all American hostages were released. 17 The Iran <strong>and</strong> Contra endgames also proved to be largely atcross purposes. For example, North’s delight in overcharging the Iranians for arms <strong>and</strong> spare parts,generating more funds for the Central Americans, ended up alienating a Tehran already sensitive tobeing cheated by the United States. After the partial delivery of HAWK missiles from Israel it wasNorth himself who relayed to Poindexter his feeling that the Iranians were unlikely to liberate all ofthe hostages in a “single transaction” because they felt that had been “scammed.” 18While North’s role in the arms sales to Iran was important, it was his role in the Contra operationthat made the lieutenant colonel “a big time operator,” becoming “the person who kept the [anti-S<strong>and</strong>inista] Contra resistance alive though financing, political support, <strong>and</strong> his own inventivedetermination.” 19 In an article whose title, “Is the mysterious colonel a saint or a sinner?’ captured thedebate about North in the aftermath of the public disclosure of Iran-Contra machinations, Newsweeknoted that North was “hardly the ‘just-following-orders’ political naïf he sometimes appears to be.In addition to the covert foreign policy he was running out of the White House basement, North wasdeeply involved in domestic policy to win financial <strong>and</strong> political support for the contras from wealthyconservatives.” 20 Part of that effort was establishing a non-governmental covert entity known as “TheEnterprise” to run the Central American war effort. In that endeavor North’s helpmates included farrightactivists <strong>and</strong>, according to sources not unsympathetic to larger administration goals, connivancewith known criminals. 21North was also a central figure in the Reagan Administration’s extensive subterfuge for keepingCongress in the dark about the U.S. role in Central America’s proxy wars. For example, althoughReagan assured Congress in June 1985 that his Administration was committed to “political, notmilitary solutions in Central America” <strong>and</strong> that “we do not seek the military overthrow of the S<strong>and</strong>inista[Nicaraguan] government,” that December he reported to his boss at the NSC that, following hisdirections, North had assured allies in Central America that the United States “intend[ed] to pursuevictory” so that these would “not be forced to seek a political accommodation with the S<strong>and</strong>inistas.” 22When the arms sales to Iran were revealed in November 1986, Reagan at first appeared onnational television to deny that they had occurred. A week later, however, he again took to theairwaves to admit that weapons had been sent to Iran, but still denied that they were part of a hostageexchange. 23 In the meantime, North <strong>and</strong> Poindexter began hectically shredding documents to keepthem from reaching the public, after the former had applied “do not log” procedures to those whichended up being destroyed.The dealings with Iran stripped Reagan of his public stance as being “a resolute foe of internationalterrorism.” 24 The secret parleys did not achieve their intended purpose of releasing U.S. hostagesheld in Lebanon. Rather available evidence suggests that once Washington was seen as willing tobetray its own public policy on non-negotiation with hostage takers, pro-Iranian militants kidnapped17Lou Cannon, President Reagan, The Role of a Lifetime, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991, p. 643; Just how far North could stray from officialpolicy underlies the fiction of “following orders” was reflected in the comments of former NSC chief McFarlane, who said that the negotiations inTehran amounted to a “hostage bazaar. I think North knew when we went there that they hadn’t agreed to release the hostages.” p. 651.18Cannon, op. cit., p. 657.19Hartle, op. cit.20Newsweek, December 22, 1986, p. 26.21February 10, 1986 memo from Rob Owen, North’s Central American point person, to North noted that a Contra supply plane “used at one timeto run drugs, <strong>and</strong> part of the crew had criminal records. Nice group the Boys (CIA) chose.” Other witnesses mentioning a drug connection to thejoint House-Senate committee investigating Iran-Contra included Alan Fiers, head of the CIA Contra task force, <strong>and</strong> Jose Fern<strong>and</strong>ez, CIA stationchief in Costa Rica. According to The Washington Post, “Contra Aid Figure Says He Almost Quit; At Spymaster’s Trial, Rodriguez tells of DisgustWith Profiteering,” August 5, 1992, CIA operative Felix Rodriguez “said he became upset by the price gouging of the contras <strong>and</strong> the presence inthe operation of individuals he considered unsavory.” According to Christopher Hitchens, key North associates included a long-time member of theJohn Birch Society <strong>and</strong> a retired general who once headed “essentially a Third Reich revivalist organization,” the World Anti-Communist League.Hitchens, “The Reagan Doctrine <strong>and</strong> the Secret State,” MERIP Middle East Report, No. 148, Sept.-Oct. 1987, pp. 6-8.22Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry <strong>and</strong> the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 112, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 250-251.23“Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist dem<strong>and</strong>s.... We did not—repeat, did not—trade weapons or anything else for hostages,nor will we,” he said.24Cannon, op. cit., p. 652.134<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
additional U.S. citizens, which allowed the Iranians to extort more arms <strong>and</strong> intelligence from theAmericans. News of the botched deal also created a political firestorm in the United States whileembarrassing the country internationally. When the affair “exploded” in the fall of 1986, one formersenior Reagan advisor noted, the administration “effectively came to a dead halt. For more than ayear, time stood still for Reagan,” as he fought a sc<strong>and</strong>al that “nearly felled” him. 25Public dem<strong>and</strong>s for a full accounting of what happened led Reagan to appoint a Special <strong>Review</strong>Board, popularly known as the Tower Commission after its chairman, Sen. John Tower (R-Texas) 26 ,to inquire into “the circumstances surrounding the Iran-Contra matter, other case studies that mightreveal strengths <strong>and</strong> weaknesses in the operation of the National <strong>Security</strong> Council system understress, <strong>and</strong> the manner in which that system has served eight different Presidents since its inceptionin 1947.”The Tower Commission Report, which was delivered to the President on February 26, 1987,criticized the actions of North; his boss, Poindexter; Secretary of <strong>Defense</strong> Caspar Weinberger <strong>and</strong>others. In part due to the confusing testimony that was given by Reagan himself, who claimed faultymemory of key events, the presidential commission did not determine the extent of the president’sknowledge of the program. 27 It found, however, that Reagan should have exercised better control ofthe NSC staff <strong>and</strong>, instead, had only weakly supervised his subordinates <strong>and</strong> their actions. 28In March 1988, North <strong>and</strong> Poindexter were indicted on multiple charges. Of the 12 counts withwhich he was charged, North was found guilty of three lesser felony counts—obstructing Congress,destroying documents <strong>and</strong> accepting an illegal gratuity. He was acquitted of nine other counts—including lying to Congress—after convincing the jury that he carried out policies he believedhad been approved by Reagan. North’s conviction was later overturned on appeal on the groundsthat the former NSC aide’s Fifth Amendment rights may have been violated by indirect use of hisCongressional testimony, for which he had been given use immunity, not because he was wronglyconvicted on the facts of the case. 29“You’re here now because of your own conduct when the truth was coming out,” Judge GerhardGesell told North at his sentencing hearing. “Apparently you could not face disclosure <strong>and</strong> decided toprotect yourself <strong>and</strong> others. You destroyed evidence, altered <strong>and</strong> removed official documents, createdfalse papers after the events to keep Congress <strong>and</strong> others from finding out what was happening. … Ibelieve that you knew this was morally wrong. … It was against all your training. Under the stressof the moment it was easier to choose the role of a martyr but that wasn’t a heroic, patriotic act norwas it in the public interest.” 30A GRADUATE OF THE U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY, North was a decorated combat veteran ofVietnam known for his gritty determination, fierce loyalty <strong>and</strong> personal charisma. Reagan biographerLou Cannon called North “a zealot <strong>and</strong> an adventurer,” someone who was “fond of assigning himselfsuch code names as ‘Blood <strong>and</strong> Guts’ <strong>and</strong> ‘Steelhammer.’” 31 One military observer noted of North:25Anderson, op. cit., pp. xvii-xxi.26Its other members were former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie <strong>and</strong> former National <strong>Security</strong> Adviser Brent Scrowcroft.27Although key aides reported that Reagan had a “literal, photographic memory” (Anderson, op. cit. p57), Reagan’s inability to remember withprecision key events may have had to do with the early onset of Alzheimer’s disease as well as political expediency.28A Congressional report issued in November of the same year noted that: “If the president did not know what his national security advisers were doing,he should have.” It added that Reagan was ultimately responsible for his aides’ misconduct <strong>and</strong> that his Administration exhibited “secrecy, deception<strong>and</strong> disdain for the law.”29The charges against Poindexter included conspiracy, lying to Congress, obstruction of justice, <strong>and</strong> altering <strong>and</strong> destroying documents pertinent to theinvestigation. In 1990, Poindexter’s conviction on several felony counts was also overturned on appeal on similar grounds.30Gesell, North Sentencing Hearing, July 5, 1989, p. 36.31Cannon, op. cit., p. 656;<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 135
- Page 2 and 3:
Security and Defense Studies Review
- Page 4 and 5:
CommentariesSecurity Cooperation Be
- Page 6:
6Security and Defense Studies Revie
- Page 9 and 10:
El espacio de las mujeres en las Fu
- Page 11 and 12:
La organización e institucionaliza
- Page 14 and 15:
encuentra altamente asociada al cam
- Page 16 and 17:
ministerial para la equidad de gén
- Page 19 and 20:
BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
- Page 21 and 22:
Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
- Page 23:
Anexo IIMujeres militares sudameric
- Page 26:
Todo un conjunto de cualidades, cap
- Page 29:
500 y durante la Batalla de Sarand
- Page 32 and 33:
miembros de la soberanía de la Nac
- Page 34 and 35:
10 de octubre de ese año, la Compa
- Page 36 and 37:
algunos barcos de apoyo para alberg
- Page 38 and 39:
1.75 metros de altura y como requis
- Page 40 and 41:
de producción sustituyendo al homb
- Page 42 and 43:
y sicológica, no sólo en los ámb
- Page 44 and 45:
La segunda etapa se caracterizó po
- Page 46 and 47:
Sin embargo, las preguntas acerca d
- Page 48 and 49:
La normativa vinculada con la asign
- Page 50 and 51:
conductas que pudieran encuadrarse
- Page 52 and 53:
Género en el marco de las Operacio
- Page 54 and 55:
ecordar que las ciencias sociales y
- Page 56 and 57:
56Security and Defense Studies Revi
- Page 58 and 59:
De ese modo nos encontramos con mod
- Page 60 and 61:
escala descendente de la oficialida
- Page 62 and 63:
del total. Debe destacarse que dent
- Page 64 and 65:
BibliografíaCarreiras, H.: Gender
- Page 66 and 67:
Tras la aprobación de esta histór
- Page 68 and 69:
Una vez aprobada la Resolución 132
- Page 70 and 71:
para designar asesores de género e
- Page 73 and 74:
firme se ha materializado en la ado
- Page 76 and 77:
la construcción de la paz, la reco
- Page 78 and 79:
Sin embargo, a medida que avanzaba
- Page 81 and 82:
Women on the Front Lines of the Fig
- Page 83 and 84: term even has meaning any longer wi
- Page 85 and 86: following graduation. 15 Of course,
- Page 87 and 88: including members from other Americ
- Page 89 and 90: Solidariedade ou interesse? O que l
- Page 91 and 92: em mais amplo e complexo. 7A possib
- Page 93 and 94: Participação dos Estados-Membros
- Page 95: sujeitos a alguma OMP. Aqueles que,
- Page 98 and 99: às recomendações das Fases II, I
- Page 100 and 101: Franco, que assumira após o Impeac
- Page 102 and 103: O Brasil, por intermédio do Presid
- Page 104 and 105: No entanto, no tocante especificame
- Page 106 and 107: Portanto, não se consegue visualiz
- Page 108 and 109: ReferênciasAlmeida Pinto, J.R. de;
- Page 110 and 111: ______. United Nations Department o
- Page 112 and 113: Beyond economic activities, the PRC
- Page 114 and 115: soy oil into the country, a flow wh
- Page 116 and 117: As is the case with Chinese investm
- Page 118 and 119: In some cases, Chinese companies, l
- Page 120 and 121: Although it is not possible to pred
- Page 122 and 123: Considering this, we will now go fr
- Page 124 and 125: The contribution of Chilean troops
- Page 126 and 127: within and outside the nation?3. Ho
- Page 128 and 129: 128Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 130 and 131: 130Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 132 and 133: the Iran-Contra affair, one of the
- Page 136 and 137: “As he frequently said with pride
- Page 138 and 139: making operation 48 was conducted s
- Page 140 and 141: secret army alongside skilled profi
- Page 142 and 143: public than Kelly, taking issue wit
- Page 144 and 145: Some conservatives, even within the
- Page 146 and 147: opponents that he was “getting pr
- Page 148 and 149: for Defense (SUBDEF)—could initia
- Page 150 and 151: Hence, our countries are showing a
- Page 152 and 153: I am referring to Ibero-American Su
- Page 154 and 155: Thus, our country has agreed to the
- Page 156 and 157: sustraer mi producción intelectual
- Page 158 and 159: hombres (22,288).• Inclusión. Al
- Page 160 and 161: La perspectiva de trabajar en el di
- Page 162 and 163: 162Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 164 and 165: assignment on the U.S. Secretary of
- Page 166 and 167: las Operaciones de Paz se abren a u
- Page 168 and 169: ConclusiónA modo de conclusión, u
- Page 170 and 171: 170Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 172 and 173: offering insight into political ter
- Page 174 and 175: goods, and skilled labor must all b
- Page 176 and 177: country” like North Korea. To be
- Page 178 and 179: 178Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 180 and 181: views of women, in effect disabling
- Page 182 and 183: Marine Col. William T. Hewes’ arg
- Page 184 and 185:
19. Hughes, Melanie M. (2007) “Un
- Page 186 and 187:
MacEoin. Commonweal 14: 8-11.This i
- Page 188 and 189:
37. Sans Echaìniz, María. (1992)
- Page 190 and 191:
47. Woodward, Rachel, and Patricia
- Page 192 and 193:
elucidativos das dificuldades que e
- Page 194 and 195:
194Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 196 and 197:
of an integrated Canadian company i
- Page 198 and 199:
198Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 200 and 201:
stated it would rightfully infringe
- Page 202 and 203:
First, through an examination of de
- Page 204 and 205:
204Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 206 and 207:
impact on the reader, by acknowledg
- Page 208 and 209:
To the Editor:Kevin P. Newmeyer’s
- Page 210 and 211:
Whitney Hoft was a Center for Hemis
- Page 212 and 213:
The transformation of the role of w
- Page 214 and 215:
en Puerto Rico, esta soldada resume
- Page 216 and 217:
Deconstruyendo a Ollie: Cómo los c
- Page 218:
Center for Hemispheric Defense Stud