War and Peace in Qajar Persia: Implications Past and ... - Oguzlar.az

40 Manoutchehr M. Eskandari-Qajartheories abstract from emotion to focus on a strict utility maximization principle.(For a thorough discussion see McDermott’s introductory remarks in theabove special issue on prospect theory, pp. 147–61.) There is also a question as towhether these new formulations are refinements of rational decision-making orsubstantial enough critiques of it to constitute departures from the theory altogether.Russett et al., op. cit., p. 166, answer that,[n]one of these challenges to the rational actor model imply that decision makersare irrational, only that actual decision making departs from the idealmodel in various and significant ways. Nor do they suggest that rational choiceapproaches to the study of world politics are doomed to failure because ofthese imperfections.It is Russett et al., op. cit., p. 163, who choose the term “refinement” to describeprospect theory as an alternate theory of rationality. There have also been attemptsto bring the findings of rational decision-making and prospect theory closer togetheras prominent exponents of each camp have looked for common ground. (Seefor instance, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Rose McDermott, “Crossing NoMan’s Land: Cooperation From the Trenches,” in McDermott, op. cit. (2004),pp. 163–76).Finally, there are questions regarding the theoretical strength of each of these theories.(For a survey of the state of the discipline regarding rationality in decisionmakingsee Eldar Shafir and Robyn A. LeBoeuf, “Rationality,” Annual Revue ofPsychology 53 (2002): 491–5.) Two challenges to prospect theory are particularlynoteworthy: a) the apparent failure of the theory to more fully explain the originand causes of framing, and b) the inability of the theory to distinguish satisfactorilybetween consistency and causality (see McDermott, op. cit., pp. 154 and160). Rational decision-making, on the other hand, has been criticized on the notionthat its requirements are too strict and its conditions impossible to fulfill in realworldsettings. Decision-making theorists such as Herbert Simon therefore speakof “limited rationality” or “bounded rationality” in decision-making and of thenotion of “satisfycing” (that is “first acceptable option” decision-making) as amore appropriately descriptive theory of the actual decision-making process thanpure utility maximization. See Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: WileyPublishers, 1957) and Models of Bounded Rationality (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982).The idea of bounded rationality is applied to wartime decision-making by ScottSigmund Garter in Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1997), as cited in Russett, et al., op. cit., p. 163. Some have even abandonedthe analytical framework of rational decision-making altogether in favour ofdifferent approaches that they argue capture the real world of decision-makingprocesses better without requiring the detachment of strict rational decisionmakingtheory, see Thomas R. Dye, Understanding Public Policy, 11th edn (UpperSaddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005), chapter 2, “Models of Politics.”Graham Allison, in his landmark formulation of the essence of decision-makingin 1971 (cited in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations andWorld Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 2nd edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ:Prentice Hall, 2001), p. 127), presents one of the most famous critiques of rationalchoice theory:where a given bureaucratic actor or diplomat stands on a given issue is oftendetermined by where he or she sits; that is, one’s view of alternative coursesof action is highly colored by the perspective of the organization to whichone belongs or role one plays. Perceptions of what is the optimal or best courseof action often vary from one bureaucratic actor to another, reflecting