War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

The Turko-Persian War 1821–1823 91Vladimirescu began a revolt in Wallachia and Bosnian Moslems rebelledagainst an “infidel” Sultan, an abortive raid by Greek exiles over the RiverPruth in Besser (Moldovia) sparked off a full-scale revolt in Morea in 1822. 4At the other end of the Empire, Abdullah Pasha, the governor of the nearimpregnable fortress and port of Acre, was in conflict with the governors ofDamascus and Aleppo, whose action was sanctioned by a falsely obtainedFarman (decree) from Constantinople. The standing army was, therefore, tieddown dealing with internal dissent and was able to offer little help to theeastern border provinces. Fighting therefore fell to locally recruited forces.Furthermore the internecine warfare, however desultory, indulged by someof the provincial governors, also removed a potential source of “soldiersfor hire”.The strategic command and control of these secondary armies put themat a distinct disadvantage compared to the Persian army. The loyalty of theTurkish troops was to their local pasha and there were many occasions wherethese pashas refused to assist one another. The process of political centralization,begun by Sultan Mahmud II, which included the elimination ofsemi-autonomous “valley lords”, was still far from complete. In contrast, therewere really only two Persian armies, north (based around the Azerbaijanforces) and south (based across the south-western provinces to the south ofAzerbaijan) and there was little disobedience, at least on a strategic level.The Turks became aware of their weakness and later in the war attemptedto combine forces under a strong Seraskier (commander-in-chief ), but thisstill offered no guarantee of a coordinated approach and often broke downunder pressure. 5 Crucially the superior discipline, technical proficiency of theartillery and the strong contingent of regular, i.e. European-trained, forcesin the Persian and, in particular, the Azerbaijan army, proved decisive. Whatthe British in India gleened from this was that the Persians had slowly cometo realize that a small number of disciplined troops, able to maximize theuse of contemporary firepower, was more than a match for any number ofill-disciplined hordes.The Turks, however, were too arrogant about their own, historicallymore important, military capabilities to seriously develop similar forces. Indeed,until the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826, such forces were more oftenbutchered by internal rather than external rivals. Without the much vauntedJanissaries, engaged in putting down the various revolts, the provincialarmies proved to be no match for the Persian front line.The northern frontOn paper, the opposing armies seemed reasonably matched. On the“northern” front (largely the frontier directly astride the Persian province ofAzerbaijan) the Ottoman Governer of Erzerum, Khosrow Pasha, was assignedas Seraskier. 6 The army at his command would be largely composed of his