Scientific and Technical Aerospace Reports Volume 38 July 28, 2000

20000064599 NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA USA
It Takes More than Technology
Hultquist, Mary, NASA Ames Research Center, USA; Utley, Judith, MRJ Techology Solutions, USA; February 2000; In English;
See also 20000064579; No Copyright; Abstract Only; Available from CASI only as part of the entire parent document
The technology required to develop and manage a production metacenter or grid environment is an important ingredient in
such a project. However, this technology may neither be the most difficult piece of the puzzle nor the one demanding the most
patience and perseverance. This paper touches on the technical underpinnings of the collaborative effort that resulted in a production
metacenter joining two cooperating IBM SPs, one at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) and the other at NASA Langley
Research Center (LaRC). The discussion then focuses on the problems attributable to differing environments, both physical and
cultural, even though both sites were part of the same agency. The approach for the Phase I NASA Metacenter was centralized
with most decisions made by the NAS Division at Ames. Also discussed is the distributed approach to resolving the even greater
difficulties encountered in the multi-agency effort to modify NASA’s technology to build a similar metacenter in the Department
of Defense. The DoD Metacenter joins two DoD Major Shared Resource Centers (MSRCs), the Aeronautical Systems Center
(ASC) MSRC at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC)
MSRC. The final discussion focuses on similar problems that have arisen at NASA with the NASA Information Power Grid.
Author
Distributed Processing; Information Resources Management; Information Systems; Systems Management
20000066583 NASA Kennedy Space Center, Cocoa Beach, FL USA
A/C 67 Investigation Board Final Report
May 11, 1987; In English; Videotape: 27 min., 41 sec. playing time, in color, with sound
Report No.(s): NONP-NASA-VT-2000078606; No Copyright; Avail: CASI; B02, Videotape-Beta; V02, Videotape-VHS
On March 26, 1987, after the launch of an Atlas/Centaur rocket with a payload of a Navy Communications Satellite, a problem
developed and the rocket was lost. John Busse chaired the Accident Investigation Board that was convened to investigate the incident.
This videotape is a press conference with Mr Busse, who reviews the findings of the investigation concerning the loss of
the Atlas/Centaur-67 launch vehicle. The loss is primarily attributed to a hardover engine yaw command that was caused by an
erroneous signal from the digital computer unit. The generation of the erroneous signal is blamed on unfavorable weather conditions
which created a lightning hazard. Mr. Busse, also, reviews the investigation’s recommendations for avoiding similar occurrences.
The press then asks questions about the findings and recommendations.
CASI
Accident Investigation; Atlas Centaur Launch Vehicle; Lightning; Weather; Spacecraft Launching; Flight Hazards; Meteorological
Parameters
20000066614 Physics and Electronics Lab. TNO, The Hague, Netherlands
BOOT: Evaluation of Studies Final Report BOOT: Evaluatie Studies
vanderHuslt, A., Physics and Electronics Lab. TNO, Netherlands; Wielemaker, J., Physics and Electronics Lab. TNO, Netherlands;
Sabel, A. A., Physics and Electronics Lab. TNO, Netherlands; February 2000; 41p; In Dutch; Original contains color
illustrations
Contract(s)/Grant(s): A98/KM/749; TNO Proj. 27655
Report No.(s): TD-99-0238; FEL-99-A194; Copyright; Avail: Issuing Activity
The acceptance of a method depends to a large extent on the quality of the decision trajectory and the quality of the outcome.
The study reported here aimed primarily at an assessment of both qualities of a method for staff-studies on facilities for education
and training (named BOOT). Results of a comparison of unguided staff-studies and BOOT based studies revealed substantial differences
in the decision trajectory. Unguided studies tended to be rather ’solution’ oriented. That is, before having reached a conclusion
on requirements, the discussion tended to focus on solutions. Only when comparing several alternatives, requirements
relating to the differences between alternatives were made explicit. BOOT, on the other hand, supports a more analytical approach.
It guides users to make requirements explicit before discussing the alternative e&t facilities. Problem with the solution oriented
approach is that it cannot guarantee that all relevant requirements are made clear and that all possible solutions are taken into
regard. Indeed, interviews revealed that potential users preferred the analytical BOOT approach. BOOT will affect the way the
RNIN Organization deals with staff-studies on e&t. BOOT forces users to motivate each crucial decision, and supports the evaluation
of those decisions by a third party. It opens up the process and gives users less control. This may negatively impact the acceptance
when decision makers in turn will not accept the end result as realistic a need.
Author
Education; Training Evaluation; Decision Support Systems; Training Devices
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