War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

100 Graham Williamsonthan any design that opened up an opportunity for Persian arms to prizeopen the border.In fact, the southern region offered an even greater opportunity for a redrawingof the border than in the north, and by doing so, not only to “reward”Persian arms, and compensate the dynasty for the loss of Caucasianprovinces, but seriously shift the balance of power in the Persian Gulf decisivelyin Persia’s favour. Why the southern campaign, as with the north, cameto naught, I shall now examine.Baghdad, the military and political keyMuch of the Governer of Baghdad’s time was spent in pacifying Arab tribesand Kurdish princes. The army was a shifting coalition of minority tribeswelded onto a small Mameluk standing army. Those who held Baghdad, withits relatively large commercial sector, population and geographical dominance,held Ottoman Iraq’. The loss of Baghdad would have unravelled their controlover the region and could have led to a quite different treaty. The relativelynew, but aggressive, Governor of Baghdad, Davoud Pasha, was unableat this time to field an army that could defeat Mohammad Ali Mirza. Lackof numbers, inferior tactics, treachery within the ranks and a small butsignificant element of European-trained troops in the Persian forces, led tohis inevitable defeat.In October 1821, after overcoming the Ottoman army in Kurdistan, thePersian army was encamped within a day’s march of Baghdad. Althoughthe city walls were formidable and stores well provisioned, the Pasha wasoutnumbered and had insufficient cannon to man all the capital’s bastions.Instead, however, of storming the city or enforcing a siege, Mohammad AliMirza simply stayed in-situ encamped for some weeks before retiring. 28Although the Treaty of Zohab (1639) relinquished all Persian claims toBaghdad, this is not likely to have been a crucial obstacle. 29 What preventedits fall is usually ascribed to nature, as Napoleon and Hitler are often saidto have been victims of “general winter”, Mohammad Ali Mirza’s forces (likethe army in the north a year later) fell to the ravages of “general cholera”.Whilst pondering his next move outside Baghdad, his army, and crucially,the leader himself, fell ill. Upon his army’s withdrawal to Kermanshah hedied in the foothills of the Zagros in December 1821. The southern armywas not well-equipped to take a city, the necessary ingredients such as regularinfantry and cannon being in short supply. It was the onset of disease,however, that settled any further thought of taking Baghdad by storm, letalone siege. Yet this opportunity had long since been squandered when thecity lay at his mercy some weeks earlier.The Shah had never wanted war with the Ottomans and on numerous occasionshad asked his sons to desist from conflict. Diplomatic correspondencesuggests that the Shah even ordered both sons to withdraw from the border,but matters had escalated too far before the messages were received. 30