“As he frequently said with pride, Oliver North made things happen.” 32In his autobiography, Under Fire, An American Story, North says that the criminal proceedingsagainst him boiled down to “two fundamental issues. The first was that everything I had done wasknown about <strong>and</strong> approved by those I had worked for. … The other … was that I hadn’t actedwith criminal intent. In other words, I had no intention of breaking any laws. In fact, those of usinvolved in helping the [Nicaraguan] resistance went to great lengths to avoid violating the Bol<strong>and</strong>Amendment or any other statute.” 33North’s legal defense operated on theory that his superiors knew almost everything that he haddone, <strong>and</strong> that Reagan—who “did not always know what he knew” but was aware of everythingconcerning the sc<strong>and</strong>al—had sought to shield himself through plausible deniability. 34 Most observersagree that North’s “goals of freeing the hostages <strong>and</strong> helping the contras were also the president’sobjectives.” 35Although Reagan was apparently never briefed about the diversion of the Iran monies to theContras before the operation was about to implode, North’s advocacy of the idea met with approvalfrom his NSC boss, Poindexter, <strong>and</strong> CIA director William Casey, who “at times seemed to treatNorth … as a son.” 36 North reported that Casey greeted the proposal with enthusiasm, calling it“the ultimate irony, the ultimate covert operation.” 37 And contemporaries clearly remember Northregaling in what he thought was the president’s direction. For example, a CIA official who servedas a liaison between the Contra supply operation <strong>and</strong> the government of El Salvador recalled sittingin North’s office in 1986, as the television showed Congress debating renewing official aid to theNicaraguan insurgents. “Those people want me, but they can’t touch me,” North said, pointing to thetelevision, because he was in favor with “the old man.” 38In the North trial, Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh noted, the Marine’s defense “centeredon his claims that all of his actions were known to <strong>and</strong> approved by his superiors, that although heknew certain of his actions were wrong, they were justifiable in light of the need for covert action ina dangerous world, <strong>and</strong> that he never believed that any of his actions were unlawful.” For example,North admitted to helping the Contras while the Bol<strong>and</strong> Amendment was in effect, saying that in1984 he was instructed by CIA Director Casey <strong>and</strong> National <strong>Security</strong> Advisor McFarlane “veryclearly … that I would be the one to replace the CIA for each of these activities. … I was told notto tell other people, not to talk about it, keep my operational role very, very secret, that it shouldnot be something that others came to know about.” 39 In response to a question from the prosecutorduring the Congressional Iran-Contra hearings about whether the government kept secrets from theAmerican people, North responded: “By their very nature, covert operations, or special activitiesare a lie. There is great deceit-deception practiced in the conduct of covert operations. They are atessence, a lie.” 4032Hartle, op. cit.; North’s self-propagated image of derring-do, together with his cloak of cl<strong>and</strong>estinity, lent itself, ready made, in the vernacular pressto variants of accusations of a “Dr. Strangelove” kind, that North himself was a member in good st<strong>and</strong>ing of a pathological <strong>and</strong> lunatic fringe. Or asconservative essayist R. Emmett Tyrell, Jr., wrote, a member of one of “two distinct species of true believers at large in Washington,” the first, “aboutwhom all learned sociologists warn, to wit: the anticommunist military goon, the straight-arrow right-winger, the propounder of old-fashioned virtues.”Tyrrell, “Borne Aloft on Hot Air,” The Washington Post, July 21, 1987, p. A21. In fact, North did risk being stereotyped in the redoubtable fashion ofU.S. academia <strong>and</strong> the American Left, which cast anti-communism in its more extreme <strong>and</strong> disreputable form, stereotyping all as McCarthyites <strong>and</strong>militarists. In Not Without Honor, Powers noted that during the July 1987 congressional hearings, “Those alarmed by Reagan’s anti-communist rhetorichad been appalled by the spectacle of the bemedaled … North facing down congressmen with attacks on their patriotism ...” (p. ix)33North, op. cit., p. 390.34Oliver North, op. cit., p. 14.35Cannon, op. cit., p. 656.36Anderson, op. cit., p.398;37Taking the St<strong>and</strong>: The Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L.North, New York: Pocket Books, 1987, p. 195.38Fox Butterfield, “Colonel Recounts How North Ran Contra Operation,” The New York Times, May 28, 1987; see also North, Under Fire, p. 353.39Walsh Iran/Contra Report, Chapter 2: United States v. Oliver North, pp. 10, 12.40Quoted in Michael Lynch <strong>and</strong> David Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text <strong>and</strong> Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings, Durham, N.C.: DukeUniversity Press, 1996, p. 115.136<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11
Similarly, concerning the charge that he had lied to Congress, Walsh noted that Northcharacterized those actions “as part of a political dispute that had nothing to do with lawbreaking.” 41In his autobiography, North claimed that there was “enormous controversy as to the meaning <strong>and</strong>scope of the various Bol<strong>and</strong> Amendments … common sense tells me that if a Congress that wasknown to be deeply divided on this issue nevertheless voted for Bol<strong>and</strong> One 42 by a margin of 411 tozero, there’s no way on earth that this amendment could have been understood as forbidding all aidto the Contras.” 43Although comedians would later lampoon Reagan’s difficulty in recalling key aspects of theIran-Contra affaire by the question—“What did he know, <strong>and</strong> when did he forget it”—North alsofound members of Congress striking a disingenuous pose, one that could have similarly been framedas: “What did they know <strong>and</strong> when did they forget it.” Sometimes a matter of looking the other way,on other occasions legislators appeared to “play dumb”—to look stricken upon supposedly hearingabout controversial <strong>info</strong>rmation for the first time, while in truth, they or their staffs had known aboutit beforeh<strong>and</strong>. In the controversial case of the sowing of Nicaraguan harbors with loud but virtuallynon-lethal “firecracker mines,” North said, Congressional opponents roared their outrage at the“cl<strong>and</strong>estine” effort, even though Senate <strong>and</strong> House intelligence committees had been briefed aboutthe operation. “Not all the members of the intelligence committees knew all the facts,” North wroteof his own involvement in Central America, “but there weren’t many people in Washington with aninterest in the Nicaraguan situation who didn’t know, at least in general, that Oliver North was up tohis ears in aiding the Contras.” At the same time, North admitted that, he has misled members of theHouse Intelligence Committee when, in November 1986, he denied a role in supporting the Contras.“I look back on that meeting today knowing that what I did was wrong. I didn’t give straight answersto the questions that I was asked.” 44THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR YIELDED a unique look at conservative national securitypractice <strong>and</strong> responsibility. History, custom, laws, constitutional intent, <strong>and</strong> the intentions of theframers have long shaped <strong>and</strong> <strong>info</strong>rmed U.S. national security policies, within a framework ofconstitutionally m<strong>and</strong>ated checks <strong>and</strong> balances, <strong>and</strong> shared powers. “Analysts who speak of foreignpolicy as the product of the executive branch alone ignore the shifting balance of power built intothe American system by the Framers,” noted political scientist James M. Scott. “The document itselfis ambiguous on the division of their powers, so the precise role <strong>and</strong> responsibility of each branch isalso unclear, creating an invitation to struggle.” 45As the Cold War raged, however, there emerged in Washington a foreign policy bias for a nonelectedbureaucratic elite to control decision-making, in which a marked predisposition for ExecutiveBranch pre-eminence emerged. 46 At the core of this shift, <strong>and</strong> a necessary emphasis on secrecy, waswhat one observer called the “colossal bluff” involved in the policy of nuclear deterrence, in which,as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles admitted to Vice President Richard Nixon: “one cannotexplain everything to our own people, as it also explains things to the enemy.” 47In addition, the Iran-Contra affair represented one of the first times a sustained cl<strong>and</strong>estine war-41Walsh Iran/Contra Report, Chapter 2, op. cit, p. 12.42In the period 1982 <strong>and</strong> 1986, five separate Bol<strong>and</strong> Amendments, named for the chair of the House intelligence committee, passed the House ofRepresentatives.43North, Under Fire, p. 238.44North, Under Fire, pp. 235-236, 322, 370.45Scott, op. cit. p. 238.46See, for example, Harold Hongju Koh, The National <strong>Security</strong> Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair, New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1990.47Frank Ninkovitch, The Wilsonian Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, pp. 200, 306..<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> <strong>2010</strong> <strong>Fall</strong>-Winter Issue / Edicíón Otoño-Invierno <strong>2010</strong> / Edicão Outono-Inverno <strong>2010</strong> / Volume 11 137
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El espacio de las mujeres en las Fu
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La organización e institucionaliza
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ministerial para la equidad de gén
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BibliografíaBarrancos, Dora (2007)
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Anexo IPaísIncorporación Femenina
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Anexo IIMujeres militares sudameric
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Todo un conjunto de cualidades, cap
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500 y durante la Batalla de Sarand
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miembros de la soberanía de la Nac
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10 de octubre de ese año, la Compa
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algunos barcos de apoyo para alberg
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1.75 metros de altura y como requis
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y sicológica, no sólo en los ámb
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La segunda etapa se caracterizó po
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conductas que pudieran encuadrarse
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Género en el marco de las Operacio
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56Security and Defense Studies Revi
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De ese modo nos encontramos con mod
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BibliografíaCarreiras, H.: Gender
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Tras la aprobación de esta histór
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Una vez aprobada la Resolución 132
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para designar asesores de género e
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la construcción de la paz, la reco
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term even has meaning any longer wi
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MacEoin. Commonweal 14: 8-11.This i
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37. Sans Echaìniz, María. (1992)
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47. Woodward, Rachel, and Patricia
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Whitney Hoft was a Center for Hemis
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