The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008 - World ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

TablesTable 7: Ultimate staying power of LBOs: Transition of firms out of LBO ownershipTable 7A: By the year of the original LBO transactionNumber of original LBO transactionsAll LBO firmsFraction of original LBO transactions1970- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2003- 2006- 1970- 1970- 1985- 1990- 1995- 2000- 2003- 2006- 1970-1984 1989 1994 1999 2002 2005 2007 2007 1984 1989 1994 1999 2002 2005 2007 2007Acquired bystrategic buyer 65 243 436 1,361 745 540 36 3,426 32% 38% 39% 31% 19% 10% 1% 18%Independent privatecompany 51 116 138 379 183 107 25 999 25% 18% 12% 9% 5% 2% 1% 5%Still in LBOownership form 15 73 224 2,028 2,708 4,550 3,815 13,413 7% 11% 20% 46% 69% 85% 98% 69%Bankrupt/restruct. 13 46 62 270 119 58 2 570 6% 7% 6% 6% 3% 1% 0% 3%Went public 59 167 253 407 155 126 0 1,167 29% 26% 23% 9% 4% 2% 0% 6%203 645 1,113 4,445 3,910 5,381 3,878 19,575 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Backed by PE fundAcquired bystrategic buyer 62 238 424 1,331 610 429 23 3,117 32% 38% 39% 32% 22% 11% 1% 20%Independentprivate company 51 115 137 366 171 84 19 943 26% 18% 13% 9% 6% 2% 1% 6%Still in LBOownership form 12 68 215 1,807 1,719 3,205 2,878 9,904 6% 11% 20% 43% 63% 83% 98% 63%Bankrupt/restruct. 13 44 61 260 91 38 2 509 7% 7% 6% 6% 3% 1% 0% 3%Went public 58 163 252 392 145 117 0 1127 30% 26% 23% 9% 5% 3% 0% 7%196 628 1,089 4,156 2,736 3,873 2,922 15,600 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%No financial sponsor / “Pure” MBOAcquired bystrategic buyer 3 5 12 30 135 111 13 309 43% 29% 50% 10% 11% 7% 1% 8%Independent privatecompany 0 1 1 13 12 23 6 56 0% 6% 4% 4% 1% 2% 1% 1%Still in LBOownership form 3 5 9 221 989 1345 937 3,509 43% 29% 38% 76% 84% 89% 98% 88%Bankrupt/restruct. 0 2 1 10 28 20 0 61 0% 12% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% 2%Went public 1 4 1 15 10 9 0 40 14% 24% 4% 5% 1% 1% 0% 1%7 17 24 289 1,174 1,508 956 3,975 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Table 7B: By the type of the original LBO transaction (1970–2002 transactions only)By LBO typeAll Public Private AllPubl. to Private to Financial LBO to to Financial LBOprivate private Division vendor Distress types private private Division vendor Distress typesAcquired bystrategic buyer 124 1,619 757 61 42 2,603 22% 29% 31% 26% 30% 29%Independent privatecompany 30 645 126 14 15 830 5% 12% 5% 6% 11% 9%Went bankrupt 37 316 93 19 15 480 7% 6% 4% 8% 11% 6%Went public 72 604 282 21 12 991 13% 11% 12% 9% 8% 11%Still in LBOownership form 302 2,307 1,176 116 58 3,959 53% 42% 48% 50% 41% 45%All exits 565 5,491 2,434 231 142 8,863 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%22 Large-sample studies: DemographyThe Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008
Table 7: Ultimate staying power of LBOs: Transition of firms out of LBO ownershipTable 7C: By the location of the LBO firm (1970–2002 transactions only)By regionUS & W. Eur. & Rest of All US & W. Eur. & Rest of AllCanada UK Scand. world regions Canada UK Scand. world regionsAcquired by strategic buyer 1,388 622 467 126 2,603 29% 34% 26% 25% 29%Independent private company 458 163 159 50 830 10% 9% 9% 10% 9%Went bankrupt 324 112 36 8 480 7% 6% 2% 2% 6%Went public 611 172 147 61 991 13% 9% 8% 12% 11%Still in LBO ownership form 1,989 756 964 250 3,959 42% 41% 54% 51% 45%All exits 4,770 1,825 1,773 495 8,863 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%Table 8: Ultimate holding periods in LBO ownership. Fraction of firms exiting the LBO ownership formAll LBO firms12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120Exit within months months months months months months months months months months1970-1984 2% 13% 21% 34% 43% 48% 54% 55% 59% 64%1985-1989 2% 10% 18% 24% 32% 39% 48% 54% 59% 65%1990-1994 3% 12% 26% 36% 44% 52% 56% 60% 64% 67%1995-1999 2% 10% 18% 24% 29% 35% 39% 43% 49% 56%2000-2002 2% 5% 10% 16% 21% 27% 32%2003-2005 2% 7% 13% 18%2006-2007 1%Total 2% 8% 15% 22% 28% 36% 42% 48% 54% 61%N 15,819 13,541 11,781 10,119 8,580 7,253 6,142 5,101 4,070 2,999Firms with PE-fund sponsor12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120Exit within months months months months months months months months months months1970-1984 2% 14% 21% 35% 44% 50% 55% 56% 60% 65%1985-1989 2% 10% 18% 25% 33% 39% 49% 55% 60% 67%1990-1994 3% 13% 27% 37% 45% 53% 57% 61% 64% 68%1995-1999 2% 11% 19% 25% 31% 36% 41% 45% 50% 56%2000-2002 2% 6% 12% 19% 25% 31% 34%2003-2005 2% 8% 16% 23%2006-2007 1%Total 2% 9% 17% 25% 31% 38% 44% 49% 55% 62%N 12,576 10,794 9,429 8,288 7,344 6,540 5,725 4,831 3,917 2,920Firms without PE-fund sponsor12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 108 120Exit within months months months months months months months months months months1970-1984 0% 0% 29% 29% 29% 29% 29% 43% 43% 43%1985-1989 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 13% 13% 20% 20% 27%1990-1994 0% 0% 5% 5% 5% 5% 15% 25% 25% 35%1995-1999 1% 4% 7% 9% 12% 13% 15% 18% 24% 30%2000-2002 2% 3% 6% 9% 12% 14% 21%2003-2005 2% 5% 7% 9%2006-2007 1%Total 2% 4% 7% 9% 12% 13% 17% 20% 25% 32%N 3,243 2,747 2,352 1,831 1,236 713 417 270 153 79The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008 Large-sample studies: Demography 23
Page 2 and 3: The Globalization of Alternative In
Page 5: ContributorsCo-editorsAnuradha Guru
Page 9 and 10: PrefaceKevin SteinbergChief Operati
Page 11 and 12: Letter on behalf of the Advisory Bo
Page 13 and 14: Executive summaryJosh lernerHarvard
Page 15 and 16: • Private equity-backed companies
Page 17 and 18: C. Indian casesThe two India cases,
Page 19 and 20: Part 1Large-sample studiesThe Globa
Page 21 and 22: The new demography of private equit
Page 23 and 24: among US publicly traded firms, it
Page 25 and 26: should be fairly complete. While th
Page 27 and 28: according to Moody’s (Hamilton et
Page 29 and 30: draining public markets of firms. I
Page 31 and 32: FIguresFigure 1A: LBO transactions
Page 33 and 34: TablesTable 1: Capital IQ 1980s cov
Page 35 and 36: Table 2: Magnitude and growth of LB
Page 37 and 38: Table 4: Exits of individual LBO tr
Page 39: Table 6: Determinants of exit succe
Page 43 and 44: Appendix 1: Imputed enterprise valu
Page 45 and 46: Private equity and long-run investm
Page 47 and 48: alternative names associated with t
Page 49 and 50: 4. Finally, we explore whether firm
Page 51 and 52: When we estimate these regressions,
Page 53 and 54: cutting back on the number of filin
Page 55 and 56: Table 1: Summary statisticsPanel D:
Page 57 and 58: Table 4: Relative citation intensit
Page 59 and 60: figuresFigure 1: Number of private
Page 61 and 62: Private equity and employment*steve
Page 63 and 64: Especially when taken together, our
Page 65 and 66: centred on the transaction year ide
Page 67 and 68: and Vartia 1985.) Aggregate employm
Page 69 and 70: sectors. In Retail Trade, the cumul
Page 71 and 72: employment-weighted acquisition rat
Page 73 and 74: FIguresFigure 1: Matches of private
Page 75 and 76: Figure 6:Figure 6A: Comparison of n
Page 77 and 78: Figure 8:Figure 8A: Comparison of j
Page 79 and 80: Figure 11: Variation in impact in e
Page 81 and 82: Figure 12: Differences in impact on
Page 83 and 84: Private equity and corporate govern
Page 85 and 86: et al (2007) track the evolution of
Page 87 and 88: groups aim to improve firm performa
Page 89 and 90: distribution of the LBO sponsors, m
Page 91 and 92:
the most difficult cases. This stor
Page 93 and 94:
to see whether these changes of CEO
Page 95 and 96:
Figure 3:This figure represents the
Page 97 and 98:
TablesTable 1: Company size descrip
Page 99 and 100:
Table 5: Changes in the board size,
Page 101 and 102:
Table 7: Board turnoverPanel A: Siz
Page 103 and 104:
Part 2Case studiesThe Global Econom
Page 105 and 106:
European private equity cases: intr
Page 107 and 108:
Exhibit 1: Private equity fund size
Page 109 and 110:
Messer Griesheimann-kristin achleit
Page 111 and 112:
ealized it was not possible to grow
Page 113 and 114:
The deal with Allianz Capital partn
Page 115 and 116:
the deal, the private equity invest
Page 117 and 118:
Exhibit 1: The Messer Griesheim dea
Page 119 and 120:
Exhibit 5: Post buyout structureMes
Page 121 and 122:
New Lookann-kristin achleitnerTechn
Page 123 and 124:
feet. This restricted store space w
Page 125 and 126:
institutional investors why this in
Page 127 and 128:
Although a public listing did not a
Page 129 and 130:
Exhibit 5: Employment development a
Page 131 and 132:
Chinese private equity cases: intro
Page 133 and 134:
Hony Capital and China Glass Holdin
Page 135 and 136:
Hony’s Chinese name means ambitio
Page 137 and 138:
Establishing early agreement on pos
Page 139 and 140:
Executing the IPOEach of the initia
Page 141 and 142:
Exhibit 1A: Summary of Hony Capital
Page 143 and 144:
Exhibit 4: Members of the China Gla
Page 145 and 146:
Exhibit 6A: China Glass post‐acqu
Page 147 and 148:
Exhibit 8: China Glass stock price
Page 149 and 150:
3i Group plc and Little Sheep*Lily
Page 151 and 152:
y an aggressive franchise strategy,
Page 153 and 154:
soul” of the business. But there
Page 155 and 156:
Exhibit 1: Summary information on 3
Page 157 and 158:
Exhibit 6: An excerpt from the 180-
Page 159 and 160:
Indian private equity cases: introd
Page 161 and 162:
ICICI Venture and Subhiksha *Lily F
Page 163 and 164:
investment,” recalled Deshpande.
Page 165 and 166:
2005 - 2007: Moderator, protector a
Page 167 and 168:
Exhibit 3: Subhiksha’s board comp
Page 169 and 170:
Warburg Pincus and Bharti Tele‐Ve
Page 171 and 172:
founded two companies at this time
Page 173 and 174:
By 2003 this restructuring task was
Page 175 and 176:
Exhibit 1C: Private equity investme
Page 177 and 178:
Exhibit 4B: Bharti cellular footpri
Page 179 and 180:
Exhibit 6: Summary of Bharti’s fi
Page 181 and 182:
Exhibit 7: Bharti’s board structu
Page 183 and 184:
In the 1993‐94 academic year, he
Page 185 and 186:
consumer products. She was also a R
Page 187 and 188:
AcknowledgementsJosh LernerHarvard
Page 189:
The World Economic Forum is an inde
show all

The Global Economic Impact of Private Equity Report 2008 - World ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?