War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

Building a new army 67(colonel), sartip (general). During the course of the century however, thissystem degenerated. Regulations governing hierarchy disintegrated and thedesignations of rank ceased to imply any fixed military responsibility or evenany connection with the army. The number of officers proliferated, and thearmy budget paid salaries and pensions to many people who had acquiredmilitary rank by patronage or purchase simply in order to benefit financially.The confusion was aggravated by a new habit among the civilian elite,fostered by Nasser-edin Shah, for wearing military uniform and sportingelaborate military decorations.In operational terms, the irregular cavalry was still the most effective fightingelement in Iran’s military forces and it had remained untouched by theEuropean military missions and government efforts at reform. It continuedto be organized exclusively on a tribal basis, with men serving under theirown chiefs and supplying their own horses and weapons. In return for keepingavailable for service a specified complement of men, the khans receivedpayment in the form of a tax deduction, a dispensation of great financialvalue and which also symbolically diminished their acknowledgement of thecentral government’s authority. The khans’ military role significantly enhancednot only their own financial resources but also their personal authority withinthe tribal structures. In general terms, the state’s continued reliance on suchforces buttressed the power of the khans and negated efforts by the reformingofficials to reduce their autonomy and make them more dependent uponand responsive to the central government, frustrating and even reversing awider agenda of centralization.The irregular cavalry was divided into 69 regiments or squadrons of varyingstrength, which were known by their places of recruitment or by that oftheir tribe. The internal organization of the regiments was based upon theold Turco-Mongol system of divisions of tens, fifties and hundreds. On mobilization,the cavalry possessed an estimated potential strength of 37,591. 54Although of some effectiveness in campaigns against their tribal enemies andas a threat to subdue urban populations, the use of the irregular cavalrywas fraught with difficulties. They were usually mobilized only for specificoperations and rarely agreed to serve outside their own districts. They weremotivated entirely by the prospect of plunder and when on campaign wereoften themselves the cause of serious disorder.Nasser-edin Shah and the Russian military missionBy the late nineteenth century little had been achieved in creating a Europeanizedarmy, either in appearance or reality. The reformed regiments’ mainsignificance was in providing a conduit through which state money might bechannelled into the pockets of elite families and in indulging the shah’s fondnessfor what amounted to military fancy dress. Nonetheless, in the 1870s,one step had been taken which was to have permanent and momentous