War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

Building a new army 57In addition to the convulsions of European diplomacy, Abbas Mirzafaced other problems. Iran’s revenues were insufficient for its expensivewars, and the revenues of Azerbaijan in particular were quite unequal to thedemands of Abbas Mirza’s agenda. In 1810 the British began paying a subsidyto Abbas Mirza, which went primarily to defray the cost of the newregiments, but training, equipping and paying these sarbaz was so expensivethat overall, even with the British subsidy, his financial problems worsened.The reforms also encountered opposition on their own account. The populationin general, and occasionally the sarbaz themselves, disliked the Europeanappearance of the new regiments, while some of the ulama declared that thepresence of infidels was harmful and the adoption of their methods betrayedthe example of the Prophet. These doubts were quickly exploited by AbbasMirza’s political enemies, but his supporters also mobilized religious supportwhere they could, obtaining opinions that the reforms were in fact areturn to early Islamic practice.By 1812 Abbas Mirza possessed a European-trained army of about13,000 infantry, cavalry and artillery, and he and the shah believed that victoryin the war with Russia was within reach. Although the fledgling regimentshad achieved some minor victories in 1810, Abbas Mirza’s hope ofexploiting Russian weakness during Napoleon’s invasion of 1812 was disappointedand the war finally ended after the Iranian nezam regimentssuffered a series of military disasters. Four British officers and twelve NCOsactually accompanied the Iranian troops into battle and, although the Iranianssnatched one victory when they routed a Russian force at Sultanabad nearthe river Aras in February 1812, the campaign ended in complete defeat atthe Battle of Aslanduz in October during which one British officer, CharlesChristie, was killed.Abbas Mirza now also faced the loss of the British mission. The allianceformed between Britain and Russia in 1812–1813 caused the British government’scommitment to Iran to weaken and the defeat of Napoleon atWaterloo in 1815 led to a further British loss of interest in Iran. By the endof 1815 the British mission had been withdrawn, although a small group ofofficers and NCOs had been allowed to stay, on condition that they tookno part in operations against countries (meaning Russia) with whom Britainwas at peace. The remaining British officers gradually left the Iranianservice after 1819, only Captain Isaac Hart continuing as commander of AbbasMirza’s bodyguard.Both the Gardane mission and the British mission had come to Iran as aresult of European conflicts and rivalries and in order to further their ownpolitical, diplomatic and military objectives. As their needs and requirementsand the European context changed, so their interest in Iran waxed and waned,their military missions being merely tools of political expedience and easilydispensed with. Naturally both Britain and France did everything possibleto undermine the work of the other’s mission. Abbas Mirza and the shahhad done their best to manoeuvre within, and to exploit, the shifting