Security and Defense Studies Review 2010 Fall ... - Offnews.info

The Marine Corps adage about “no man being left behind” is a point of pride. However, inIran-Contra one palpable casualty was North’s secretary Fawn Hall, the sometimes model who waspilloried in the press for her role and her continuing loyalty to North. Under oath, Hall testified thatNorth was an “inspirational boss,” who was “never lazy or self-serving.” 77 For years after the scandalbroke, however, North did not bother to even contact her. “Ollie used me,” Hall later complained. Iwas like a piece of Kleenex to him.” 78 Noted NSC consultant Michael Ledeen, one of North’s keyallies in Iran-Contra. “Loyalty means not just loyalty up, but loyalty down. He did not show it toher.” 79In assaying North’s conduct as a military officer in the Iran-Contra scandal, it is important tonote what may have been institutional enablers within the Marines itself, ideas and practices thathelp explain, although not excuse, his behavior. In the Marine Corps, military writer Thomas Rickstells us, culture, “that is, the values and assumptions that shape its members—is all the Marineshave. … Theirs is the richest culture; formalistic, insular, elitist, with a deep anchor in their ownhistory and mythology. Much more than the other branches, they place pride and responsibility at thelowest levels of the organization.” In addition, a sense of being different and better than the civiliansociety it is sworn to defend is deeply engrained within the Marines, and makes North’s distain forcivilian rules and procedures only an extreme case noteworthy for the power and influence he cameto hold. In the past three decades, Ricks wrote, “as American culture has grown more fragmented,individualistic, and consumerist, the Marines have become more withdrawn; they feel that theysimply cannot afford to reflect the broader society. Today’s Marines give off a strong sense of disdainfor the very society they protect.” 80 North’s hubris, and thus much of the Iran-Contra action, mayhave been midwifed by that disdain.CONSERVATIVES WERE SPLIT ALONG SEVERAL lines in the aftermath of the disclosure ofthe Iran-Contra affair. The first fault line divided those who sought to isolate Reagan and the WhiteHouse from embarrassment, political eclipse and even impeachment, against those who rallied todefend North from attack. The second divided North supporters into those who justified his actionsand those who chose not to address his deeds but rather sought to deflect blame by pointing out thealleged perfidy or callowness of North’s critics. Further nuances in the conservative camp drewdistinctions between conservatives and anti-communists, those who wanted to protect Reagan andthose who sought to protect the presidency, and proponents of limited government (worried about endsbeing used to justify means) versus those favoring a strong presidency. The varying views of Northand Iran-Contra among conservatives appeared in part to reflect Richard Gid Powers’ observationthat American anti-communism was “a complex, pluralistic movement,” in which various strains ofopposition to the Marxist left were united only by “their hatred of communism.” 81Upon public revelation of Iran-Contra, the Reagan White House moved to a strategy of damagecontrol meant to keep the president from being impeached and restoring his tattered authority for therest of his second term. Institutionally, that strategy necessarily involved distancing the president fromprior knowledge of the scandal and to make underlings such as North and Poindexter scapegoats. 82As Reagan biographer Cannon noted, the president “was able to avert the impeachment that Meeseand others had considered a serious possibility because the Contra diversion could not be pinned onhim.” 8377Hall, North Trial Testimony, March 22, 1989, p. 5419.78Quoted in Roxanne Roberts, “Ollie North, Action Hero; 10 Years After Iran-Contra, Freedom Alliance Honors Its Mr. Right,” The Washington Post,July 9, 1997.79Weiss, op. cit.80Ricks, op. cit., p. 19.81Richard Gid Powers, Not Without Honor, op.cit. p. 426.82See Robert Busby, Reagan and the Iran-Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan Press, 199983Cannon, op. cit, p. 718.Security and Defense Studies Review 2010 Fall-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno 2010 / Edicão Outono-Inverno 2010 / Volume 11 143