War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

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Figure 6.2 The 1850 Williams line and rival Persian and Ottoman interpretations(to its west and east) of the 1847 Shatt al-Arab boundary delimitationSource: R. Schofield, ed., The Iran–Iraq Border, 1840–1958 (Farnham Common:Archive Editions, 1989), vol. 5, p. 76.
158 Richard Schofieldstipulation about the right of Persian vessels to navigate freely, was used toargue that the boundary delimitation ran along the middle of the river. Sothe chief effect of all this had been to create a zone of overlapping claims inthe deltaic region at the head of the Persian Gulf. Williams soon respondedon 4 February 1850 by proposing the line in the delta region that he reckonedhad been introduced by Article Two of the Erzurum Treaty. His lineran southwards from Hawizeh to the junction of the Jideyeh canal with theShatt al-Arab and from there along the east (Persian) bank of the river tothe Persian Gulf. Its raison d’être was to keep the Ottomans away from territoryeast of Mohammerah and Khizr Island and Persia away from the watersand islands of the Shatt, thereby guaranteeing the future security and continuedprosperity of Mohammerah and Basrah. 25While the Williams line would later become universally accepted as theriver boundary delimitation introduced by the Erzurum Treaty, getting theOttomans to respect it – even on a temporary basis – proved a tedious andelusive affair. By the end of March 1850, Persia had all but consented to theWilliams line for the river delimitation but wanted its territory to be definedto extend four miles further upstream so as to leave resident Bani Ka’ab tribesmenin Persia. When this suggestion was frowned upon by the mediating commissionersbecause of the threat such a move might present to the well-beingof Basrah (as well as to explicitly contravene the stipulations of Britain’sExplanatory Note of April 1847), Persia agreed on 25 May 1850 to acceptthe Williams line, provided that all Ka’ab tribesman to its west be transferredback to Persian territory. This was never acted upon since getting Ottomanmovement on the issue was proving a far tougher nut to crack. All the intensiveefforts of the British and Russian ambassadors in Constantinople to inducethe Porte’s (short for Sublime Porte, a commonplace nineteenth-centuryEuropean reference to the Ottoman government) acceptance came to noughtand resulted in a proposal in the summer that the disputing parties only temporarilyrespect the mediating commissioners formula and move on to dealingwith other, less troublesome stretches of the borderlands further north.For much of the next year, however, a protracted legal wrangle ensued asto what constituted the status quo in Mohammerah and what it representedin relation to the 1847 treaty itself. In the end the Ottomans would not consentto respect the Williams line on a temporary basis until the autumn ofthe following year, meaning that in the intervening period the commissionwas idle in an official sense. The frustration of the mediating commissionersat their impotence in moving the business forward was graphicallyexpressed by an exasperated Palmerston, “the boundary between Turkey andPersia can never be finally settled except by an arbitrary decision on the partof Great Britain and Russia”. 26 While history would ultimately prove himright – with Britain and Russia finally gaining the arbitrating powers to dojust this on the eve of the Great War during 1913–1914, progress towardsdelimiting the borderlands would remain infuriating elusive in the midnineteenthcentury. But at least with the qualified Ottoman assent finally
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War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
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War and Peace inQajar PersiaImplica
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ContentsList of figuresContributors
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Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
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Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
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AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
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2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
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4 Roxane Farmanfarmaianchapter in t
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6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
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8 Roxane Farmanfarmaiangaining grea
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10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
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12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geo
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14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
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16 Peter W. Averybut the invasion w
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Part IWar
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22 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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24 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarap
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26 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarmi
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30 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajardo
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32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn
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34 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarco
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36 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarTh
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42 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarop
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44 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarbe
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46 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarva
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48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
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50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
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52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
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54 Stephanie Croninprincipally on h
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56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
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58 Stephanie CroninEuropean alignme
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60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
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62 Stephanie Croninin the revolutio
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64 Stephanie Croninof power and sta
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66 Stephanie Croninliving and the m
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68 Stephanie Croninconsequences for
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70 Stephanie Croninrevolution was a
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72 Stephanie CroninNew British miss
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74 Stephanie CroninBrigade to a Div
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76 Stephanie Croninwithout the sove
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78 Stephanie Croninaccounting devic
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80 Stephanie Croninbut also faced a
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82 Stephanie Cronindetermined on th
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84 Stephanie Cronin15 For a discuss
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86 Stephanie Cronin55 The Anglo-Rus
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3 The Turko-Persian War1821-1823Win
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90 Graham WilliamsonThe resultant w
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92 Graham Williamsonprovincial forc
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94 Graham WilliamsonThe field armyO
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96 Graham Williamsonnot hold out mu
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98 Graham Williamsonoften in arrear
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100 Graham Williamsonthan any desig
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102 Graham WilliamsonThere were ove
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104 Graham Williamsonone should not
Page 119 and 120: Table 3.2 Persian regional armies (
Page 121 and 122: 108 Graham WilliamsonIranian influe
Page 123 and 124: 4 Social networks andborder conflic
Page 125 and 126: 112 Vanessa MartinPersian troops on
Page 127 and 128: 114 Vanessa Martinof comparatively
Page 129 and 130: 116 Vanessa MartinTHE ROLE OF SOCIA
Page 131 and 132: 118 Vanessa MartinThe Shah’s negl
Page 133 and 134: 120 Vanessa Martinborder or any oth
Page 135 and 136: 122 Vanessa Martin44 No. 38, 2 June
Page 138 and 139: 5 The consolidation of Iran’sfron
Page 140 and 141: Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
Page 150 and 151: Figure 5.2 Arab principalities
Page 162 and 163: 6 Narrowing the frontierMid-ninetee
Page 164 and 165: Narrowing the frontier 151witnessed
Page 166 and 167: Figure 6.1 The 1843 borderlands sta
Page 168 and 169: Narrowing the frontier 155And the S
Page 172 and 173: Narrowing the frontier 159elicited
Page 174 and 175: Narrowing the frontier 161travellin
Page 176 and 177: Narrowing the frontier 163be found
Page 178 and 179: Narrowing the frontier 165A similar
Page 180 and 181: Narrowing the frontier 167and accep
Page 182 and 183: Narrowing the frontier 169Perhaps t
Page 184 and 185: Narrowing the frontier 171By this s
Page 186 and 187: Narrowing the frontier 17346 For a
Page 188 and 189: Crime, security, and insecurity 175
Page 196 and 197: 8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
Page 198 and 199: Merchants without frontier 185the m
Page 200 and 201: Merchants without frontier 187and d
Page 202 and 203: Merchants without frontier 189photo
Page 204 and 205: Merchants without frontier 191their
Page 206 and 207: Merchants without frontier 193In an
Page 208 and 209: Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
Page 210 and 211: Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
Page 212 and 213: Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
Page 214 and 215: Merchants without frontier 201Figur
Page 216 and 217: Merchants without frontier 203Studi
Page 218 and 219: Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
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Merchants without frontier 207and t
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Merchants without frontier 209or pu
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Merchants without frontier 211It ca
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9 The politics of concessionReasses
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The politics of concession 215gradu
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The politics of concession 217Shah,
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The politics of concession 219assig
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The politics of concession 221compa
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The politics of concession 223gross
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The politics of concession 225the B
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The politics of concession 227as th
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IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
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Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
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Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131
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War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

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