War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

Between Scylla and Charybdis 33The decision, however was not sudden. Nor was it solely the result of thedisappointment Fath-Ali Shah must have felt in having thrown in his lotwith the British and then being snubbed and seeing their promises to himbroken. There is an interesting remark recorded by Iradj Amini concerninga question Fath-Ali Shah posed to Malcolm at their first meeting in 1801.The Shah asked him point blank, “Are the French a powerful people?”Malcolm replied “Certainly. They would not otherwise deserve to be mentionedas enemies of the English.” Upon hearing this reply, Amini relates,the Shah turned to his ministers and said: “There you have it. We were ledto believe that the French were a weak and contemptible nation. The Elchee(ambassador), by telling us the truth, has done them justice, and elevatedhis country at the same time.” 40 What Amini uncovers here is far more thana conversation between an inquisitive monarch and a foreign ambassador.What this reveals is that Fath-Ali Shah was already weighing different optionswith regard to the help he knew he needed in facing this enemy who had,since the time of his uncle, become more formidable and more intransigent.Amini further adds this illuminating note:By praising the French, [Malcolm] confirmed Fath Ali Shah’s personalopinion of them, an opinion he had no doubt formed as a result of thenews he regularly received from Rousseau, the commissioner of Frenchcommercial relations in Baghdad, about French exploits in Europe. Forthe time being, however, the Persians were only too pleased to negotiatewith the British, especially with their government in India, which,owing to its proximity, was in a better position than any other powerto keep in check the territorial ambitions of Russia. So the Shahordered his Prime Minister, Hajji Ibrahim Itimad-al-Dauleh, to start immediatelyupon commercial as well as political negotiations with Malcolm. 41Thus the picture that emerges is one of Persian initiative rather than passivityin the face of the constraints imposed on Persia by geopolitics beyondher control.Of course, Persia’s attempt to break free of the dilemma of a menacingRussia and a reluctant and demanding England does not end there. In reactionto General Tsitsianov’s seizing of the Khanate of Ganjeh (Ganja) onJanuary 3, 1804, marking the beginning of Russian hostilities against Persia,and in response to British foot dragging on the question of assistance againstRussia, Fath-Ali Shah weighed his “best alternative options” and turned tothe French, who now eagerly seized the opportunity by offering a treaty offriendship and mutual support. The British not having fulfilled their end ofthe bargain, Fath-Ali Shah felt free now not to be bound by his. The resultof this new policy was the Treaty of Finkenstein between France and Persiain 1807. What Fath-Ali Shah could not get in writing from the British inthe Treaty of 1801, he achieved from the French in 1807, or so he thought.Naturally, there were also costs attached to this new alliance. One was of