War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

Between Scylla and Charybdis 31and before long Persia was engaged with Russia again in a struggle forsupremacy over the Khanates and Georgia. In addition, now Britain andFrance turned their attention to Persia as well.Assessments on the decision-making process of Fath-Ali Shah and on hisawareness of the larger context within which Persia had to operate at thistime, differ, as do the assessments of the kinds of constraints the Qajars hadto work under. Certainly one set of constraints were the power politics ofthe Napoleonic Wars as they spilled out into the Middle East. Another setwere those emanating from the policy of the British Empire in India, which,for the early years of Qajar rule, represented slightly different pressures thanthat of England proper, and which the Qajars tried to adjust to, understand,and use to their advantage whenever possible.After Napoleon’s unsuccessful campaign in the Levant in 1799, LordWellesley, then Governor General of India, felt it was time for British Indiato cover her western flank by staving off any possible further advances. Herforward defensive line would be Persia, or, failing that, Afghanistan. ThusMajor General John Malcolm was dispatched from Bombay with a retinuefit for a potentate, to impress upon the Persian ruler how necessary an alliancewith Britain would be. The result of this expedition was the Anglo-PersianTreaty of 1801. The treaty had separate political and economic componentsto it. The economic one, which a few decades prior would have been uppermoston Britain’s mind, was to become negligible in view of unfoldingevents. The political component, which was played down by Malcolm at first,turned out to be the decisive aspect of the treaty and the most vexing aspectfor both parties in the years to come.Sir Denis Wright relates the essence of this treaty thus:Malcolm was instructed to encourage Persian attacks on Afghanistan,to counteract any possible moves by “those villainous but activedemocrats, the French” and to stimulate English and Indian trade.. . . Under the Political Treaty the Shah undertook to attack Afghanterritory should that country invade India and to prevent the Frenchfrom settling or residing in Persia: in return the British were to supply“as many cannon and warlike stores as possible, with necessary apparatus,attendants and inspectors” should either the Afghans or theFrench attack Persia and, in the latter event, also to send troops to joinPersian forces in securing “the expulsion and extermination” of theFrench. 37The Russians for their part were not interested in treaties of mutual assistancewith the Persians. They were about to conquer what they needed fromthe Persian-controlled areas of the southern Caucasus. As for the rest, theywould negotiate with Persia from a position of strength once their conquestwas complete. Here is what Gavin Hambly states regarding the position ofFath-Ali Shah and his assessment of the Russian threat: