Industrialised, Integrated, Intelligent sustainable Construction - I3con

SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION HANDBOOK 2
Figure 3. Gaming logic for Prisoner’s Dillema model
Figure 3 illustrates prisoner’s dillema logic. It typifies players at the two ends of data exchange in a
typical integrated system. Players represent active data generators and users in construction project
development processes. This include professional handlers of construction and facilities management
processes, clients and project policy influencers – especially in project packaging. The Prisoner’s
Dillema model described in Figure 3 above has been used frequently in different scenarios in
construction processes. (Saxby 2004) explored its aplication in construction procurement, while
(Gruneberg and Hughes 2006) used it to mirror collaboration in construction consortia relationships.
In theory, it is applicable when players must adopt definitive position on collaboration in the face of
risks and uncertainties. The application of this in the design and BIM industries is that when all
parties (intra-relationships between project development and management consultants and the
capacity to extend this extrinsically to clients) cooperate to facilitate collaboration in integrated
systems, all parties benefit in improved service delivery and systemic savings or benefits of BIM.
However, when a party refuses to cooperate whether due to technical or economic reasons, this party
benefits more in the short run than the party that is committed to the pricinples of collaboration. When
both party remain committed to self interest against collaboration, both party benefit according to
quality of their commitment and the focus of industry standard.
Pareto-Optima
Pareto-optima is popularly conceptualised on the result of the early works of an Italian economist and
sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto (1848 - 1923). It is often used in gaming scenarios to demonstrate
effective allocation of resources. (Bass and Ndekugri 2003) have exemplified this model breaking
even in dispute negotiation. In practice, both parties are well-off when they cooperate maximally. It
may appear as if one of the parties (the party that contributes least to the common course at first)
benefits more more in the short run, however in the long run, that party will emerge as the most
valuable contributor, even though the system is stable and balanced as all players benefit evenly.
Moreover, there is no way a party will be better off in the common course without the other party
being worse-off. This is because, on the one hand, the party that cooperates benefits more, while the
party that defects is worse of. When they both defect, they are both worse-off. On the other hand, if
things fall apart in the course of cooperation, the party that would have benefitted if the cooperation
had worked out well will be worse off.
102
Player B
Cooperate
Defect
±
‐
‐
Player A
Cooperate Defect
±
±
+
+
+
+
+
+
‐
‐
+
+
Legends
± Both parties benefit
+ The party benefits
‐ The party losses