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essays in public finance and industrial organization a dissertation ...

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CHAPTER 2. HEALTH PLAN CHOICE 69<br />

risk, denoted θ. Each consumer chooses between a high-cost plan A <strong>and</strong> a low cost<br />

plan B. We can th<strong>in</strong>k of the plans, for now, as vertically differentiated. The plans’<br />

expected costs of cover<strong>in</strong>g a type-θ consumer are cA(θ) <strong>and</strong> cB(θ). Let ∆c (θ) =<br />

cA(θ) − cB(θ) denote the cost differential. We assume ∆c is strictly positive <strong>and</strong><br />

<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> θ.<br />

Let vA(θ) <strong>and</strong> vB(θ) denote a type θ’s expected (dollar) value from be<strong>in</strong>g covered<br />

by each of the plans. For the moment, the benefits of coverage are determ<strong>in</strong>ed only<br />

by forecastable health risk. We assume that contributions vary across plans but<br />

not across consumers. A consumer who makes a contribution pj to enroll <strong>in</strong> plan<br />

j ∈{A, B} gets a net benefit vj(θ) − pj. 3 Def<strong>in</strong>e ∆v(θ) =vA(θ) − vB(θ) to be the<br />

additional amount a type-θ consumer would pay for the high-cost plan.<br />

The efficient assignment places a type-θ consumer <strong>in</strong> plan A if <strong>and</strong> only if<br />

∆v(θ) − ∆c(θ) ≥ 0.<br />

At the same time, a type-θ consumer will select plan A if <strong>and</strong> only if<br />

∆v(θ) − ∆p ≥ 0,<br />

where ∆p = pA − pB is the <strong>in</strong>cremental contribution for plan A.<br />

Are there prices that lead to an efficient outcome? Assume that ∆v(θ) is <strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>in</strong> θ, which seems appropriate if plan A simply offers more generous coverage or easier<br />

access to care. Then for any <strong>in</strong>cremental contribution ∆p, atype-θ consumer will<br />

choose A if <strong>and</strong> only if θ ≥ θ(∆p), where θ (∆p) is a threshold that can be varied<br />

arbitrarily with ∆p. 4 Therefore it is possible to achieve efficient sort<strong>in</strong>g if <strong>and</strong> only if<br />

the efficient assignment also <strong>in</strong>volves a threshold rule, i.e. if ∆v(θ)−∆c(θ) is negative<br />

up to some θ ∗ <strong>and</strong> positive above it. Intuitively, the requirement for efficiency is that<br />

will<strong>in</strong>gness to pay <strong>in</strong>creases more quickly with risk than the cost differential between<br />

3 Here we make the simplify<strong>in</strong>g assumption, which we ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> our econometric model, that<br />

plan preferences are additively separable <strong>in</strong> the plan premium. See ? for an extensive discussion of<br />

this assumption.<br />

4 An empirical prediction of this model is that plan A will experience unfavorable selection, <strong>and</strong><br />

its risk composition will be worse the larger is ∆p.

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