secret army alongside skilled profiteers.” 58 McFarlane, who like North served in the Marine Corps inVietnam <strong>and</strong> made him a protégé, “turned North loose in a big way, <strong>and</strong> Poindexter had neither theskill nor the sense to rein him in.” 59 For his part, North “understood the extent to which the WhiteHouse had become hostage to the hostages,” 60 a point that not only underscored their rescue as apresidential priority, but also allowed him to leverage his action-oriented ideas, however implausible<strong>and</strong> un-vetted, into a principal role for himself. Nor was there any doubt about Reagan’s commitmentto the Nicaraguan rebels, who he lionized as “freedom fighters” <strong>and</strong> about whose proxy battle againstthe Soviet-backed Marxist regime, Haig had assured the president, “This is one you can win.” 61THE U.S. MILITARY VIEW of North’s role in Iran-Contra reflected its own traditions <strong>and</strong> codesof conduct, <strong>and</strong> brought to the fore questions about both the lieutenant colonel’s personal ethics <strong>and</strong>his internalization of institutional values. North’s truthfulness <strong>and</strong> discipline became key st<strong>and</strong>ardsupon which he was judged, as was the inversion of military discipline that occurred when Northclaimed to have a better, more comprehensive view of matters of state than his superiors becausehe was closer to them “on the ground.” The way North pushed generals around during meeting bywalking in <strong>and</strong> saying that he spoke for the president became the stuff of legend; his personal foiblenonetheless underscored how often senior military officers could be intimidated by political power.He was, recalled an Air Force colonel who worked with him on Latin America policy from the JointStaff at the Pentagon, “a brash, upstart lieutenant colonel who ignored military protocol <strong>and</strong> calledgeneral officers by their first name” 62The armed forces’ strict subordination to elected authority <strong>and</strong> respect for the rule of law arecornerstones of American democracy. Throughout its history, the U.S. military has been a nondeliberativeinstitution of distinctly conservative culture, maintaining <strong>and</strong> striving to improve valuessuch as leadership, high moral st<strong>and</strong>ards <strong>and</strong> values, <strong>and</strong> discipline, a st<strong>and</strong>ard far higher than thatof mere citizenship expected of all Americans. “The values necessary to defend the society are oftenat odds with the values of society itself,” noted General (ret.) Walter “Dutch” Kerwin, former Armyvice chief of staff. “To be an effective servant of the people, the military must concentrate not onthe values of our liberal society, but on the hard values of the battlefield.” 63 Two political scientistsrecently warned: “The military culture is rightly conservative, observing high st<strong>and</strong>ards, morals, <strong>and</strong>values, any further trend to make the military more like civilian culture would be detrimental to theinstitution’s very existence.” 64“Martial values” include boldness, integrity, honor, courage, commitment, responsibility, <strong>and</strong>intrepidity, as well as loyalty, work ethic, sacrifice, toughness, tradition, example <strong>and</strong> teamwork.The Uniformed Code of Military Justice, which applies to all uniformed personnel within the armedservices, says that all orders of a superior officer must be obeyed by subordinates—unless the orderis unlawful. The honor code of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point states: “A cadet will not lie,58Larry Bensky, “Ollie North: A Soldier for ‘God’s America,’ Los Angeles Times, Nov. 3, 1991.59Cannon, op. cit., p. 627. Poindexter lacked ties to Reagan, political experience <strong>and</strong> knowledge of international relations. “Rarely has such anintelligent <strong>and</strong> unassuming man been so poorly suited for the high position he inherited as Poindexter was as Reagan’s national security adviser,”Reagan biographer Lou Cannon wrote. “Introverted <strong>and</strong> reclusive in his habits … Poindexter was a remote figure even within the NSC … WhenI mentioned … during an interview that even some Republican congressmen had complained about his inaccessibility, he told me that he had noresponsibility for dealing with Congress <strong>and</strong> gave the impression he also had no interest.” More adverse to political process than other of his militarypeers, “This aversion would enable Poindexter to carry out what he believed to be the wishes of his comm<strong>and</strong>er in chief without troubling himself aboutthe legality of his conduct.” His reticence “would enable the venturesome <strong>and</strong> temperamentally opposite Oliver North to gain lock-stock-<strong>and</strong>-barrelcontrol over the many-sided Iran initiative.” Cannon, pp. 625-626.60Cannon, op. cit., pp. 627-628.61Powers, op. cit, p. 396.62Author interview, name withheld by request.63Quoted in John Meroney, “Is the Naval Academy Off Course?” The American Enterprise Online @ http://www.taemag.com/issues/articeid.17028/article_detail.asp64Krista E. Weig<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> David L. Paletz, “The Elite Media <strong>and</strong> the Military-Civilian Culture Gap,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 27, No. 2, Winter2001, pp. 193, 196.140<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
cheat, steal, nor tolerate those who do.” 65 “Loyalty, fairness, accountability—that’s what makes themilitary work,” noted former Reagan Secretary of the Navy James Webb, North’s boxing rival in theAnnapolis class of ’68 (<strong>and</strong> current United States Senator from Virginia). 66The integrity of an officer’s word, deed <strong>and</strong> signature were considered paramount <strong>and</strong> rested on apragmatic underst<strong>and</strong>ing: that if senior officers were allowed to lie to their men about the dangers theyfaced, vital missions might fail <strong>and</strong> the men could be condemned to pointless death. Some observerspoint to a deterioration of these ethical values occurring during the war in Vietnam, when pressure toinflate statistics on enemy dead <strong>and</strong> false reports meant to win decorations <strong>and</strong> promotions caused,in the words of a former officer, “the erosion of trust upon which professional relationships, lifelongfriendships <strong>and</strong> loyalties of comrades in arms <strong>and</strong> the honorable perception of military service havebeen based.” 67The testimony of North <strong>and</strong> Poindexter at the Iran-Contra hearings, long-time New York TimesPentagon correspondent Richard Halloran noted, “raised a fundamental question of military ethics:May an officer lie?”Is it permissible for a military officer to lie? If so, under what circumstances, to whom <strong>and</strong>about what? If not, why not? After considerable deliberation, the nation’s top military officersdeclined to reply to the query, thus underscoring the ambivalence that runs through the officercorps of all services on a critical issue of military ethics <strong>and</strong> integrity. … in recent years, thepractice of what military officers refer to as ‘situational ethics’ has become pervasive. Thatview … says that a higher end, such as national security, justifies such means as lying <strong>and</strong>deception. 68Halloran observed that the importance of trust as a military value was underscored by the feelingthat: “an officer lying through the press to the people he has sworn to defend soils his uniform <strong>and</strong>violates the time-honored code dictating that officers do not lie, cheat, or steal.” Even deception,Halloran said, “a basic principle of war” used to deceive the enemy, “is not permissible when it …deceives American citizens. The lie would not only be dishonorable but would erode the credibilityof the military service once the lie has been discovered.” 69As North catapulted into national headlines, the head of the Marine Corps, Gen. Paul X. Kelly,whose many detractors criticized his leadership style <strong>and</strong> the type of role model he himself offered,avoided commenting directly on the case. Kelly was asked whether he considered North “a heroor a bum,” or if he objected to the lieutenant colonel wearing his uniform while taking the FifthAmendment. He noted that North had an “outst<strong>and</strong>ing combat record” before he left the Corps forduty at the White House in 1981, after which “he hasn’t belonged to me” <strong>and</strong> therefore could notjudge his performance. It was North’s “call,” he said, whether to wear his uniform while testifyingbefore Congress. 70 (Although the public did not know it at the time, North had been directed not towear his uniform in his appearance before Congress as none of his activities under investigation hadbeen done as a Marine. The Corps stood down on its position, however, when the Administrationoverrode the order <strong>and</strong> Kelly acquiesced.) 71Other military officers <strong>and</strong> civilian experts on national security issues were less forgiving in65One critical cadet in the 1970s observed that: “The central, ironic paradox of Academy life is that the institution attempts to build leaders by denyingthem room for individual choice, through <strong>and</strong> initiative.” Quoted in Bill Kauffman, “The West Point Story,” The American Enterprise Online @ http://www.taemag.com/issues/artcileid.17027/article_detail.asp66“Tradition in the Military,” The American Enterprise Online @ http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleid.16210/article_detail.asp67Halloran, The New York Times, op. cit. The officer quoted was Lewis S. Sorley III, a 1956 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.68Halloran, The New York Times, op. cit.69Halloran, “Soldiers <strong>and</strong> Scribblers Revisited: Working with the Media,” Parameters, Summer 1995.70George C. Wilson, “Top Marine Sees U.S. Losing Moral Fiber; Working Mothers a Factor,” The Washington Post, June 26, 1987.71Author’s communication with long-time military analyst who worked with the Marine Corps.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 141
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BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
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Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
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