glossary of terms used by frithjof schuon - Sophia Perennis

The mythological wording of a traditional perspective is essentially determined by a
spiritual and social interest which in an ultimate sense coincides with the truth; this it
does by definition. The sacred wording contains in its own way the infinite Truth, failing
which it could not serve an interest concerning that very Truth. [TB, Cosmological and
Eschatological Viewpoints]
The notion of myth usually evokes a picture of traditional stories charged with a wealth
of symbolism and more or less devoid of historical foundation; however, in defining
myth one should not lay undue stress on this supposed lack of historical basis, for the
function of myth is such that once it has been properly understood the question of
historicity ceases to have any practical importance. What guarantees the spiritual function
of a sacred story is its symbolism on the one hand, and its traditional character on the
other. In the case of stories belonging to the Mahayana, it is the Buddha who stands
surety for the reality and hence for the efficacy of the story; that is to say, if he does not
guarantee absolutely the historical truth of the facts, at least he guarantees the certainty of
their spiritual truth, which takes precedence over the historical aspect, and he guarantees
also their power of salvation which is the reason for the myth’s existence. [TB,
Dharmakara’s Vow]
Naïvety: A naïve outlook is often attributed to everyone who lived in the past. There is
no simpler way of exalting oneself, and it is all the easier and more tempting because it is
founded on accurate though fragmentary assessments which can be made the most of,
with the help of false generalizations and arbitrary interpretations, by being related to an
assumed all-embracing evolutionary progress. But the word “naïve” can be understood in
more than one way, and so can other words that can be used in a more or less comparable
sense. It would be better if people who use such words would first agree on what they are
talking about. If to be naïve is to be direct and spontaneous, to know nothing of
dissimulation and subterfuge and also no doubt nothing of certain experiences, then
unmodernized peoples certainly possess – or possessed – that kind of naïvety; but if it is
merely to be without intelligence or critical sense and to be open to all kinds of
deception, then there is certainly no reason to suppose that our contemporaries are any
less naïve than their forbears.
However that may be, there are few things that the “insulated” being who calls himself
“modern man” endures less readily than the risk of appearing naïve; everything else can
go by the board so long as the feeling of not being duped by anything is safeguarded. In
reality the acme of naïvety is to believe that man can escape from naïvety on every plane,
and that it is possible for him to be integrally intelligent by his own efforts; he who seeks
to gain all things by cleverness ends by losing all in blindness and ineffectuality . . . One
must get rid of the notion of a hopelessly naïve Middle Ages versus a breathtakingly
intelligent twentieth century; against that view must be set the fact that history does not
abolish simplicity of outlook, but merely displaces it, together with the fact that the most
flagrant of naiveties is to fail to see naïvety where it exists . . . An ancient writer may give
an impression of simplicity of outlook, but if he does so, it is largely because he had not
got to take account of a thousand errors still unknown nor of a thousand possibilities of
misinterpretation . . . seeing that the writer in question could in a large measure dispense
with fine shades of meaning; words still possessed a freshness and a fullness, or a magic,
which it is difficult for us to imagine, living as we do in a climate of verbal inflation . . .
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