War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

104 Graham Williamsonone should not discount ethnic tension between Persian and Arab, particularlyamongst the religious establishment. Litvak notes that “Arabs and Indiansresented Iranian domination of the shrine cities” and ethnic differenceswere often reflected within the rituals of popular religion. He also remindsus, however, that “a correlation between ethnicity and political conduct (didnot) appear during the nineteenth century”. 35The Iraqi ulama should not therefore be seen as plotting to usurp Ottomanpower and replace it with Qajar rule. They were quite prepared to cooperatewith the local Sunni ulama and Turkic authorities if it suited. Thelucrative religious taxes and donations were jealously guarded and while acceptingthat the Shi’a ulama were concerned with keeping Ottoman hands offthis income, they were equally unlikely to readily gift it instead to the Qajars.Although they often encouraged Persian pressure to be brought to bear uponBaghdad, it was not their only avenue of support. A substantial amount ofincome was derived from a generous annual endowment from the Shi’a stateof Awadh (Oudah) (1722–1846) in northern India. Controlling this wasextremely important and like all these financial donations took up the ulama’stemporal thoughts far more perhaps than politics. Nevertheless, faced witha de facto Qajar occupation, it begs the question whether the Shi’a wouldhave rallied around their co-religionists as a matter of preference.Turkish responseWe should not however suppose that the Ottomans would have lightlyacquiesced to the loss of the province. Not only did they benefit from Shi’apilgrim money but there was lucrative commercial trade via the Persian Gulf,and the loss of control of that trade by surrendering Basra and its hinterlandwould have been viewed as extremely serious. The Ottomans would haveparticularly been keen to restore the border beyond the Shatt al Arab (a majorfactor in the Ottoman’s taking, if only temporarily, of Mohammara in1837). The loss of Baghdad, a key post on the ancient Silk Road and asymbol of a once powerful empire, would have led to severe tensions amongthe remaining Arab minorities. The Ottomans had been steadily losingterritory on their European borders for years, and a further new loss in thesouth would have been unacceptable.On the one hand, they believed they had certain advantages over the Qajarsthat would facilitate a “comeback”. For example they counted on: a) greaterresources, financial and human (a population of 23 to 26 million); b) historicallygreater military traditions, which included individual bravery andresourcefulness, as well as vast experience. In addition, the death of MohammadAli Mirza emboldened Turkish morale as it weakened Persian. On theother hand: a) the standing army was heavily stretched in 1822; the Greekrevolt in the west did not end on the ground until 1827 and only then withthe help of the Egyptians; b) the Ottomans were experiencing difficultymobilizing sufficient troops. They may have had a paper strength in excessof 300,000, but perhaps only a third could be counted on to rally to the colours