War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn retrospect, Russian expansion into the southern Caucasus regionappears inevitable, but in Fath Ali Shah’s view of the world, theKhanates belonged wholly to Iran. ...Until 1804 it is probable thatneither the Shah nor his entourage fully apprehended the extent of theRussian threat. It would simply be perceived in terms of the type oftrans-border skirmishing in which the Iranians engaged with theirneighbours, while it would be taken as axiomatic that local rulers in suchcircumstances would attempt to play off one potential overlord againstanother. It is unlikely that anyone in Tehran imagined that the Russiangovernment in Saint Petersburg might be planning outright annexation,or that the pro-consular ambitions of local Russian commanders in thefield would tend to promote just such an outcome. It was the mannerof dealings with the Russians as much as anything else that madecontemporary British observers assume that Fath Ali Shah lived in a worldof fantasy. Ignorant of the world beyond his frontiers he certainlywas, but to blame him for failure to anticipate the subsequent courseof Russian expansionism is to read back into the early years of thereign subsequent developments which few, around 1800, could havepredicted. 38Hambly’s assessment of Fath-Ali Shah notwithstanding, the assertion thathe was not aware of the gathering storm and the extent of that storm is notborne out by what is known of his policy decisions in this regard. In fact,the genesis of the ill feelings and mutual suspicion between the Qajars andthe British is found in Fath-Ali Shah’s disappointment over what he perceivedto be England’s reneging on her offer of assistance against Russia’sincursions into Persia’s territories in the southern Caucasus. Of course,England had no such view of her promises to Persia. “The British aversionto commitments in peacetime,” says Edward Ingram, “may have beenstrengthened by their resentment of the demands made on them by the Qajarregime in Persia in the twenty-five years following the Napoleonic Wars. . . .Like many similar arrangements between the British and foreigners, its legacywas bitterness and disappointment. Expecting to be offered help, the Britishresented being asked for it. They expected to fight Napoleon to the last Austrianand to defend India to the last Persian.” 39Of course, Fath-Ali Shah’s view was different. He felt he had made a treatyof equals and he also felt that the treaty included assurances by the Britishto help defend his territory against Russian incursion in return for his guaranteeto do the same for the British in India or wherever they would requesthis assistance. It is true that he did not know the extent of the disparagementof his person and of his abilities as a ruler by the British, but he wasable to form a fairly accurate view of their willingness to keep promises made,whether in the spirit or the letter of the treaties, and realizing that the Britishtherefore did not treat him as an equal, Fath-Ali Shah turned to the Frenchwhen the occasion arose.