As is the case with Chinese investments, loans from Chinese banks appear driven by a combinationof a desire by the PRC to use its enormous currency surplus strategically <strong>and</strong> to diversify away fromdollar-denominated resources, <strong>and</strong> to the fact that no Latin American country, to date, has defaultedon a major PRC loan.While some countries receiving Chinese loans, such as Brazil <strong>and</strong> Peru, have demonstratedrelatively solid fiscal <strong>and</strong> monetary policy, others such as Venezuela <strong>and</strong> Ecuador appear to bemirroring the behavior of Latin American regimes of the 1970s <strong>and</strong> 1980s, which borrowed largesums from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) <strong>and</strong> World Bank, using the loans to sustain currentspending, without generating the productive resources that would be used to repay the loans, <strong>and</strong>ultimately being forced to default. In the case of Venezuela, Ecuador <strong>and</strong> Bolivia, the dynamic isparticularly worrisome, since commodity production generating the resources that would pay off thedebt is actually declining, while corruption <strong>and</strong> management inefficiency appear to be on the rise. 32The Chinese have already taken steps in an attempt to hedge against loan default, includingtying the deal to petroleum in the case of Ecuador, <strong>and</strong> establishing binding 3 rd party internationalarbitration procedures in London for disputes arising out of repayment of that loan. 33 With respectto Venezuela, the PRC has not only linked loan repayment to future oil deliveries, but in some cases,actually has physical control of the oil being extracted in Venezuela for repayment, implying thatthe Venezuelan government would have to actively block the Chinese from extracting <strong>and</strong> shippingVenezuelan oil out of the country, in order to stop repayment of the loan.As with the issue of nationalization, it is unlikely that the Chinese would use overt coercionagainst nations defaulting on major loans. Nonetheless, as China’s August <strong>2010</strong> attempts to “counsel”Venezuela suggest, 34 as the balance of soft power <strong>and</strong> economic influence in the region shifts towardthe PRC, it may become progressively more deeply involved in providing “technical assistance” inthe management of the revenue generating activities of populist states, <strong>and</strong> other activities tied to therepayment of those loans.4. Protection of resource flowsAlthough the percentage of Chinese imports coming from Latin America constitutes only 5.3percent of its imports globally, this percentage has doubled in the past eight years, 35 with increasingPRC reliance on Latin American commodities in select sectors such as petroleum, metals <strong>and</strong>minerals, soy, fishmeal, <strong>and</strong> other agricultural products. While an interruption of one or more ofthese flows in the short term may not “wreak havoc” on the Chinese economy, their importance willmotivate Chinese business <strong>and</strong> government leaders to dedicate effort to preserve them, in the interestof sustaining Chinese economic performance.Numerous potential risks exist to the flow of resources from Latin America to the PRC, manyof which have already impacted the Chinese, albeit in a limited fashion. In August <strong>2010</strong>, a strikeparalyzed operations at the PdVSA refinery in Curacao, responsible for processing the majority ofVenezuelan oil sent to China. 36 Similarly, in Marcona, Peru, the mining operation of the Chinesefirm Shougang, has suffered an average of 1-3 strikes per year since acquiring the operation in1992. Beyond protests <strong>and</strong> work stoppages, Chinese operations have also been subject to violence,32See, for example, Kevin Casas-Zamora, “The Devil Comes to Collect His Due.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com. September 24,<strong>2010</strong>.33“Prestamo chino se hará con garantía petrolera.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. September 4, <strong>2010</strong>.34Roger F. Noriega, “Chávez <strong>and</strong> China: Challenging U.S. Interests.” Latin American Outlook. http://www.aei.org/docLib/03-LAO-<strong>2010</strong>-g.pdf.No. 3, August <strong>2010</strong>.35In 2001, PRC imports from Latin America were $6.6 billion, out of $244 billion of imports from all parts of the world. By 2009, the PRC wasimporting $53.4 billion from Latin America, out of $1004 billion in imports globally. International Monetary Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics.Quarterly. June <strong>2010</strong>, Yearbook 2008.36“Trabajadores de refinería Isla en Curacao entran en huelga.” El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela. http://www.eluniversal.com. August 8, <strong>2010</strong>.116<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
such as the takeover of CNPC oilfields in Tarapoa, Ecuador in November 2006,37 or the protestsagainst Petroriental in Orellana that turned violent in July 2007, ultimately forcing the Ecuadorangovernment to declare a state of emergency. 38The increasing presence of Chinese companies on the ground in Latin America, <strong>and</strong> in particularin mining <strong>and</strong> petroleum extraction in remote areas with complex populations, is likely to spawn arange of challenges with which those companies, with or without the support of the PRC government,will have to deal. On one h<strong>and</strong>, new operations, such as those proposed by the mining firm Tonglingin Corriente copper belt of southern Ecuador, 39 or those planned at Toromocho, Rio Blanco, <strong>and</strong>Galleno in Peru, are likely to spawn unrest with local populations over a range of issues, from Chinesemanagement practices <strong>and</strong> the use of Chinese versus local workers, to issues of invasion of <strong>and</strong> rightsto the l<strong>and</strong>, issues. (These generated violence by indigenous groups in the remote Peruvian region ofBagua in 2009.) Already, the new Chinese mining project in Toromocho has run into problems withresidents of the town of Morococha, which is located on the mining site <strong>and</strong> has to be relocated bythe concession owner, China Aluminum Corporation (Chinalco). 40Chinese operations in remote areas will increasingly involve the shipment of high value-addedgoods through relatively isolated mountainous, or jungle terrain, where security of the shipmentswill be a challenge. Chinese suppliers, customers, facility operators such as Hutchison-Whampoa,<strong>and</strong> logistics firms such as China Shipping <strong>and</strong> China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO) willalso have to concern themselves with port <strong>and</strong> airport security, including not only the risk that theirmerch<strong>and</strong>ise will be stolen, but also that it could be used for the shipment of narcotics <strong>and</strong> otherillegal activities, which could ultimately lead to a police incident causing a costly disruption of theiroperations.In protecting its resource flows, the PRC will also have to prepare for the risk of radical politicalchange, <strong>and</strong> associated violence, which has frequently occurred in the region. A civil war, suchas that which seemed possible in Bolivia during the 2007-2008 timeframe; the expansion of anarcoinsurgency, such as that of Sendero Luminoso in the valley of the Apurimac <strong>and</strong> Ene rivers(VRAE) in Peru, or an interstate conflict, such as that between Colombia <strong>and</strong> Venezuela, could havea major disruptive influence on Chinese extractive operations. An even more serious problem wouldbe violent regime collapse, were the escalating crisis of governability to exp<strong>and</strong> out of control ina state such as Venezuela, with significant ongoing Chinese oil <strong>and</strong> mining operations <strong>and</strong> a wellarmedlocal militia with a strategy of decentralized resistance to fight against challengers to theregime.5. Protection of Chinese nationals <strong>and</strong> operations in the regionAs noted in the previous section, the expansion of Chinese commercial projects in Latin Americawill be accompanied by a growth in the number of Chinese companies, businessmen <strong>and</strong> othernationals on the ground in the region, in a context in which the nature of their activity, <strong>and</strong> theirlocation often in remote areas, will put them in harm’s way with respect to criminals, guerrillas, <strong>and</strong>simply un-accepting, potentially violent local populations. The growing occurrence of incidentssuch as those seen in Tarapoa in 2006 <strong>and</strong> Orellana in 2007 will force the PRC <strong>and</strong> its companies toconsider the question of how to best ensure the security of its personnel.37“Concluye toma de petrolera china Andes Petroleum.” El Universo. Guayaquil, Ecuador. http://www.eluniverso.com. November 11, 2006.38“Protestas contra Petroriental dejan 31 heridas en ocho días.” El Comercio. Quito, Ecuador. http:www.elcomercio.com. July 4, 2007.39“Tongling, China Railway Plan to Invest $3 Billion in Ecuador Copper Mine.” Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com. August 13, <strong>2010</strong>.40See, for example, “Minera CHINALCO en Morococha tras los pasos de SHOUGANG. Mantuvo cerrada vía de acceso a Yauli por 1 año. Alcaldeimpone principio de autoridad. ¿A quién pertenece el Perú?” http://marconaprotesta.wordpress.com/2008/08/27/minera-chinalco-en-morocochatras-los-pasos-de-shougang-mantuvo-cerrada-via-de-acceso-a-yauli-por-1-ano-alcalde-impone-principio-de-autoridad-%C2%BFel-peru-a-quienpertenece/.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 117
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CommentariesSecurity Cooperation Be
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El espacio de las mujeres en las Fu
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La organización e institucionaliza
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ministerial para la equidad de gén
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BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
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Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
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Anexo IIMujeres militares sudameric
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Todo un conjunto de cualidades, cap
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miembros de la soberanía de la Nac
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algunos barcos de apoyo para alberg
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1.75 metros de altura y como requis
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conductas que pudieran encuadrarse
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Género en el marco de las Operacio
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56Security and Defense Studies Revi
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De ese modo nos encontramos con mod
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BibliografíaCarreiras, H.: Gender
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goods, and skilled labor must all b
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views of women, in effect disabling
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Marine Col. William T. Hewes’ arg
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MacEoin. Commonweal 14: 8-11.This i
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37. Sans Echaìniz, María. (1992)
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Whitney Hoft was a Center for Hemis
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The transformation of the role of w
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