Consolidation of Iran’s frontier 133The real impetus for a naval force came when the campaign to <strong>in</strong>creasecustoms revenues was <strong>in</strong>troduced. In 1883, the <strong>Persia</strong>n government decidedto acquire one vessel a year <strong>and</strong> thereby build up a flotilla which could policethe coast <strong>and</strong> hopefully <strong>in</strong>crease customs revenue. In 1885 the Tehran governmentf<strong>in</strong>ally acquired a ship, the Persepolis, which was built <strong>in</strong> Germany, topatrol Gulf waters. 50 A small river steamer, the Susa, was built <strong>in</strong> Germany<strong>in</strong> sections which were sent to be assembled at Mohammerah. These shipsdid not prove very effective <strong>and</strong> the impetus for the navy seems to have dissipated.In 1903, the <strong>Persia</strong>n government bought an armed Belgian steamyacht to carry out anti-smuggl<strong>in</strong>g patrols <strong>in</strong> the Gulf, <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong> 1905 orderedfive more from Bombay. 51 It is doubtful, however, whether this made muchof a dent <strong>in</strong> illicit trade <strong>in</strong> the Gulf.In response to the commercial expansion aris<strong>in</strong>g from the advantagesextended to Russian <strong>and</strong> British subjects <strong>in</strong> treaties of 1828 <strong>and</strong> 1841, respectively,trade grew. The <strong>Persia</strong>n government established a network of agentsof the M<strong>in</strong>istry of Foreign Affairs, called kargozars, who were stationed <strong>in</strong>important cities such as Bushehr <strong>and</strong> could arbitrate between Iranians <strong>and</strong>the grow<strong>in</strong>g number of foreign subjects. This kargozari system was set up<strong>in</strong> the 1860s <strong>and</strong> was fully operative by the 1870s <strong>and</strong> 1880s. 52 (It was particularlyeffective <strong>in</strong> Bushehr, <strong>in</strong> contrast to the more unsettled situation prevail<strong>in</strong>g<strong>in</strong> Khorasan. 53 ) The kargozar was supposed to deal with foreigners<strong>in</strong>dependently of the local authorities such as the governor. From Tehran’spo<strong>in</strong>t of view, the kargozar’s job was to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> order, control foreigners<strong>in</strong> their area, <strong>and</strong> impede their acquisition of property. 54 Before 1898, thekargozars h<strong>and</strong>led disputes between foreign merchants <strong>and</strong> the customs, butafter the reform <strong>in</strong> 1898 the customs were reformed <strong>and</strong> regularized. 55Beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1882, there was a political reorganization of the Gulf ports,which were removed from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Fars<strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>ed over to the Am<strong>in</strong> al-Sultan, the gr<strong>and</strong> vizier <strong>and</strong> an <strong>in</strong>timate ofthe shah. The royal government was <strong>in</strong> dire need of revenue, <strong>and</strong> the customsduties from the southern ports were an attractive asset. In 1887 a GulfPorts district, headquartered at Bushehr, was formed which conta<strong>in</strong>edBushehr, Langeh, <strong>and</strong> B<strong>and</strong>ar Abbas <strong>and</strong> their dependencies. 56Before major changes were made <strong>in</strong> the Customs Adm<strong>in</strong>istration after 1898,the customs were farmed out <strong>and</strong> there was no degree of uniformity <strong>in</strong> theircollection. The central government only received a small portion of the taxescollected <strong>in</strong> the prov<strong>in</strong>ces. In the late n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, however, the shah’sgovernment was <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong> need of revenue, <strong>in</strong> particular to repay foreignloans. Because the customs duties of the Gulf ports were one of the mostlucrative <strong>and</strong> reliable assets, the port cities were <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>gly brought underthe control of Tehran. (These revenues were pledged, for example, to guaranteepayment of the loan made <strong>in</strong> 1892 to compensate for cancell<strong>in</strong>g theTobacco Concession.) To repay a small loan made <strong>in</strong> March 1898, the (Britishowned)Imperial Bank of <strong>Persia</strong> sent agents to Bushehr <strong>and</strong> Kermanshah tocarry out collection between April <strong>and</strong> August 1898. Start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> 1899, the
134 Lawrence G. Pottercustoms were put under the control of Belgian experts, who aimed to <strong>in</strong>troducea uniform <strong>and</strong> efficient system of tax collection <strong>and</strong> to raise the rates.With<strong>in</strong> two years all tax farms had been abolished <strong>and</strong> management placed<strong>in</strong> a new department, the Imperial <strong>Persia</strong>n Customs. In March 1900 the customsof Bushehr, Langeh, <strong>and</strong> B<strong>and</strong>ar Abbas were placed under the controlof the new department, which led to a remarkable rise <strong>in</strong> revenue forTehran. 57 The new higher tariffs were opposed by the merchants <strong>and</strong> led toa sharp decl<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong> legitimate trade <strong>in</strong> the Gulf, notably at B<strong>and</strong>ar Langeh(<strong>and</strong> a concomitant rise <strong>in</strong> smuggl<strong>in</strong>g). 58RETAKING THE GULFThe fall of BushehrAlthough <strong>in</strong> the early n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century the <strong>Qajar</strong> government was not <strong>in</strong>a position to take control of the Arab pr<strong>in</strong>cipalities along its Gulf littoral,by mid-century the situation had changed. Bushehr, on the northern coast,was the most important Gulf port, with substantial <strong>in</strong>come from customs<strong>and</strong> tax receipts. 59 “Bushehr was a port city, but <strong>in</strong> contrast to many otherAsian port cities of the colonial era,” Floor notes, “it was a port that wasan <strong>in</strong>tegral part of a large <strong>in</strong>dependent state, Iran.” 60 At the time of Fath-Ali Shah, half of <strong>Persia</strong>n imports <strong>in</strong> the Gulf came through Bushehr. 61Bushehr had been governed by the Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur family s<strong>in</strong>ce 1750. The Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur were members of an Arab tribe, the Martarish, who are reportedto have come from Oman. 62 They ruled not only Bushehr, but also coastallocalities rang<strong>in</strong>g from B<strong>and</strong>ar Rig, Ganaveh, <strong>and</strong> Deylam to the north, aswell as Asaluyeh to the south. They also controlled some <strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong> towns <strong>and</strong>districts such as Ahram, Bor<strong>az</strong>jan <strong>and</strong> Dalaki. 63 The Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur had a closealliance with the Z<strong>and</strong> dynasty <strong>in</strong> Shir<strong>az</strong> from 1770 to 1789, <strong>and</strong> acted astheir maritime arm, for example provid<strong>in</strong>g ships to besiege Basra. The Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur held Bahra<strong>in</strong> between 1752 <strong>and</strong> 1783. 64Dur<strong>in</strong>g the early n<strong>in</strong>eteenth century, chang<strong>in</strong>g economic <strong>and</strong> political conditions<strong>in</strong> Iran jeopardized the autonomous position of the Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur. Mostcritically, their relationship with their overlords deteriorated. The new <strong>Qajar</strong>dynasty did not seek to carry out any military adventures <strong>in</strong> the Gulf, <strong>and</strong>therefore, unlike the Z<strong>and</strong>s, did not need the help of vassals <strong>in</strong> Bushehr. Fromabout 1820 to 1850, Shir<strong>az</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>ed ever greater payments of tribute, whilethe sources of revenue for the Al-M<strong>az</strong>kur were shr<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g.One reason was the transformation of Bushehr, start<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the lateeighteenth <strong>and</strong> early n<strong>in</strong>eteenth centuries, from a port-of-call to a port-oftransit.65 As a port-of-call, Bushehr acted as a market<strong>in</strong>g <strong>and</strong> distribution centrefor long-distance trade, <strong>and</strong> merchants would come to the city to trade <strong>in</strong>season. Later as a port-of-transit, goods were shipped directly from Bushehrto markets <strong>in</strong>l<strong>and</strong>, <strong>and</strong> visit<strong>in</strong>g merchants were replaced by resident merchants
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War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
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War and Peace inQajar PersiaImplica
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ContentsList of figuresContributors
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Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
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Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
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AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
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2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
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4 Roxane Farmanfarmaianchapter in t
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6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
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8 Roxane Farmanfarmaiangaining grea
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10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
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12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geo
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14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
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16 Peter W. Averybut the invasion w
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Part IWar
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22 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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24 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarap
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26 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarmi
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28 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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30 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajardo
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32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn
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34 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarco
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36 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarTh
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38 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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40 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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42 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarop
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44 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarbe
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46 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarva
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48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
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50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
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52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
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54 Stephanie Croninprincipally on h
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56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
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58 Stephanie CroninEuropean alignme
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60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
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62 Stephanie Croninin the revolutio
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64 Stephanie Croninof power and sta
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66 Stephanie Croninliving and the m
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68 Stephanie Croninconsequences for
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70 Stephanie Croninrevolution was a
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72 Stephanie CroninNew British miss
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74 Stephanie CroninBrigade to a Div
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76 Stephanie Croninwithout the sove
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78 Stephanie Croninaccounting devic
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80 Stephanie Croninbut also faced a
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8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
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Merchants without frontier 185the m
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Merchants without frontier 187and d
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Merchants without frontier 189photo
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Merchants without frontier 191their
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Merchants without frontier 193In an
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Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
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Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
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Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
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Merchants without frontier 201Figur
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Merchants without frontier 203Studi
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Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
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Merchants without frontier 207and t
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Merchants without frontier 209or pu
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Merchants without frontier 211It ca
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9 The politics of concessionReasses
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The politics of concession 215gradu
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The politics of concession 217Shah,
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The politics of concession 219assig
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The politics of concession 221compa
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The politics of concession 223gross
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The politics of concession 225the B
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The politics of concession 227as th
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IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
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Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
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Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131