War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

The Turko-Persian War 1821–1823 97a Russian deserter, Dragoon Sergeant Samson Makintzev. Taking the nameSamson Khan and a Colonelcy in the Persian army, he helped form a companyof Russian deserters in 1804. By 1820 it was composed of two battalions.One was of company strength and was held in reserve for married men, whilstthe other fluctuated between four and nine companies of single men. Despitethe casualties it had already suffered earlier on in the campaign it would stillhave been a sizeable unit. As the firing intensified they had been drawn closerto the advancing Turkish “line” which had by now degenerated into an unwieldymass with little coordination between neighbouring units, let alone amongthe corps. Yet, the Bagaderan did not become too overextended and the eventualforward push of the Persian regular infantry, led by the Russians, tookthe high ground on the Turkish left. At that point the Turks fell back in disorderto be ruthlessly harried by the Persian irregular cavalry.With superiority of numbers and control of the most favourable groundthe Turks should have swept the Persians from the field. However, the divisionof forces along provincial lines once again allowed petty rivalries andjealousies to hold sway. Their right flank, for example, barely moved thatday, presumably content to husband the troops for defence of their provincein the event of defeat. Their tactics were poor; the artillery fired from longdistance, compounded by their small calibre, and consequently could not exploitthe infantryman’s natural huddling together or formation into a square whenfaced with cavalry. Time and again the Turkish provincial forces weredefeated by superior training or tactics. 21 By pure mischance, the Persianswere not, however, at this moment able to exploit their success. As the victoriousarmy began its march towards the Ottoman provincial capital ofErzerum, it fell foul of cholera and had to withdraw back to the frontier.The loss of perhaps 4,000 regulars was a blow to Abbas Mirza’s forces andwould take time to replace.WHY WAS THE TURKS’ MILITARY VULNERABILITYNOT EXPLOITED?Given their military superiority, one might have expected the Persianssooner or later to extract favourable demands from the Ottomans or evenseize and hold territory. That this was not done can be set down to a numberof factors, the most substantial being financial, supplies, and war aims.FinancialAs Napoleon stated, an “army marches on its stomach” and, however populara ruler, however fertile a land, the necessary sustenance will have to bepaid for. Further still, equipment has to be bought or made and the troopspaid. Despite the best efforts of Abbas Mirza he never had enough moneyto purchase all he required and indeed pay his troops, whose wages were