War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

132 Lawrence G. Potterthat Qajar Iran could withstand the imperialist threat of Britain and Russia,”according to Amanat. “By playing off the two rivals and sacrificing controlover Iran’s often precarious periphery, the Qajar state maintained controlof Iran’s heartland and avoided, at least partially, the most menacingEuropean interference in its internal affairs.” 44Throughout much of the nineteenth century, Persian policy toward the Gulf,such as it was, was carried out by the governor of Fars Province, based inShiraz. He administered the whole area from Bushehr to Jask. He also formulatedpolicy toward neighbouring Gulf states. Ever since the Persians weredriven out of Bahrain in 1783, regaining it had been the constant aim of Persiandiplomacy. This led, in 1822, to the Treaty of Shiraz, in which the BritishResident at Bushehr acknowledged Persian sovereignty over Bahrain. Thistreaty, however, was immediately repudiated by the British Indian government.Fath-Ali Shah, angry that his son in Shiraz had negotiated with theBritish behind his back, also disowned it. In 1861 the British recognized theshaikh of Bahrain as an independent ruler and after 1880 they took controlover Bahraini foreign policy. Nevertheless, Persia never relinquished her claimbut rather, periodically invoked the Shiraz treaty. It also asked the Britishto loan vessels so it could retake the island. 45 In 1855, Persia even proposeda treaty with the US that would provide naval assistance so the shah couldassert control in the Gulf. 46A key to Persian weakness in the Gulf lay in the fact that, unlike Omanor Britain, the shah did not have a navy. The British viewed Persian capabilitieswith derision: according to Curzon, “Brave and victorious as thePersians have shown themselves at different epochs on land, no one has everventured so far as to belie the national character as to insinuate that theyhave betrayed the smallest proficiency at sea.” 47 The issue did not becomeacute until, at the time of the negotiations over the Bandar Abbas lease renewal,Oman threatened to blockade the port unless Persia came to terms. Tehranwas dependent upon the British navy to dissuade the Omanis from doingso, and began thinking of acquiring its own flotilla. Around 1865 NasseredinShah proposed acquiring several armed steamers (to be commanded byBritish naval officers and manned by Arabs or Indians), but Britain refusedon the grounds that it might cause trouble for Bahrain. 48The Persians clearly wished to continue relying on the British to policethe Gulf. In 1868, the Prince Governor General (beglerbegi) of Fars toldColonel Pelly, the Persian Gulf Resident, that:As regards the proposed creation by Persia of a flotilla in the PersianGulf, the Prince said he entirely concurred with me in thinking it wouldprove an unnecessary expense and a costly failure. He said Persiaentrusted the peace of the Gulf entirely to the British Resident, andthat he would be prepared to issue any orders I might draft in view tomy securing full support and prompt communication from the localGovernors along the Persian coast line. 49