War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

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Social networks and border conflicts 115the Governor, the people of Bushehr threw sticks and stones, and Iraniansoldiers under the command of a local khan, Baqir Khan Tangistani, firedon the British. The upshot was that the British Resident decided to withdrawthe Residency to Kharg on 30 March 1839. 21 In the British missionthere was much disquiet at what had taken place. The British Representative,Sheil wrote to Lord Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary, fulminatingon the loss of British influence consequent on what he considered a trial ofBritish forbearance over a long series of indignities. He pointed out that theBritish Admiral and Resident had retired, in the eyes of Iranians, beforethe “rabble” of Bushehr. The British were particularly disturbed as the eventcoincided with a setback in Kandahar.The British withdrawal was greeted with mixed feelings by the local population.Realizing the implications for trade, the Bushehr merchants and theqazi (principal judge) wrote to the British Resident expressing disquiet at hisdeparture. Letters were also sent to the Governor of Bushehr asking him topromise not to impede British trade. The conciliatory view of the merchantsof Bushehr was not shared by Mohammad Shah, who seized the opportunity,realizing the implications for British prestige. He summoned Baqir KhanTangistani, the qazi of Bushehr and his nephew, Shaikh Salman, to court,where they received robes of honour, decorations and substantial pensionsand were received by the Shah with great condescension and respect. It wasofficially reported that an English admiral in command of a ship of 80 gunshad, by a stratagem, taken Bushehr, but had been defeated with great lossby Baqir Khan and his force of Dashtestanis, and driven from the town. Itwas additionally reported that a large quantity of English heads had beensent to Shiraz. 22The Shah made his version known throughout Iran and down the PersianGulf, 23 undermining British prestige, which, of course, resulted in additionalfinancial burdens from reduced commerce from the Iranians. This event causedmore damage to British prestige in the Persian Gulf than had their retreatfrom Kabul in 1841–1842. It is evident from the vehemence of Sheil’s dispatchesthat it really was a victory for the populace. 24The British eventually evacuated Kharg Island in February 1842. ABritish presence in the form of a coaling station, representing the longstandingaspirations of the government of India, clung on until it was finallyremoved as a result of repeated remonstrations by the Persian governmentto London in 1944.The people of Kharg Island had benefited from the war as they had paidlittle in the way of taxes for three years, their main dues normally being paidto Shaikh Nasir to support the island garrison through a pilotage tax. 25 Theyhad restructured their administration and grown used to managing their ownaffairs by council. They remained, however, loyal to the Shah. Why did theBritish go? The main reason was that if they seized part of the south, theRussians might do the same in the north; but also, in those days there waslittle financial advantage in staying if the locals were not friendly.
116 Vanessa MartinTHE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKS IN FARSMeanwhile the impact of the war, and the Shah’s loss of authority throughhis failure before Herat, produced disturbance and defiance on the partof the provincial authorities throughout Fars. Fereydun Mirza, the Shah’sbrother, and governor of the province, regarded the people of Fars as secretlyin league with the British – and indeed Baqir Khan Tangistani sent themfriendly messages. However, there is not much evidence of a direct connectionbetween the British and the local powers. The main problem was thatthe continuing economic difficulties exacerbated the political situation, particularlyin Shiraz. In August 1839, for example, Mirza Ahmad Khan, theprincipal administrator of Fars and the governor’s leading official, was drivenfrom the town by popular discontent. 26 On 9 August 1839 a tumultuous crowdgathered in objection to his return. In desperation, the prince-governor, especiallydressed in military uniform, gave an order that the town should bedestroyed and the people massacred; however, he too was forced to quit thecity by the angry populace, 27 leaving the people victorious. Despite bringingpressure on the leading mujtahid Shaikh, Abu Turab, in September 1840,Mohammad Shah had little success in imposing his will on Shiraz, and lessin raising any taxes. The people of Shiraz, like those of Kharg Island, usedthe period of the war and its aftermath to further their own interests.IMPACT ON THE WAR BY POPULAR NETWORKS IN THEEASTERN AND WESTERN REGIONSWith regard to the war on the eastern front it is difficult to assess the leveland nature of popular involvement. This is partly because of lack of sourcematerial; partly because of the localized nature of the struggle in Afghanistanrather than Iran – by contrast to Bushehr, which was radicalized by the actualBritish presence; and partly because the eastern border that was underpopulated.One observer remarked that if the Shah really wanted to extendhis rule in Khorasan he had better start by re-peopling Torbat-e Shaikh Jam. 28The majority of local potentates appear to have resisted British pressure tojoin them: Amir Assadollah Alam fought in the Iranian army; 29 MohammadReza Khan and ‘Ali Khan of Sistan and certain leaders of the Baluch tribesreportedly gave their allegiance; 30 however, the chief of Kelat Naderi soughtalliance with the British. 31 As Mojtahed-Zadeh has observed, while the peoplesof the eastern frontier were at war with the British, they collaborated, butonce the threat was past, they reverted to their customary tribal and ethnicrivalries.To the west and north-west there was trouble in Kermanshah, where thepeople turned against the governor, 32 and also in the area between Erzurumand Khoi, where there were attacks by the Kurds, who constantly harassedthe villages there. 33 However, such problems were endemic and not noticeablyworse than at any other period, unlike the situation in the south. The Shah
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War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
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War and Peace inQajar PersiaImplica
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ContentsList of figuresContributors
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Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
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Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
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AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
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2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
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4 Roxane Farmanfarmaianchapter in t
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6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
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8 Roxane Farmanfarmaiangaining grea
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10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
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12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geo
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14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
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16 Peter W. Averybut the invasion w
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Part IWar
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22 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
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24 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarap
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26 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarmi
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30 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajardo
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32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn
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34 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarco
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36 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarTh
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42 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarop
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44 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarbe
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46 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarva
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48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
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50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
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52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
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54 Stephanie Croninprincipally on h
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56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
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58 Stephanie CroninEuropean alignme
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60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
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62 Stephanie Croninin the revolutio
Page 77 and 78: 64 Stephanie Croninof power and sta
Page 79 and 80: 66 Stephanie Croninliving and the m
Page 81 and 82: 68 Stephanie Croninconsequences for
Page 83 and 84: 70 Stephanie Croninrevolution was a
Page 85 and 86: 72 Stephanie CroninNew British miss
Page 87 and 88: 74 Stephanie CroninBrigade to a Div
Page 89 and 90: 76 Stephanie Croninwithout the sove
Page 91 and 92: 78 Stephanie Croninaccounting devic
Page 93 and 94: 80 Stephanie Croninbut also faced a
Page 95 and 96: 82 Stephanie Cronindetermined on th
Page 97 and 98: 84 Stephanie Cronin15 For a discuss
Page 99 and 100: 86 Stephanie Cronin55 The Anglo-Rus
Page 101 and 102: 3 The Turko-Persian War1821-1823Win
Page 103 and 104: 90 Graham WilliamsonThe resultant w
Page 105 and 106: 92 Graham Williamsonprovincial forc
Page 107 and 108: 94 Graham WilliamsonThe field armyO
Page 109 and 110: 96 Graham Williamsonnot hold out mu
Page 111 and 112: 98 Graham Williamsonoften in arrear
Page 113 and 114: 100 Graham Williamsonthan any desig
Page 115 and 116: 102 Graham WilliamsonThere were ove
Page 117 and 118: 104 Graham Williamsonone should not
Page 119 and 120: Table 3.2 Persian regional armies (
Page 121 and 122: 108 Graham WilliamsonIranian influe
Page 123 and 124: 4 Social networks andborder conflic
Page 125 and 126: 112 Vanessa MartinPersian troops on
Page 127: 114 Vanessa Martinof comparatively
Page 131 and 132: 118 Vanessa MartinThe Shah’s negl
Page 133 and 134: 120 Vanessa Martinborder or any oth
Page 135 and 136: 122 Vanessa Martin44 No. 38, 2 June
Page 138 and 139: 5 The consolidation of Iran’sfron
Page 140 and 141: Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
Page 150 and 151: Figure 5.2 Arab principalities
Page 162 and 163: 6 Narrowing the frontierMid-ninetee
Page 164 and 165: Narrowing the frontier 151witnessed
Page 166 and 167: Figure 6.1 The 1843 borderlands sta
Page 168 and 169: Narrowing the frontier 155And the S
Page 170 and 171: Figure 6.2 The 1850 Williams line a
Page 172 and 173: Narrowing the frontier 159elicited
Page 174 and 175: Narrowing the frontier 161travellin
Page 176 and 177: Narrowing the frontier 163be found
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Narrowing the frontier 165A similar
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Narrowing the frontier 167and accep
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Narrowing the frontier 169Perhaps t
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Narrowing the frontier 171By this s
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Narrowing the frontier 17346 For a
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Crime, security, and insecurity 175
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8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
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Merchants without frontier 185the m
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Merchants without frontier 187and d
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Merchants without frontier 189photo
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Merchants without frontier 191their
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Merchants without frontier 193In an
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Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
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Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
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Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
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Merchants without frontier 201Figur
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Merchants without frontier 203Studi
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Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
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Merchants without frontier 207and t
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Merchants without frontier 209or pu
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Merchants without frontier 211It ca
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9 The politics of concessionReasses
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The politics of concession 215gradu
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The politics of concession 217Shah,
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The politics of concession 219assig
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The politics of concession 221compa
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The politics of concession 223gross
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The politics of concession 225the B
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The politics of concession 227as th
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IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
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Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
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Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131
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