War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

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Introduction 11however, brought this Iranian dominance to an abrupt halt as the UnitedStates appeared to Iran’s east in Afghanistan and north in the Central Asianrepublics of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and, in 2003, to Iran’s west in Iraq.Much like the situation faced by the Qajars as the Great Game came to focusmilitary might around its periphery, so Iran faced a situation in the earlytwenty-first century, in which it was directly pressured on three sides andforced back from geopolitical dominance to a purely Gulf dimension.Yet, like the Qajars, the leaders of Iran today are facing a period ofGreat Power rebalancing that includes several similar characteristics to thatbygone era: the conflicts around it are, for example, beyond Iran’s direct controlbut play off its critical geopolitical importance, and the rebalancing ofthe Great Power relationship in its region relates directly to Iran’s particularapproach to political and strategic independence in regard to its attemptsto ward off outside penetration. The greatest force on Iran’s several borders,the United States, is, much like imperial Britain during the Qajar period,discovering itself unable fully to control events on either side of Iran’s territory,the massive American military strength being sapped of efficacy in theface of local realities; and instead, US power finds itself vulnerable in theface of the complex geopolitical linkages and ignominies that characterizeregional relationships. US foreign policy towards Iran is based on an understandingof the state that is astonishingly similar to that of Britain’s duringthe Qajar period and which constructed the Qajars in terms that have theirecho in American constructions of the Islamic Republic. These include theview that Iran’s threat emanates from a weak government, that it is incompetentin governance and shamefully corrupt, that it suffers a fundamentalinability to form a cohesive link with its people, that its Oriental traditionsare incompatible with modernity and that its obstreperous rhetoric continuouslypits one power against another in delaying tactics that promote onlyIran’s nefarious plans. Perhaps a further parallel can be drawn in the tendencyto characterize the decision-making process of the current Iranianleadership again as fraught with irrationality, ulterior motives and lack ofpolitical vision, in other words, as overly personal in nature in contrast tothe “impersonal, rational, objective” way by which Iran’s rivals in the regionand beyond are thought to come to their decisions.Not least among the difficulties faced by the US and its partners inthe current crisis is the question of borders, particularly along the Shatt-alArab (although the Kurdish regions to the north, and the eastern border ofBaluchistan are not altogether immune). Despite the Algiers Agreement of1975, the southwestern border remains an ambiguous area of shifting tribes,active gun-running, multiple power sources and independent militias, manyof which are linked to the holy cities that line the divide between Iran andIraq. As noted earlier, Williamson draws a similar picture as existing duringthe early nineteenth century, suggesting a pattern along a geopoliticaldivide of longue durée. The parallels with the later Treaty of Erzerum, andthe contests it left in its wake, need not be further emphasized.
12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geopolitics is significant to another Great Power relationshipalong its borders, that of the US and Russia, which, like Britain and Russiaduring the Qajar period, appear deeply distrustful of each other’s motivesin their approach to the Iranian plateau. For Russia today, as in the Qajarpast, Iran is its “near abroad”, a country with which it shares a long borderand with which it has extensive trade agreements. To understand the tensionsbetween the United States and Russia today, an analysis of the uncertainrelationship between Russia and Britain during the Qajar period mayoffer useful insights as, like the US today, Britain then was the non-residentpower, its greatest engagement in the region based on economic and strategicinterests rather than geopolitical imperative. Britain’s commitment to Indiacan be seen to have its echoes in the US commitment to the oil-rich Gulfstates, in both cases marking a course that contains within it both a fear ofexpanding Russian influence though Iran into the south, and a not-so-cloakedthreat against Russian adventurism – expressed perhaps most strongly todayagainst its support of the Iranian nuclear energy project. Iran, because of itsgeopolitical location, appears again at the centre of this maelstrom of powerpolitics.The issue of resources likewise finds thematic continuity. For the Qajars,the silver basis of the currency proved by the end of their reign to be adevastating hindrance which severely weakened the state. For modern Iran,although oil has been in many ways a boon, it has also been a curse, exposingthe country to the vulnerabilities of price changes on the internationalmarket – a situation not dissimilar to the price fluctuations of silver acentury earlier.The studies in this collection are a contribution to a deeper understandingof an era important in its own right in the progress of history. Yet, theirinsights beckon toward a more cohesive approach to comprehending howthe present is rooted in the past, and how responses can more usefully beanalyzed in relation to circumstances, rather than specific events.Notes* Special appreciation for his input and insight on this introduction goes toProfessor George E. Joffé of the Centre of International Studies, CambridgeUniversity.1 Naval Intelligence Division of HM Admiralty, Persia: Geographical Handbook Seriesfor Official Use Only, B.R. 525 (Restricted), (Oxford: Oxford University Press),September 1945, p. 291.2 Stephanie Cronin, The Politics of Debt: “The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and theBakhtiyari Khans”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 4, July 2004, pp. 1–31.
Page 2 and 3: War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
Page 4 and 5: War and Peace inQajar PersiaImplica
Page 6 and 7: ContentsList of figuresContributors
Page 8 and 9: Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
Page 10 and 11: Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
Page 12: AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
Page 15 and 16: 2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
Page 17 and 18: 4 Roxane Farmanfarmaianchapter in t
Page 19 and 20: 6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
Page 21 and 22: 8 Roxane Farmanfarmaiangaining grea
Page 23: 10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
Page 27 and 28: 14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
Page 29 and 30: 16 Peter W. Averybut the invasion w
Page 32: Part IWar
Page 35 and 36: 22 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
Page 37 and 38: 24 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarap
Page 39 and 40: 26 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarmi
Page 43 and 44: 30 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajardo
Page 45 and 46: 32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn
Page 47 and 48: 34 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarco
Page 49 and 50: 36 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarTh
Page 55 and 56: 42 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarop
Page 57 and 58: 44 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarbe
Page 59 and 60: 46 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarva
Page 61 and 62: 48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
Page 63 and 64: 50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
Page 65 and 66: 52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
Page 67 and 68: 54 Stephanie Croninprincipally on h
Page 69 and 70: 56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
Page 71 and 72: 58 Stephanie CroninEuropean alignme
Page 73 and 74: 60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
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62 Stephanie Croninin the revolutio
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64 Stephanie Croninof power and sta
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66 Stephanie Croninliving and the m
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68 Stephanie Croninconsequences for
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70 Stephanie Croninrevolution was a
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72 Stephanie CroninNew British miss
Page 87 and 88:
74 Stephanie CroninBrigade to a Div
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76 Stephanie Croninwithout the sove
Page 91 and 92:
78 Stephanie Croninaccounting devic
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80 Stephanie Croninbut also faced a
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82 Stephanie Cronindetermined on th
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84 Stephanie Cronin15 For a discuss
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86 Stephanie Cronin55 The Anglo-Rus
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3 The Turko-Persian War1821-1823Win
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90 Graham WilliamsonThe resultant w
Page 105 and 106:
92 Graham Williamsonprovincial forc
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94 Graham WilliamsonThe field armyO
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96 Graham Williamsonnot hold out mu
Page 111 and 112:
98 Graham Williamsonoften in arrear
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100 Graham Williamsonthan any desig
Page 115 and 116:
102 Graham WilliamsonThere were ove
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104 Graham Williamsonone should not
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Table 3.2 Persian regional armies (
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108 Graham WilliamsonIranian influe
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4 Social networks andborder conflic
Page 125 and 126:
112 Vanessa MartinPersian troops on
Page 127 and 128:
114 Vanessa Martinof comparatively
Page 129 and 130:
116 Vanessa MartinTHE ROLE OF SOCIA
Page 131 and 132:
118 Vanessa MartinThe Shah’s negl
Page 133 and 134:
120 Vanessa Martinborder or any oth
Page 135 and 136:
122 Vanessa Martin44 No. 38, 2 June
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5 The consolidation of Iran’sfron
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Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
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Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Figure 5.2 Arab principalities
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Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
6 Narrowing the frontierMid-ninetee
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Narrowing the frontier 151witnessed
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Figure 6.1 The 1843 borderlands sta
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Narrowing the frontier 155And the S
Page 170 and 171:
Figure 6.2 The 1850 Williams line a
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Narrowing the frontier 159elicited
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Narrowing the frontier 161travellin
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Narrowing the frontier 163be found
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Narrowing the frontier 165A similar
Page 180 and 181:
Narrowing the frontier 167and accep
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Narrowing the frontier 169Perhaps t
Page 184 and 185:
Narrowing the frontier 171By this s
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Narrowing the frontier 17346 For a
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Crime, security, and insecurity 175
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
Page 198 and 199:
Merchants without frontier 185the m
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Merchants without frontier 187and d
Page 202 and 203:
Merchants without frontier 189photo
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Merchants without frontier 191their
Page 206 and 207:
Merchants without frontier 193In an
Page 208 and 209:
Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
Page 210 and 211:
Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
Page 212 and 213:
Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
Page 214 and 215:
Merchants without frontier 201Figur
Page 216 and 217:
Merchants without frontier 203Studi
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Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
Page 220 and 221:
Merchants without frontier 207and t
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Merchants without frontier 209or pu
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Merchants without frontier 211It ca
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9 The politics of concessionReasses
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The politics of concession 215gradu
Page 230 and 231:
The politics of concession 217Shah,
Page 232 and 233:
The politics of concession 219assig
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The politics of concession 221compa
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The politics of concession 223gross
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The politics of concession 225the B
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The politics of concession 227as th
Page 242 and 243:
IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
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Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
Page 246 and 247:
Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131
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