Between Scylla <strong>and</strong> Charybdis 37could have had access to. Hav<strong>in</strong>g pursued her <strong>in</strong>terests on several fronts witha s<strong>in</strong>gular view of rega<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g lost territories <strong>in</strong> the Caucasus, <strong>Persia</strong> could nothave acted differently given the resources available to her. Had she <strong>in</strong> facthad a stronger military with more modern equipment or the support of anally who would commit troops side-by-side with her, there is little doubt thatAbbas Mirza could have recovered some, if not all, of the lost ground. Despitethe limited means at his disposal, the record of his military victories aga<strong>in</strong>stRussia is not negligible, <strong>and</strong> if it is suggested that more could have been done,the onus surely would have to be on those who suggest it, to show how, giventhese parameters, limitations <strong>and</strong> constra<strong>in</strong>ts push<strong>in</strong>g on <strong>Persia</strong>, <strong>Persia</strong>could have done better than she did.Rational theory shows that <strong>Persia</strong>’s reaction was called forth by Russia’sactions <strong>in</strong> the Caucasus. Rational decision-mak<strong>in</strong>g theory also shows that<strong>Persia</strong>’s decision-makers had little choice as to how to react. Rationaldecision-mak<strong>in</strong>g theory helps us underst<strong>and</strong> the larger context of the actionsof Russia <strong>and</strong> <strong>Persia</strong> <strong>and</strong> those of the other players, the Ottoman Empire,France. <strong>and</strong> Great Brita<strong>in</strong>. Prospect theory, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, helpsexpla<strong>in</strong> the peculiarities <strong>and</strong> differences between Agha Mohammad Khan’s<strong>and</strong> Fath-Ali Shah’s reactions to <strong>Persia</strong>’s foes.Prospect theory’s f<strong>in</strong>d<strong>in</strong>g that players tend to want to “protect what theyhave <strong>and</strong> [take] fewer risks to acquire what they want” applies very preciselyas an explanation of differences <strong>in</strong> the decisions of Fath-Ali Shah <strong>and</strong> AghaMohammad Khan. There is no question that people <strong>in</strong> general <strong>and</strong> decisionmakers<strong>in</strong> particular, tend to be risk-takers when they start out <strong>and</strong> areseek<strong>in</strong>g to achieve their goals, but once they have reached those goals orapproximated them, they tend to become risk averse <strong>in</strong> order to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>their achieved status. Given the exigencies <strong>and</strong> pressures on Agha MohammadKhan as a dynasty builder <strong>and</strong> consolidator, he was will<strong>in</strong>g to take greatrisks <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>cur heavy personal costs to rega<strong>in</strong> <strong>Persia</strong>’s territorial heritage.The loss of his beloved brother by his own h<strong>and</strong>, the constant campaign<strong>in</strong>g.<strong>and</strong> the hardship of life on the battlefield – all these were offset by the goalof unify<strong>in</strong>g rule over <strong>Persia</strong>, consolidat<strong>in</strong>g power for the sake of pass<strong>in</strong>g iton to his chosen heir, Baba Khan (Fath-Ali Shah), <strong>and</strong> establish<strong>in</strong>g a viabledynasty that could withst<strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>evitable challenges <strong>and</strong> uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties thatany new rulers might face.The circumstances surround<strong>in</strong>g Fath-Ali Shah’s rule, on the other h<strong>and</strong>,were very different from those of his uncle, <strong>and</strong> thus his aims <strong>and</strong> goalswere quite different also. For Fath-Ali Shah, ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of power, notconsolidation, was important. Given the memory of the turmoil under whichthe dynasty was established, the violent deaths of his great-gr<strong>and</strong>father <strong>and</strong>namesake Fath-Ali Khan, <strong>and</strong> that of his gr<strong>and</strong>father, father <strong>and</strong> uncle, <strong>and</strong>the many years of <strong>in</strong>ternal strife, <strong>and</strong> foreign wars it took before he was ableto reach the throne of <strong>Persia</strong>, his paramount goal throughout his rule wasstability <strong>and</strong> thus risk aversion. For Fath-Ali Shah this translated <strong>in</strong>to a desireto end military engagements as soon as possible with foreign foes such as
38 Manoutchehr M. Esk<strong>and</strong>ari-<strong>Qajar</strong>the Ottoman Empire <strong>and</strong> Russia <strong>and</strong> <strong>in</strong>stead to forge alliances with Engl<strong>and</strong><strong>and</strong> France <strong>in</strong> order to fend off further wars. 48 Prospect theory’s further po<strong>in</strong>tthat decision-makers will “take fewer risks to acquire territory than to preventthe loss of territory,” also helps expla<strong>in</strong> some of Abbas Mirza’s actionsthat resulted <strong>in</strong> the defeat at Asl<strong>and</strong>uz, <strong>and</strong> the actions of both Fath-Ali Shah<strong>and</strong> Abbas Mirza that resulted <strong>in</strong> the defeat <strong>in</strong> 1828 <strong>and</strong> the subsequentTurkomanchay treaty. Abbas Mirza’s risk-tak<strong>in</strong>g strategy, runn<strong>in</strong>g counterto his father’s risk aversion, was dictated by the circumstances he found himself<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> by the prospect of reconsolidation through one decisive victorythat could have restored a balance that had been disturbed by Russia. Fate,of course, would have it otherwise.Just as Odysseus’ troubles were not over when he survived the sea passagebetween the tw<strong>in</strong> monsters Scylla <strong>and</strong> Charybdis, neither were those ofthe <strong>Qajar</strong>s after Golestan <strong>and</strong> Turkomanchay. The stranglehold by <strong>Persia</strong>’stw<strong>in</strong> foes cont<strong>in</strong>ued well <strong>in</strong>to the twentieth century, with ill results for the<strong>Qajar</strong>s <strong>and</strong> for the Pahlavis who followed them. What rational decisionmak<strong>in</strong>gtheory <strong>and</strong> prospect theory allow us to conclude, however, is that theearly <strong>Qajar</strong>s were not hapless victims of circumstance. They were <strong>in</strong>itiatorsof policies <strong>and</strong> acted rationally, though on a calculus difficult to discern withoutthe <strong>in</strong>sights these theories make possible.Notes1 Book XII of the Odyssey relates the encounter of Odysseus with the monsterssucc<strong>in</strong>ctly as follows: “Next came Charybdis, who swallows the sea <strong>in</strong> awhirlpool, then spits it up aga<strong>in</strong>. Avoid<strong>in</strong>g this we skirted the cliff where Scyllaexacts her toll. Each of her six slaver<strong>in</strong>g maws grabbed a sailor <strong>and</strong> wolfed himdown.” In Greek mythology Scylla was the daughter of Phorcys <strong>and</strong> the TitanCeto, <strong>and</strong> Charybdis the daughter of Poseidon <strong>and</strong> Gaia. Both were beautifulwomen, turned by Circe <strong>and</strong> Zeus, respectively, <strong>in</strong>to these monsters. As monsters,Charybdis was more dangerous, but Scylla was more terrify<strong>in</strong>g.2 By early <strong>Qajar</strong>s are meant the first two rulers of the <strong>Qajar</strong> dynasty, AghaMohammad Khan <strong>and</strong> Fath-Ali Shah <strong>Qajar</strong>, but this description of course also<strong>in</strong>cludes Abbas Mirza, Fath-Ali Shah’s son, heir, <strong>and</strong> chief military comm<strong>and</strong>er,<strong>and</strong>, <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> aspects of the article, applies as well to Mohammad Shah <strong>and</strong> Nassered<strong>in</strong>Shah until the conquest of Herat <strong>in</strong> 1856.3 What economists refer to as “utility maximization,” political scientists call the“pursuit of national <strong>in</strong>terests.” While <strong>in</strong> economics the assumption, both normatively<strong>and</strong> empirically, is that the actor <strong>in</strong> the marketplace acts with <strong>in</strong>dividual goals <strong>in</strong>m<strong>in</strong>d, <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ternational politics the assumption is that the actor acts with the <strong>in</strong>terestof the state, or national <strong>in</strong>terest, <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d. In this context, actor refers to nationallevel decision-maker such as monarch, pr<strong>in</strong>ce, general, prime m<strong>in</strong>ister, or president,<strong>and</strong> this dist<strong>in</strong>ction between the requirements of rational private action <strong>and</strong>the dictates of rational public action is best <strong>and</strong> most memorably expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>Niccolò Machiavelli’s treatize, The Pr<strong>in</strong>ce.4 In politics as <strong>in</strong> economics, scarcity, not plenty, is the fundamental premise, <strong>and</strong>though this is more easily understood with regard to wealth over which economiccompetition occurs, this is no less true of power, over which political competitionunfolds. As <strong>in</strong> economics so also <strong>in</strong> politics, means for the acquisition of the
- Page 2 and 3: War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
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- Page 6 and 7: ContentsList of figuresContributors
- Page 8 and 9: Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
- Page 10 and 11: Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
- Page 12: AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
- Page 15 and 16: 2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
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- Page 19 and 20: 6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
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- Page 23 and 24: 10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
- Page 25 and 26: 12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geo
- Page 27 and 28: 14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
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- Page 61 and 62: 48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
- Page 63 and 64: 50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
- Page 65 and 66: 52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
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- Page 69 and 70: 56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
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- Page 73 and 74: 60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
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3 The Turko-Persian War1821-1823Win
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90 Graham WilliamsonThe resultant w
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92 Graham Williamsonprovincial forc
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94 Graham WilliamsonThe field armyO
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96 Graham Williamsonnot hold out mu
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98 Graham Williamsonoften in arrear
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100 Graham Williamsonthan any desig
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102 Graham WilliamsonThere were ove
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104 Graham Williamsonone should not
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Table 3.2 Persian regional armies (
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108 Graham WilliamsonIranian influe
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4 Social networks andborder conflic
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112 Vanessa MartinPersian troops on
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114 Vanessa Martinof comparatively
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116 Vanessa MartinTHE ROLE OF SOCIA
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118 Vanessa MartinThe Shah’s negl
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120 Vanessa Martinborder or any oth
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122 Vanessa Martin44 No. 38, 2 June
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5 The consolidation of Iran’sfron
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Figure 5.2 Arab principalities
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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6 Narrowing the frontierMid-ninetee
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Narrowing the frontier 151witnessed
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Figure 6.1 The 1843 borderlands sta
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Narrowing the frontier 155And the S
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Figure 6.2 The 1850 Williams line a
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Narrowing the frontier 159elicited
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Narrowing the frontier 161travellin
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Narrowing the frontier 163be found
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Narrowing the frontier 165A similar
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Narrowing the frontier 167and accep
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Narrowing the frontier 169Perhaps t
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Narrowing the frontier 171By this s
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Narrowing the frontier 17346 For a
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Crime, security, and insecurity 175
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Crime, security, and insecurity 177
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Crime, security, and insecurity 179
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Crime, security, and insecurity 181
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8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
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Merchants without frontier 185the m
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Merchants without frontier 187and d
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Merchants without frontier 189photo
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Merchants without frontier 191their
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Merchants without frontier 193In an
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Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
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Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
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Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
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Merchants without frontier 201Figur
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Merchants without frontier 203Studi
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Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
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Merchants without frontier 207and t
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Merchants without frontier 209or pu
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Merchants without frontier 211It ca
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9 The politics of concessionReasses
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The politics of concession 215gradu
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The politics of concession 217Shah,
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The politics of concession 219assig
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The politics of concession 221compa
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The politics of concession 223gross
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The politics of concession 225the B
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The politics of concession 227as th
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IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
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Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
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Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131