Industrialised, Integrated, Intelligent sustainable Construction - I3con

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SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION HANDBOOK 2 Figure 3. Gaming logic for Prisoner’s Dillema model Figure 3 illustrates prisoner’s dillema logic. It typifies players at the two ends of data exchange in a typical integrated system. Players represent active data generators and users in construction project development processes. This include professional handlers of construction and facilities management processes, clients and project policy influencers – especially in project packaging. The Prisoner’s Dillema model described in Figure 3 above has been used frequently in different scenarios in construction processes. (Saxby 2004) explored its aplication in construction procurement, while (Gruneberg and Hughes 2006) used it to mirror collaboration in construction consortia relationships. In theory, it is applicable when players must adopt definitive position on collaboration in the face of risks and uncertainties. The application of this in the design and BIM industries is that when all parties (intra-relationships between project development and management consultants and the capacity to extend this extrinsically to clients) cooperate to facilitate collaboration in integrated systems, all parties benefit in improved service delivery and systemic savings or benefits of BIM. However, when a party refuses to cooperate whether due to technical or economic reasons, this party benefits more in the short run than the party that is committed to the pricinples of collaboration. When both party remain committed to self interest against collaboration, both party benefit according to quality of their commitment and the focus of industry standard. Pareto-Optima Pareto-optima is popularly conceptualised on the result of the early works of an Italian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto (1848 - 1923). It is often used in gaming scenarios to demonstrate effective allocation of resources. (Bass and Ndekugri 2003) have exemplified this model breaking even in dispute negotiation. In practice, both parties are well-off when they cooperate maximally. It may appear as if one of the parties (the party that contributes least to the common course at first) benefits more more in the short run, however in the long run, that party will emerge as the most valuable contributor, even though the system is stable and balanced as all players benefit evenly. Moreover, there is no way a party will be better off in the common course without the other party being worse-off. This is because, on the one hand, the party that cooperates benefits more, while the party that defects is worse of. When they both defect, they are both worse-off. On the other hand, if things fall apart in the course of cooperation, the party that would have benefitted if the cooperation had worked out well will be worse off. 102 Player B Cooperate Defect ± ‐ ‐ Player A Cooperate Defect ± ± + + + + + + ‐ ‐ + + Legends ± Both parties benefit + The party benefits ‐ The party losses
HANDBOOK 2 SUSTAINABLE CONSTRUCTION Player B Cooperate Defect Figure 4. Gaming logic for Pareto Optima model Figure 4 above illustrates pareto-optima logic. The implication of this model is that all parties and players will benefit from BIM when they maximally cooperate to collaborate in intergrated systems. In the short run, there is limited incentive in the industry to widen the horizon for BIM adoption and deployment due to the slow pace of adoption and undefinitve methodical understanding of BIM precepts by all stakeholders. However, even though this challenge persists, the party that remains committed to implementing BIM will benefit more when the market is fully ripe for systemic BIM deployment. Hawk-dove Player A Cooperate Defect ± + ‐ ± ± ‐ + ‐ + ‐ + + ‐ + ‐ Legends ± Both parties benefit + The party benefits ‐ The party losses According to (Gruneberg and Hughes 2006), players in hawk-dove game model always have implicit self intentions outside team’s benefits during cooperation. This is often complicated by players’ latent bias towards protecting personal interests through fragmented conventions. Moreover, part of players’ motives in this gaming relationship model is to share the benefits of cooperation unequally. If the cooperation relationship succeeds, both parties will be worse off. If the relationship fails, both parties benefit somewhat equally. Moreover, when the relationship fails mid-way the party that least cooperates benefits more in the long run than the party that defects; the party that contributes more to the relationship loses more than the party that refuses to collaborate. Figure 5 illustrates hawk-dove gaming logic. Evidently, hawk dove phenomenon has been a major concern in the industry. According to (Ahmad et al. 2007), the frameworks for managing effective flow of information are still very weak. The complex nature of uncertainties in the industry could partly be a major disincentive for this. Many empirical evidence that feature in literatures (e.g. (Egbu et al. 1999)) suggest that most construction professionals and practices still struggle to understand and deploy the precepts of collaboration. While construction market is structured to favour self interest due to fragmented conventions, BIM can only drive its potential efficiency through thorough collaboration. Therefore, when parties decide to refute BIM, product performance in not guaranteed. Consequently, all parties will be worse-off. When all stakeholders decide to cooperate, collaborate and service all the ethos of BIM, they will all benefit moderately in the short run, and markedly in the long run. 103
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