In some cases, Chinese companies, like others, may in order to a avoid problems pay protectionmoney or otherwise “cut deals” with criminals <strong>and</strong> guerillas in the areas in which they operate. InColombia, for example, former congressman Óscar Tulio Lizcano, has charged that between 2006<strong>and</strong> 2008, while he was being held hostage by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios de Colombia(FARC), he observed helicopters from CNPC carrying doctors <strong>and</strong> medical supplies into the guerrillacamp in which he was being held prisoner, 41 suggesting that CNPC was effectively providingassistance to the FARC, in an effort to prevent it from making problems for CNPC operations in theregion.Beyond collaboration, to the extent that Chinese companies hire private security forces in LatinAmerica, as they have in Africa, 42 they will risk generating even greater conflict with local populations<strong>and</strong> governments, should those security forces commit abuses. To the extent that the PRC engages insecurity cooperation with the governments of the region to better protect its companies <strong>and</strong> nationals,its actions will likely raise red flags in the United States.As PRC commercial, political, <strong>and</strong> cultural activities with Latin America exp<strong>and</strong>, Chinesepopulations at risk will not be limited to oil industry workers <strong>and</strong> miners in remote regions, but willalso include businessmen, tourists, <strong>and</strong> ethnic Chinese residing in the region. For example, in 2004, inMaracay <strong>and</strong> Valencia, Venezuela, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers became the focus of violent protests,v<strong>and</strong>alism <strong>and</strong> looting when they attempted to close their stores in sympathy with a strike against theregime of Hugo Chavez. 43 In Buenos Aires, Chinese shopkeepers in the suburbs of the federal capitalbecame the target in 2007 of a strike by local truckers, focalizing community resentment over theChinese, who were seen to have replaced Spanish shopkeepers, <strong>and</strong> who were believed to unfairlycollaborate <strong>and</strong> associate with mafias to undercut the competition with their prices. 44In previous years, Chinese leaders have not believed that the PRC had the power or theresponsibility to defend its nationals abroad, many of whom had immigrated prior to the Communistrevolution, <strong>and</strong> who were seen as anti-communist defectors <strong>and</strong> traitors. Today, however, many ofthe ethnic Chinese in Latin America are part of a different cohort, which immigrated to Latin Americafor largely economic reasons. Others, such as businessmen <strong>and</strong> tourists, are citizens of the PRC, withreason to expect that their government will protect them if they come into harm’s way.6. Isolation of TaiwanAs noted previously, for the PRC the issue of the diplomatic recognition in the internationalcommunity of the Republic of China (ROC; otherwise known as Taiwan) as the legitimategovernment of all of China is an important matter of domestic security. Therefore, Latin Americais a particularly important battleground, since it is the home of 12 of the 23 States worldwide thatcontinue to recognize the ROC. These states are relatively small in terms of population <strong>and</strong> economicactivity, with the consequence that a relatively small amount of investment, public works projects, orpromised trade, can constitute an enormous incentive for changing their diplomatic posture.Since the victory of the Kuomintang party in Taiwan <strong>and</strong> the ascension of its leader Ma Yingjeouto the presidency in May 2008, an <strong>info</strong>rmal agreement has been established in which, so longas China <strong>and</strong> Taiwan continue on their path of rapprochement with each other, neither will attemptto change the diplomatic allegiance of States recognizing the other, whether through offers of aid, or41“Lizcano dice que petrolera daba apoyo logístico a las Farc.” Tierra. Bogotá, Colombia. http://www.terra.com.co. 15 de Julio 2009.42Andrew Erickson <strong>and</strong> Gabe Collins, “Looking After China’s Own: Pressure to Protect PRC Citizens Working Overseas Likely to Rise,” ChinaSignpost. No. 2. August 17, <strong>2010</strong>.43Yol<strong>and</strong>a Ojeda Reyes, “Ciudadanos chinos reciben protección.” El Universal. Caracas, Venezuela. http://www.eluniversal.com. November 11,2004.44“Los camioneros ratifican el boicot a los súper y autoservicios chinos.” Clarín. Buenos Aires, Argentina. http://www.clarin.com. June 26, 2006.118<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
y other means. 45 Since the last switch in diplomatic recognition—by Costa Rica in May 2007—arange of newly-elected leaders in other states that recognize Taiwan have expressed their interestin changing the diplomatic posture of their respective countries, including Ricardo Martenelli ofPanama, 46 Fern<strong>and</strong>o Lugo of Paraguay, 47 <strong>and</strong> Mauricio Funes of El Salvador. 48 Although the interestexpressed by each of these leaders was made before being elected to office, to date none has evolvedinto a public action, although as recently as June <strong>2010</strong> Paraguayan government officials have spokenof changing recognition. 49Although in the short term the “pact” between the PRC <strong>and</strong> the ROC has put an end to someof the most aggressive maneuvering for diplomatic recognition, it has not altered the fundamentalcompetition between the two states, <strong>and</strong> remains in effect only while both sides consider it useful toadhere to it. It is likely, thus, that when the treaty breaks down, perhaps with an unsolicited changein sides by one of the remaining states that recognize Taiwan, the PRC will return in earnest to astruggle for the diplomatic recognition of countries of the region, in order to advance the diplomaticisolation of Taiwan as a fundamental national policy goal.Implications for the U.S. <strong>and</strong> the RegionChina’s growing engagement with, <strong>and</strong> interests in, Latin America is frequently downplayed becausethe PRC currently has very limited capability for projecting military power into the region, <strong>and</strong> thusfar has not demonstrated an interest in doing so. As this article has argued, to apply such a frameworkof “gunboat diplomacy” to assess the implications of China’s exp<strong>and</strong>ing engagement with LatinAmerica is misleading.The Chinese government <strong>and</strong> its companies have powerful <strong>and</strong> growing sources of leverage inLatin America that are appropriate to the types of interests that it is struggling to defend, includingleverage stemming from its purchases of Latin American commodities, its multi-billion dollarinvestments in the region, <strong>and</strong> the exp<strong>and</strong>ing presence of its companies on the ground, parallelingthe ability of Western companies of the previous century to play a significant role in Latin Americanpolitics, even without the involvement of U.S. military forces. 50At the same time, China is also likely to become increasingly willing to fight for those interests,as it transitions to a new generation of leadership that is less disposed than the previous ones to viewthe PRC from a perspective of weakness, <strong>and</strong> by extension, less disposed to defer to concepts of theprevious world order, such as an exclusive US “sphere of influence” in Latin America.In particular, PRC decision-makers evaluating how to protect China’s growing interests in LatinAmerica are progressively less inclined to view the nation from a position of weakness; the emerging5th <strong>and</strong> 6th generations of PRC leadership have come to power in a China which is much stronger<strong>and</strong> more self-confident than the China of the generation of Mao, which was grasping from a positionof weakness to define its identity in a struggle for survival between the United States <strong>and</strong> the SovietUnion. The China of the generation of Hu Jintao is less likely to defer to the sensibilities of otherpowers, such as that was represented by the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, when it perceivesthat important issues are at stake.45“President Ma defines ‘flexible diplomacy’.” The China Post. Taipei, Taiwan. http://chinapost.com. November 11, 2008.46Jenny W. Hsu, “Panama respects Taiwan, China ‘truce’: ambassador.” Taipei Times. Taipei, Taiwan. http://www.taipeitimes.com. February 6,<strong>2010</strong>.47“Posible relación con China Continental.” ABC Digital. Asuncion, Paraguay. http://www.abc.com.py. June 7, 2007.48“El Salvador anuncia que restablecerá relaciones con Cuba.” Hoy. Quito, Ecuador. http://www.hoy.com.ec. March 18, 2009.49“Ministro habla en China de establecer relaciones ” ABC Digital. Ascuncion, Paraguay. http://www.abc.com.py. June 7, <strong>2010</strong>. See also “Canciller,a favor de relación con China.” ABC Digital. Asuncion, Paraguay. http://www.abc.com.py. November 15, 2009.50It is a symbol of the growing weight of Chinese companies in Latin America, for example, that Jaime Thorne, who was name Minister of <strong>Defense</strong>of Peru in September <strong>2010</strong>, held a seat on the board of China’s oldest <strong>and</strong> previously largest mining operation in that country, Shougang Hierro Peru.“Jaime Thorne León, Nuevo Ministro de <strong>Defense</strong> de Perú.” InfoDefensa. http://www.<strong>info</strong>defensa.com/lamerica/noticias/noticias.asp?cod=2536&n.September 16, <strong>2010</strong>.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 119
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ministerial para la equidad de gén
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BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
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Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
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Anexo IIMujeres militares sudameric
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Todo un conjunto de cualidades, cap
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56Security and Defense Studies Revi
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BibliografíaCarreiras, H.: Gender
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Tras la aprobación de esta histór
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goods, and skilled labor must all b
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views of women, in effect disabling
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37. Sans Echaìniz, María. (1992)
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