to grow the company. We would nothave maintained our independence and control if wemerged with a competitor from the industry.”<strong>The</strong> Hony‐China Glass TransactionAn alignment <strong>of</strong> interestsUnlike many private equity transactions that are marked byprotracted negotiations and at least some tension betweenbuyer and seller, Hony’s purchase <strong>of</strong> Jiangsu Glass wasfacilitated by a commonality <strong>of</strong> interests and objectivesamong the three principal stakeholders:• <strong>The</strong> company owner: <strong>The</strong> Suqian municipal governmentwas a highly motivated seller. As the Mayor explained,“<strong>The</strong> privatization <strong>of</strong> SOEs under our control was part<strong>of</strong> the larger Chinese policy to reduce the government’sfinancial burden and strengthen the private sector’s rolein the economy. We agreed with this new emphasis bythe central government because we were overburdenedby responsibilities to oversee SOEs, and unable to providethem with the financial resources they needed to growand compete.”• <strong>The</strong> company management: CEO Zhou Cheng explained:“We knew the Chinese glass industry was undergoingrapid consolidation that would increasingly favour a few<strong>of</strong> the largest players, and therefore we could not surviveas currently structured. Either we would be acquired byone <strong>of</strong> our larger competitors, or we needed to becomean acquirer, which would take additional capital.”• <strong>The</strong> private equity investor: <strong>The</strong> Jiangsu Glass pr<strong>of</strong>ile waswell-suited to the investment criteria established by therecently created Hony Capital. According to Zhao: “We wereactively seeking buyout opportunities [privatizations], andconstruction materials were a very good bet in a countrygrowing consistently at a 10% annual rate. Moreover, thesingle most important criteria for us was a high level <strong>of</strong>confidence in management, and after my first conversationwith Zhou Cheng I believed he was a person we could workwith. Just as we were getting started, Jiangsu Glasspresented us with an excellent investment opportunity.”118 Case studies: Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong>
Establishing early agreement on post‐investmentobjectives and strategyThis initial compatibility <strong>of</strong> objectives allowed due diligenceto proceed rapidly and smoothly, with a minimal amount <strong>of</strong>friction along the way. One <strong>of</strong> the most striking aspects <strong>of</strong>this pre‐closing period was the time and attention devotedto planning and agreeing on the post‐investment strategy.Zhao’s criteria with all Hony deals is that there must be aclear agreement pre‐investment on the post‐investmentvalue-creation strategy. This, he believes, requires a clearalignment <strong>of</strong> interest between Hony and management abouthow to grow the company. This was clearly the case withJiangsu Glass.Both sides agreed from the outset that their singular focusshould be on the execution <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> concrete actionsthat would transform the company into a market leader. Butgiven the industry’s cyclicality and their expectation that priceswere likely to peak in late 2004 or early 2005, time was <strong>of</strong> theessence to raise capital on favourable terms. Among the mostimportant components <strong>of</strong> this strategy were:• CEO Zhou Cheng would relinquish his position as an<strong>of</strong>ficial <strong>of</strong> Suqian City and work full-time for the company• Preparations would begin immediately to position thecompany to execute an IPO on the Hong Kong StockExchange (HKSE) as soon as legally possible. (To conformwith HKSE listing requirements, the company would needto be legally transformed from a Chinese joint stockcompany to a limited liability company, and then, priorto the IPO, a wholly foreign‐owned enterprise.)• Proceeds from the IPO would be utilized to buildadditional production lines and to expand productionvia acquisitions• Immediate efforts would be made to identifyacquisition targets• Immediate efforts would be made to attract a world‐classglass manufacturer as a shareholder and strategic partnerStructuring and closing the transaction<strong>The</strong> key to implementing the post‐investment growth strategywas executing the IPO as quickly as possible, ideally bymid‐2005. Rather than listing on one <strong>of</strong> the two domestic stockexchanges, from the outset, Hony targeted the China Glasslisting for the more demanding HKSE, where its more rigorouslisting requirements would demonstrate to international investorsthat the company satisfied the highest standards <strong>of</strong> financialreporting, transparency and corporate governance.But the HKSE listing requirements stipulated there must beno material change in company ownership for at least oneyear prior to the <strong>of</strong>fering, in addition to a number <strong>of</strong> otherlisting requirements (e.g., independent audit, compliance withHKSE GAAP). In order to meet their aggressive IPO timetableand remain in compliance with HKSE regulations, therefore, alegal purchase agreement was first signed on 31 December2003 whereby Hony Capital took control <strong>of</strong> Jiangsu Glassfrom the Suqian State‐owned Assets Supervision andAdministration Commission, with an independent valuationconducted two weeks later and the agreed sum paid byHony in February 2004. Hony then spent 10 more monthsnegotiating for and completing the transaction <strong>of</strong> theremaining minority shares from two government‐ownedasset management companies. <strong>The</strong> entire process wasfinally completed in December 2004, a year after the legalshare purchase agreement had been signed.Although unusual by Western standards, this methodicaland drawn‐out process <strong>of</strong> negotiations, valuations andapprovals is not unusual for Chinese SOE privatizations.Even as negotiations were continuing, Hony assumed therole <strong>of</strong> controlling shareholder and immediately began tomake changes in the company in preparation for theanticipated IPO. During this interim period, prior to the finalacquisition <strong>of</strong> the minority stakes, the company’s entireaccounting and financial reporting systems were revamped,an independent audit was conducted and a new Board <strong>of</strong>Directors was established. In addition, with an eye toenhancing the company’s perceived value with prospectiveIPO investors, a formal long‐term relationship was negotiatedwith a highly reputable, globally recognized strategic investor,as described in the next section. (See Exhibit 3 for the majorsteps in the time line <strong>of</strong> the transaction.)In sum, Hony acquired the stakes <strong>of</strong> Jiangsu Glass for RMB93 million (about US$13 million), 8 an amount that equalledabout one third <strong>of</strong> Hony’s entire first fund. Zhao believed“our willingness to make such a relatively large commitmentshortly after we had established our first fund was a goodindication <strong>of</strong> our confidence in the company”.Executing the value enhancement strategyHony and the Jiangsu Glass management team had ashared vision for the post‐buyout company from the verybeginning <strong>of</strong> their interaction. By the time the buyout <strong>of</strong> thecontrolling stake was <strong>of</strong>ficially closed in February 2004, theyalso reached complete agreement about the strategy toachieve the vision. <strong>The</strong> most urgent task was to prepare thenewly named China Glass for the HKSE IPO. Once thecompany held a deeper pool <strong>of</strong> long‐term capital, attentionwould shift to transforming the company by expandingcapacity through the construction <strong>of</strong> new production linesand a series <strong>of</strong> acquisitions. In pursuit <strong>of</strong> these objectives,some <strong>of</strong> the significant actions included:Creating financial incentives for key managementFirst, Hony’s 100% ownership stake was immediately reducedto 96% with a pre‐arranged agreement to sell 4% <strong>of</strong> its sharesto the company’s seven most senior managers at the sameprice Hony originally paid for its shares. Simultaneously, it was8As is customary in Chinese practice, the valuation is based on net asset value plus the assumption <strong>of</strong> all outstanding debt obligations.<strong>The</strong> <strong>Global</strong> <strong>Economic</strong> <strong>Impact</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Private</strong> <strong>Equity</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2008</strong> Case studies: Hony Capital and China Glass Holdings 119
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The Globalization of Alternative In
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ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
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PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
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Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
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Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
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• Private equity-backed companies
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C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
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Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
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The new demography of private equit
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among US publicly traded firms, it
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should be fairly complete. While th
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according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
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draining public markets of firms. I
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FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
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TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
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Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
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Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
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Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
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Table 7: Ultimate staying power of
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Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
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Private equity and long-run investm
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alternative names associated with t
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4. Finally, we explore whether firm
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When we estimate these regressions,
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cutting back on the number of filin
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Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
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Table 4: Relative citation intensit
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figuresFigure 1: Number of private
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Private equity and employment*steve
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Especially when taken together, our
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centred on the transaction year ide
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and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
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sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
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employment-weighted acquisition rat
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FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
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Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
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Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
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Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
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Figure 12: Differences in impact on
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Private equity and corporate govern
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AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
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The World Economic Forum is an inde