essays in public finance and industrial organization a dissertation ...
essays in public finance and industrial organization a dissertation ...
essays in public finance and industrial organization a dissertation ...
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CHAPTER 2. HEALTH PLAN CHOICE 93<br />
do affect the <strong>in</strong>terpretation of the effects of the different plan types on utilization of<br />
care. In particular,the reduction <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>sured costs for low risks <strong>in</strong> the network plan may<br />
represent, at least <strong>in</strong> part, a shift from <strong>in</strong>sured to un<strong>in</strong>sured payments, rather than a<br />
reduction <strong>in</strong> utilization or prices. For high risks, <strong>in</strong> contrast, the difference <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>sured<br />
costs between the plans likely underestimates the extent to which the <strong>in</strong>tegrated plan<br />
reduces total costs.<br />
2.5.2 Quantify<strong>in</strong>g Social Welfare Inefficiencies<br />
In this section, we use the estimated dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> cost model to compute the <strong>in</strong>effi-<br />
ciency associated with observed contribution policies relative to alternative efficient<br />
benchmarks. We also compare welfare between the observed policies <strong>and</strong> alterna-<br />
tive uniform contribution policies to demonstrate the extent to which the <strong>in</strong>efficiency<br />
associated with a uniform contribution could be reduced with<strong>in</strong> the current <strong>in</strong>stitu-<br />
tional constra<strong>in</strong>ts. Table 2.6 presents the results of these simulations. The left-h<strong>and</strong><br />
panels present the market share, average enrollee risk, <strong>and</strong> the average <strong>in</strong>cremental<br />
contribution for each plan under five different pric<strong>in</strong>g scenarios. The <strong>in</strong>cremental con-<br />
tribution represents the monthly contribution per enrollee relative to the <strong>in</strong>tegrated<br />
HMO averaged across all households. The right-h<strong>and</strong> panels present <strong>in</strong>formation on<br />
the change <strong>in</strong> surplus relative to the observed allocation for each scenario.<br />
The Welfare Cost of Observed Prices<br />
In the top panels, we calculate the <strong>in</strong>efficiency of observed pric<strong>in</strong>g policies rela-<br />
tive to two risk-rated benchmarks. The first is <strong>in</strong>dividual risk rat<strong>in</strong>g based on the<br />
observed risk scores. This pric<strong>in</strong>g policy, which we refer to as “feasible risk-rated<br />
contributions”, maximizes social welfare conditional on knowledge of the risk scores,<br />
but not each household’s private <strong>in</strong>formation. The third panel of the Table reports<br />
outcomes when prices are first-best, i.e. risk-rated based on both <strong>public</strong> <strong>and</strong> private<br />
<strong>in</strong>formation.<br />
Overall, under risk-rated contributions, high-risk households face higher premiums<br />
<strong>and</strong> low-risk households face somewhat lower premiums for the network plans relative<br />
to observed contribution policies. In both the feasible <strong>and</strong> first-best scenarios, this