War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

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Between Scylla and Charybdis 35negotiate from a position of weakness, as England not only held most of thecards but also held a grudge against Fath-Ali Shah for what it deemed tobe his desertion of his obligations under the 1801 treaty.Given these setbacks, one might wonder if Fath-Ali Shah and his advisorswere in fact fully aware of the dangers lurking in the waters they werenow navigating. Amini argues that they were, but could do very little aboutthem other than hope for a favourable turn of events. Commenting on AbbasMirza’s understanding of Napoleon’s neglect of Persia in favour of his owninterests in Europe, he states:This comment by Prince Abbas Mirza shows that the Persian authoritieswere perfectly aware of the political realities of Europe and of thepriorities of French diplomacy. But the fact remained that, torn apartby Russia’s ambitions to the north and Britain’s to the south, they hadno choice but to attempt the impossible to oppose both countries withthe power of France. Perhaps the partisans of this theory, who includedpersons as influential as the Crown Prince himself and the primeMinister, Mirza Shafi, hoped that Napoleon’s hatred of Britain and hisdesire to invade India by way of Persia would prevail over his friendshipwith Russia, and that he would sooner or later act in their country’sfavour. Had not Gardane done everything to convince them of thesincerity of France’s friendship? 44In the meantime, Persia did not remain idle in her attempts to regain herlost territories and was fighting her battles on two fronts, one military andone diplomatic. In the winter of 1808, Abbas Mirza confronted the Russiansand, though he engaged General Nebolsin’s troops at Nakhtchevan in Novemberagainst the advice of his father and lost, in December he managed tosnatch a victory against the more formidable General Gudovitch at Erivan,showing that the reforms of the armed forces he had initiated could standhim in good stead. On the diplomatic front, in the spring of 1809, Persiasigned her second treaty with England, represented by Harford Jones. Thissecond Anglo-Persian treaty remedied from the point of view of the Persiansthe one defect of the first that drove them into the arms of the French inthe first place. The price of this new treaty, on England’s insistence, was anabrogation of all concessions made to France, but in return it gave to Persiathe guarantee that Britain would come to the aid of Persia if she was invadedby a “European” power, as well as providing Persia with military aid andfinancial assistance. The inclusion of the term “European” was a concessiondemanded by Persia, but the term had a very different meaning foreach party. From Persia’s point of view, the treaty strengthened her handagainst Russia. From Britain’s, it covered her western flank from anyfurther incursion by France as the “European” power in question, andthe question of territory was again in reference to present and not pastboundaries. 45
36 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarThinking herself safer now, Persia pursued her struggle against Russia inthe hope of regaining lost ground while England, in the person of Lord Minto,the new Governor General of India, was already thinking of ways to extricateherself from the obligation to support Persia’s struggle against Russia.Again, in another turn of events, European political considerations interferedwith Persia’s interests. In 1809, Gudovitch, sensing his position to bemore precarious than he had led the Persians to believe, offered a negotiatedsettlement. This time it was Britain that insisted that the war must continueand that Persia should fight on. England did so out of concern over Russia’sstrength in the European theatre should Russia be rid of the problem of fightingPersia. Persia reluctantly agreed, but Mirza Shafi made these remarks toHarford Jones showing the degree of calculation the Persians were engagedin at every turn of the road: “Very well, but supposing that things turn outbadly in Europe and you leave us ‘in a tight spot.’ Today we can make peaceif we want to. But what will happen tomorrow if we trust you and if yourgovernment is at variance with you?” 46In fact this is exactly what happened in the coming years. Jones was replacedby Sir Gore Ouseley, and Gudovitch with General Tormazov. While Ouseleywas following the new policy of his country, Tormazov was laying down thenew and tougher line of his. In Europe, in the meantime, Russia and Britainhad allied in the Third Coalition against Napoleon. Amini states that thisnew change in British policy was to “have disastrous effects on Persia,” asPersia now found herself abandoned again without the military support sheneeded to see her struggle with Russia through. It is here that Abbas Mirzamade the most fateful decision of his campaigns. Assessing his chances at apossible military victory in one decisive battle, he took a chance and engagedthe enemy at Aslanduz, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by theRussians. The result was defeat and with this defeat, Persia was no longerin a position to engage the Russians alone. Having lost France’s support andEngland’s, Persia had to sue for peace. The resulting Treaty of Golestan,negotiated with the assistance of Sir Gore Ouseley, was a terrible blow toPersia. In it Persia ceded control over all the Khanates north of the Arasexcept for Nakhtchevan and Erivan, and given the outcome of this treaty,questions were raised by Persia on the role of Ouseley in seeing to Russianand thus British interests rather than to those of Persia, which by treaty hewas supposed to help protect. 47RETHINKING QAJAR DECISION-MAKING USINGPROSPECT THEORY AND RATIONAL DECISION-MAKINGTHEORYThough the outcome was negative for the Persian side, little in her decisionmakingprocess, based on the evidence, could legitimately fault Persia forhaving taken fewer precautions than necessary, or neglected information she
Page 2 and 3: War and Peace in Qajar PersiaPersia
Page 4 and 5: War and Peace inQajar PersiaImplica
Page 6 and 7: ContentsList of figuresContributors
Page 8 and 9: Figures5.1 Omani enclaves 1305.2 Ar
Page 10 and 11: Contributor listMansoureh Ettehadie
Page 12: AcknowledgementsThis volume grew ou
Page 15 and 16: 2 Roxane Farmanfarmaianrepresented
Page 17 and 18: 4 Roxane Farmanfarmaianchapter in t
Page 19 and 20: 6 Roxane FarmanfarmaianThus, two si
Page 21 and 22: 8 Roxane Farmanfarmaiangaining grea
Page 23 and 24: 10 Roxane Farmanfarmaiantough deals
Page 25 and 26: 12 Roxane FarmanfarmaianIranian geo
Page 27 and 28: 14 Peter W. Averyin Shiraz and cont
Page 29 and 30: 16 Peter W. Averybut the invasion w
Page 32: Part IWar
Page 35 and 36: 22 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarth
Page 37 and 38: 24 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarap
Page 39 and 40: 26 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarmi
Page 43 and 44: 30 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajardo
Page 45 and 46: 32 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-QajarIn
Page 47: 34 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarco
Page 55 and 56: 42 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarop
Page 57 and 58: 44 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarbe
Page 59 and 60: 46 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajarva
Page 61 and 62: 48 Stephanie Cronincapacity and res
Page 63 and 64: 50 Stephanie Croninforces of the es
Page 65 and 66: 52 Stephanie CroninPART ONE: THE QA
Page 67 and 68: 54 Stephanie Croninprincipally on h
Page 69 and 70: 56 Stephanie CroninThe French offic
Page 71 and 72: 58 Stephanie CroninEuropean alignme
Page 73 and 74: 60 Stephanie Croninthe authorities
Page 75 and 76: 62 Stephanie Croninin the revolutio
Page 77 and 78: 64 Stephanie Croninof power and sta
Page 79 and 80: 66 Stephanie Croninliving and the m
Page 81 and 82: 68 Stephanie Croninconsequences for
Page 83 and 84: 70 Stephanie Croninrevolution was a
Page 85 and 86: 72 Stephanie CroninNew British miss
Page 87 and 88: 74 Stephanie CroninBrigade to a Div
Page 89 and 90: 76 Stephanie Croninwithout the sove
Page 91 and 92: 78 Stephanie Croninaccounting devic
Page 93 and 94: 80 Stephanie Croninbut also faced a
Page 95 and 96: 82 Stephanie Cronindetermined on th
Page 97 and 98: 84 Stephanie Cronin15 For a discuss
Page 99 and 100:
86 Stephanie Cronin55 The Anglo-Rus
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3 The Turko-Persian War1821-1823Win
Page 103 and 104:
90 Graham WilliamsonThe resultant w
Page 105 and 106:
92 Graham Williamsonprovincial forc
Page 107 and 108:
94 Graham WilliamsonThe field armyO
Page 109 and 110:
96 Graham Williamsonnot hold out mu
Page 111 and 112:
98 Graham Williamsonoften in arrear
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100 Graham Williamsonthan any desig
Page 115 and 116:
102 Graham WilliamsonThere were ove
Page 117 and 118:
104 Graham Williamsonone should not
Page 119 and 120:
Table 3.2 Persian regional armies (
Page 121 and 122:
108 Graham WilliamsonIranian influe
Page 123 and 124:
4 Social networks andborder conflic
Page 125 and 126:
112 Vanessa MartinPersian troops on
Page 127 and 128:
114 Vanessa Martinof comparatively
Page 129 and 130:
116 Vanessa MartinTHE ROLE OF SOCIA
Page 131 and 132:
118 Vanessa MartinThe Shah’s negl
Page 133 and 134:
120 Vanessa Martinborder or any oth
Page 135 and 136:
122 Vanessa Martin44 No. 38, 2 June
Page 138 and 139:
5 The consolidation of Iran’sfron
Page 140 and 141:
Consolidation of Iran’s frontier
Page 142 and 143:
Page 144 and 145:
Page 146 and 147:
Page 148 and 149:
Page 150 and 151:
Figure 5.2 Arab principalities
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Page 154 and 155:
Page 156 and 157:
Page 158 and 159:
Page 160 and 161:
Page 162 and 163:
6 Narrowing the frontierMid-ninetee
Page 164 and 165:
Narrowing the frontier 151witnessed
Page 166 and 167:
Figure 6.1 The 1843 borderlands sta
Page 168 and 169:
Narrowing the frontier 155And the S
Page 170 and 171:
Figure 6.2 The 1850 Williams line a
Page 172 and 173:
Narrowing the frontier 159elicited
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Narrowing the frontier 161travellin
Page 176 and 177:
Narrowing the frontier 163be found
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Narrowing the frontier 165A similar
Page 180 and 181:
Narrowing the frontier 167and accep
Page 182 and 183:
Narrowing the frontier 169Perhaps t
Page 184 and 185:
Narrowing the frontier 171By this s
Page 186 and 187:
Narrowing the frontier 17346 For a
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Crime, security, and insecurity 175
Page 190 and 191:
Page 192 and 193:
Page 194 and 195:
Page 196 and 197:
8 Merchants without bordersTrade, t
Page 198 and 199:
Merchants without frontier 185the m
Page 200 and 201:
Merchants without frontier 187and d
Page 202 and 203:
Merchants without frontier 189photo
Page 204 and 205:
Merchants without frontier 191their
Page 206 and 207:
Merchants without frontier 193In an
Page 208 and 209:
Figure 8.1Seated, first from left:
Page 210 and 211:
Figure 8.3Seated: Hajj Mohammad-Taq
Page 212 and 213:
Figure 8.5 Taken in Hajj Hasan Jour
Page 214 and 215:
Merchants without frontier 201Figur
Page 216 and 217:
Merchants without frontier 203Studi
Page 218 and 219:
Merchants without frontier 20516 Me
Page 220 and 221:
Merchants without frontier 207and t
Page 222 and 223:
Merchants without frontier 209or pu
Page 224 and 225:
Merchants without frontier 211It ca
Page 226 and 227:
9 The politics of concessionReasses
Page 228 and 229:
The politics of concession 215gradu
Page 230 and 231:
The politics of concession 217Shah,
Page 232 and 233:
The politics of concession 219assig
Page 234 and 235:
The politics of concession 221compa
Page 236 and 237:
The politics of concession 223gross
Page 238 and 239:
The politics of concession 225the B
Page 240 and 241:
The politics of concession 227as th
Page 242 and 243:
IndexAbbas Mirza, Crown Prince 6, 1
Page 244 and 245:
Index 231Gulf Arabs 127-9Gwadar 136
Page 246 and 247:
Index 233policy in Persian Gulf 131
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